Well-known Russian and Kazakh experts share their forecasts regarding the dynamics of the development of Russian-Kazakh relations, whom we asked to answer the following questions:

1. What issues, in your opinion, will dominate the agenda of bilateral Kazakh-Russian relations in 2018?

2. One of the key events in 2018 in Russia will be the presidential elections scheduled for March. What impact will they have on the internal political situation in Kazakhstan, on the bilateral relations of our countries?

3. According to the EEC, in January-October 2017, Kazakhstan and Russia managed to stop the negative trend of decreasing mutual trade and increase its indicators by 33%. In your opinion, will it be possible to continue this positive trend in 2018 and at the expense of which sectors?

4. In 2018, the membership of Kazakhstan in the Security Council will continue, in addition, new rounds of the Astana process on the Syrian peace settlement are expected. How, in your opinion, will cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan develop in security issues in 2018?

Eduard Poletaev, Head of the Public Foundation "World of Eurasia":

1 - 3. I am sure that the agenda of bilateral Kazakh-Russian cooperation will not undergo major changes, everything will be directed to its development along an evolutionary path.

In addition to bilateral cooperation, work will continue within the framework of multilateral interaction formats, primarily the Eurasian Economic Union. As you know, in 2018 Russia is chairing this organization, for sure, we should expect some significant initiatives and progress in this direction from it.

We should also expect a solution to the problem of “under-integration” of our economies: the Customs Code of the EAEU has just begun to work, which the member countries of the association could not agree on and accept for a long time. It is still necessary to “settle down” possible contradictions, difficulties and misunderstandings in this part - the work is moving “into the field”.

In bilateral relations, the main problem in the economy - the decline in mutual trade - has been resolved. Last year we managed to achieve some success in the growth of trade between our countries. There is great hope that this positive trend will continue. In addition, there are a number of agreements on joint investment projects, including in border areas. Russian businessmen invest an average of $1 billion annually in the economy of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is also an investor in the Russian economy, albeit on a smaller scale.

Let me remind you that about 70% of trade between our countries is in the border regions. Plus, Tatarstan is our most important trading partner. Among the promising joint projects, I would name a plant for the production of cars in Ust-Kamenogorsk. Cooperation with the Orenburg region is actively developing.

There are a number of problems in the fuel and energy complex, on which our economies are highly dependent. But it must be admitted that the trend towards expanding the range of goods in mutual trade has recently intensified - this is partly due to the activities of the EAEU, partly to the sanctions confrontation in which the Russian economy has become involved. Although the structure of exports in Russia has not changed significantly yet, nevertheless, mutual deliveries of manufacturing products between Kazakhstan and Russia have nevertheless increased. It is possible that next year we will see the continuation and growth of this trend. After all, the EAEU was created in many respects precisely in order to form a progressive structure of the economy and overcome the raw materials specialization of our countries in the international system of division of labor.

Due to the fact that Russia has changed the context of interaction with many of its traditional foreign economic partners, its partners in Eurasian integration have good chances to occupy niches in the Russian market.

I would like to note that in the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and the EAEU countries, more than 90% is accounted for by Russia. The volumes of trade with Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, not to mention Armenia are rather insignificant. Since there is a trend in Russia towards import substitution and reorientation towards export deliveries to Southeast Asia, Kazakhstan can play its own, albeit small, corresponding to the scale of the economy, role in these processes - for example, in the supply of food products to the Russian market, as well as the sale its transit potential.

Let me give you an example of such import substitution: recently, a Latvian journalist with great surprise discovered sprats of Shymkent production on the shelves of Russian stores. This is an illustrative example of how Kazakhstan managed to launch the production of goods that were not at all typical for our market and for our region. Sprats are, after all, to some extent a political commodity: Russia, as you know, lifted sanctions on their import for a number of Latvian and Estonian producers in December 2017. However, it is quite possible that Latvian and Estonian producers will find that this niche is already occupied by Kazakh entrepreneurs. Why not try to produce and supply to the Russian market a number of other products from the sanctions list using the same scheme?

Pharmaceuticals is another industry in which the EAEU countries are heavily dependent on Western technologies and raw materials. It is no coincidence that the single market for medicines was one of the very first to be created – let me remind you that it started working last year. And although this production area is not in a brilliant state in the EAEU countries, nevertheless, the prospects for cooperation here are very significant. There are even historical prerequisites for this: for example, at the beginning of the 20th century, medicines from Shymkent were exported outside Russian Empire.

2. Kazakhstan has already expressed its attitude to the presidential elections in the Russian Federation, supporting the current Russian leader. Kazakhstan does not need surprises and surprises in the Russian electoral cycle. In addition, our republic is interested in a strong and authoritative leader of a neighboring friendly state.

Our republic calmly and without stress went through a variety of election campaigns in the Russian Federation: when Boris Yeltsin left, and when Dmitry Medvedev was elected. This did not affect either the state of bilateral relations or the internal political situation in the republic. Although, of course, the population is interested in what is happening in the Russian Federation, the degree of predictability of the voting results is very high and therefore no surprises are expected from the elections.

Perhaps only technical points will be important. For example, the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Kazakhstan and Russia in the 21st century, signed in Yekaterinburg in 2013, expires in 2018. If the parties do not want to change anything, then it will simply be extended. Perhaps the parties will want to strengthen it, introduce new formats of interaction into it. Then it is quite possible that a new treaty will be signed.

Of course, Kazakhstan will carefully consider what new tasks the elected president of the Russian Federation will set for the country and, probably, based on this, will adjust its strategic development plans.

On the whole, Kazakhstan and the people of Kazakhstan should not expect serious changes from the elections in Russia.

4. With regard to cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia in the field of security, in my opinion, no significant problems are foreseen.

It is another matter that today we are witnessing how the Syrian crisis is mutating – new players have joined it, new points of conflict, new issues and new challenges have emerged. For example, recently there was news that Israel had launched strikes on Syrian territory. In connection with the protests, the situation in Iran, a country that is one of the guarantors of resolving the Syrian crisis, has become more complicated. All these changes will need to be taken into account when holding a new round of negotiations in Astana.

Kazakhstan has a significant bonus in 2018 to support initiatives in the field of security - access to the international microphone in the UN Security Council, at least during January, when it will chair the Council.

I note that Kazakhstan has taken the mission of its membership in the UN Security Council quite seriously. It is possible to assess the ambitions of Kazakhstan in different ways, which it realizes thanks to being in the Security Council, however, it is obvious that these ambitions were backed up by serious organizational work. The program of chairmanship of Kazakhstan was developed, seven priorities were formulated. A huge number of meetings have been held, resolutions and statements have been signed. The UN is a complex bureaucratic system. And membership in the Security Council is, first of all, a good practice for Kazakhstan. Kazakh modern diplomacy is only 25 years old, in this we are inferior to such countries as Ukraine and Belarus, which have been members of the organization since 1946, on a par with the Soviet Union, and in fact are the founding countries of the UN.

Although Kazakhstan is not the first post-Soviet republic to receive the status of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Ukraine and Lithuania were ahead of it, but it is the first in Central Asia. We represent the entire region. The experience is very good. Of course, it will be very difficult, because many countries have a request to reform the Security Council - this has been repeatedly stated by the leaders of various states and international organizations.

Kazakhstan has a significant advantage in the Security Council - it does not experience conflicts with any of its permanent members. I am sure that the opinion of our republic will be listened to and we will be able to implement much of what was planned.

Sergei Rekeda, Director of the Information and Analytical Center

1. Economy and security - these two areas will remain a priority in Russian-Kazakh relations in 2018. The first point is determined by the fact that the task of entering the trajectory of stable socio-economic development, corresponding to the modernization tasks facing both countries, remains relevant. In Kazakhstan, these tasks have already been formulated and made public; in Russia, most likely, they will be presented in 2018, but at the same time, they are unlikely to fundamentally differ from the Kazakh formulas.

The relevance of the second point - security - is dictated by the international context. In addition to the growing threats in the Afghan direction, the first week of 2018 has already been marked by a number of important events in both Syria and Iran, which indicate that international tension will not ease in the coming year.

2. Serious changes in the internal political situation in Kazakhstan in connection with the presidential elections in Russia, I think, should not be predicted. The main result of the elections for Kazakhstan should be the preservation of the previous level of allied relations and the continuation of the implementation of joint projects. During the pre-election period, one can expect informational "stuffing" that will be an attempt either to discredit the partnership between the two countries, or to link internal Kazakhstani problems with the "growth of Moscow's aggressiveness in the pre-election period." It is logical, of course, to assume that in the first half of the year, in connection with the elections, the attention of the Russian leadership to the internal situation will increase compared to foreign policy, but this will not seriously affect the dialogue between Moscow and Astana.

3. The growth in mutual trade noted by the Eurasian Commission is understandable and expected - for the time being, this is a period of recovery of the previous indicators, rather than a breakthrough, which should be expected only in 2018. It should be expected largely due to the increase in economic interaction between the regions of Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as account of high-tech industries. The problem is that mutual trade in traditional industries after the start of the work of the EAEU is the “cream” that, by and large, has already been practically skimmed off. Next, we need to move towards the growth of economic interaction through cooperation in new industries. Efforts in this direction can be observed from both sides.

4. In 2017, it was indeed possible to observe very effective cooperation between Moscow and Astana in the international arena and similar coordination of actions, I think, can be observed in 2018. The Western flank of foreign policy is not a priority for Russia now. More precisely, progress in this direction depends on the success of foreign policy in other areas - the near abroad, the Middle East, China, Southeast Asia. In these areas…

Urazgali Selteev, political scientist, leading expert of the Institute of World Economy and Politics under the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Elbasy:

1. Do not expect any special changes. The traditional format of strategic partnership will be preserved. The strengthening of trade and economic ties and cultural and humanitarian cooperation will continue.

This is quite natural, since Kazakhstan and Russia are one of the main sales markets for each other. It is important to take into account that the Russian Federation occupies a significant share in the total volume of imports of the Republic of Kazakhstan. This figure has risen to over 38% over the past five years.

The development of cross-border trade will continue. Interaction between regions has significant potential. There are growth points that are not fully utilized. This is evidenced by the annual forums of interregional cooperation.

Given that this is 2018, the year of Russia's presidency in the EAEU, the main focus will be on strengthening relations within the framework of Eurasian integration. With the entry into force of the new Customs Code, problematic issues related to the elimination of exemptions and restrictions in trade will be resolved.

At the same time, some synchronization of internal development agendas can be expected in the near future. We are talking about the fact that for Kazakhstan now the key direction is the digitalization of the economy and technological renewal. In Russia, these issues are likely to be raised more clearly in the election program of Vladimir Putin, and subsequently the government will focus on their implementation as part of a new reform plan. Accordingly, some joint projects may arise here.

2. Absolutely none. The result of the upcoming elections in Russia is predictable. Therefore, in Kazakhstan they are guided by the continuation of the established dialogue with their neighbor.

3. It is clear that the main factor in the decline in volumes in previous periods was the fall in oil and gas prices. Much depends on this, since energy resources occupy a significant share in the structure of trade - 20-30%. And forecasts for world prices for this year are the most controversial.

In general, I think there will be no fundamental changes in this area. In mutual trade, the same line of goods will remain. In the structure of Kazakh deliveries to the Russian Federation, sales of raw materials in the form of energy carriers, ores and metals, and agricultural products dominate. In turn, the main export items of Russian manufacturers to Kazakhstan are engineering products, foodstuffs and products of the chemical industry.

4. In the sphere of security, the vision of Kazakhstan and Russia coincides. In addition to the fact that Kazakhstan chairs the UN Security Council in January, in 2018 our country is also at the head of the CSTO.

Undoubtedly, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a strategic partner, will support Kazakhstan's initiatives in these international structures.

It is worth noting that the problems that Kazakhstan plans to raise in the UN Security Council will be updated through the CSTO. This concerns security in Central Asia, water resources, the situation in Afghanistan.

Recorded by Zhanar Tulindinova (Astana)

Prospects for economic and political cooperation

Conclusion

Literature

Economic and political cooperation

History and geography objectively predetermined the special nature of Russian-Kazakh relations. Both states are among the ten largest countries in the world in terms of area. The border between the two countries is over 6,000 km and is one of the longest in the world. Both Russia and Kazakhstan are pantries natural resources(oil, gas, metals). Finally, in Kazakhstan, even despite the significant outflow of the Russian-speaking population in the 90s of the last century, one of the largest Russian diasporas lives (up to a third of the population of the republic).

It is no coincidence that in 1992, when starting to develop a foreign policy strategy for the newly independent Kazakhstan state, President N. Nazarbayev noted the fact that "due to geographical, political, ethnic and other historical factors, relations with Russia are the most important issue for us." During the 1990s, it was Russian-Kazakhstani relations that were most intense and, in general, developed without any major upheavals. True, in the 1990s, the position of the Russian-speaking population remained an acute issue in Russian-Kazakh relations. Nevertheless, both countries are included in all integration formations created on the ruins of the USSR, and, for example, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was generally created on the initiative of N. Nazarbayev.

The desire to integrate with Russia meets the urgent needs of the young Kazakh republic. After all, Kazakhstan has no access to the sea and is away from the world's transport corridors. Possessing large reserves of oil and gas, the country does not have a developed pipeline system. In this regard, Russia, by virtue of its advantageous geographical location is of interest to the southern neighbor, since it can transport Kazakhstani energy resources at relatively low prices, which it does (about a third of the oil produced in Kazakhstan is exported through Russian territory).

The removal of all customs barriers and barriers to trade (one of the main conditions of the agreement on the Common Economic Space (CES)) is in the economic interests of the two countries. Russia traditionally buys Kazakh grain. There are about 300 large joint Russian-Kazakh enterprises operating in Kazakhstan. The number of small joint ventures exceeds 1,000. Bilateral trade last year amounted to approximately $5.5 billion. And this is not the limit. At the opening of the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan in January of this year. the presidents of both states promised to double it.

The economic systems of Russia and Kazakhstan are largely similar. The difference in GDP per capita is insignificant. The degree of depreciation of fixed industrial assets is almost the same. The raw materials sector plays a leading role in exports, which makes it highly dependent on the global oil and metal prices, as well as on the exchange rate of the national currency against the US dollar. So, it is the Russian-Kazakh economic integration that is now the most real and relevant.

Without Russian assistance, it is difficult for Kazakhstan to count on successfully solving problems in the field of security and strengthening its defense capability. In turn, Russia is interested in a reliable ally to ensure a stable situation in its "underbelly". These issues were at the center of attention during the recent visit to Astana by Secretary of the Russian Security Council V. Rushailo. After a number of amendments were made, a plan for cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of Russia and Kazakhstan for 2004 in the field of combating organized crime, illegal migration and drug trafficking was approved. Earlier, Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan M. Altynbaev agreed in Moscow that the republic would buy weapons at domestic Russian prices. At the beginning of February of this year. The Parliament of Kazakhstan ratified an agreement on the procedure for the mutual provision of military training grounds for live firing by formations and military units of the air defense forces of the two countries. In addition, Russia provides training for Kazakh military personnel free of charge. Currently, 786 cadets from Kazakhstan are studying in Russian military universities.

Those. Russia is also strengthening the intellectual potential of Kazakhstan. The level of Russian education, in spite of everything, has been and remains high. Thousands of Kazakh students and graduate students study at Russian universities. According to bilateral agreements, some of them are trained free of charge, which is not even in Kazakhstan. Diplomas from Moscow and St. Petersburg universities are quoted in the republic no lower than diplomas from Western ones. educational institutions where only a few can afford education.

Despite the reduction in the number of Russian printed publications in the republic during the years of independence, the readership tastes of its inhabitants have not changed much. According to Kazinform agency, more than four thousand Russian newspapers and magazines are read in Kazakhstan today. The top five most popular Russian print media are " healthy image life", "Arguments and Facts", "Behind the wheel", "Izvestia" and "Komsomolskaya Pravda". Russian TV programs, serials and talk shows, as well as Russian music radio stations are very popular in Kazakhstan.

At the same time, there are very significant obstacles on the way of integration, created mainly from outside. The rapprochement between Russia and Kazakhstan that has been outlined in the last two years causes displeasure of some political circles in the West, which are not interested in unification processes in the post-Soviet space. Political pressure on the Kazakhstani leadership has noticeably intensified.

At the end of 2001, during a meeting with N. Nazarbayev, US President George W. Bush harshly expressed impartial criticism of the situation in the republic. A year later, US State Department spokesman Phil Reeker and a group of American congressmen accused the President of Kazakhstan that all the leading posts in the country are occupied by his relatives, and the money from the sale of oil and gas allegedly ends up in the accounts of the Future Generations Fund controlled by him. At sessions of the European Parliament, the issue of human rights violations and the persecution of dissidents in the republic is periodically raised.

The opposition Kazakh electronic media, which exist on the money of overseas sponsors, are actively engaged in exposing the "criminal regime" and are in favor of an intensive rapprochement with the United States as a counterbalance to Russia.

However, such "attacks" are virtual and do not pose a great danger to the ruling elite. The key to the stability of the situation in Kazakhstan is an alliance with Russia. Moreover, the course towards integration with the northern neighbor is also supported by the population. According to the results of a poll among residents of Kazakhstan, conducted by the Komkon-2 Eurasia agency in April last year, 84% of respondents believe that the republic should unite with Russia. Only 3.6% of those polled were in favor of uniting with the United States, 2% were in favor of an alliance with China, and 0.4% - with Ukraine. 0.4% of respondents do not support the idea of ​​an alliance with any country at all. For the most part, Kazakhstanis do not want to unite with their neighbors - the states of Central Asia.

Thus, Kazakhstan's choice of Russia as the main strategic partner is predetermined by historical, geographical, political and economic prerequisites. The union of Russia and Kazakhstan - the two largest states in the post-Soviet space - meets the vital interests of both countries and their peoples. The success of further integration depends on the actions of the leadership of Russia and Kazakhstan.

Russian-Kazakh relations and internal politics of Kazakhstan

The key to the stable development of Kazakhstan, including in the political aspect, lies only in the sphere of the continuation of the Eurasian policy of President Nazarbayev on rapprochement with Russia, in the sphere of efforts that Nursultan Abishevich is undertaking to re-integrate the Eurasian space and to give the CIS a completely new meaning. It is the rapprochement between Kazakhstan and Russia that guarantees that the political situation in Kazakhstan, which is not so difficult, but gradually becoming somewhat tense, will be resolved harmoniously and positively.

It is very important here that Putin's personal relations with Nazarbayev are developing, perhaps, in an optimal way in comparison with other heads of the CIS countries. The problems that our countries are facing today belong to a common "family of challenges". Both Russia and Kazakhstan are building democracy, but this process is inscribed in a specific geographical, historical and cultural context. Democracy in both Russia and Kazakhstan is in the process of formation, therefore, from time to time there is a danger of distorting this process both in the direction of a relapse of authoritarian tendencies, and vice versa, in the direction of falling into chaos and uncontrollability. Both Putin and Nazarbayev, in a sense, have a similar situation: both Putin and Nazarbayev are popular democratic rulers in their home countries who are concerned about long-term stability in their countries as a priority, as well as rapprochement between all states of the post-Soviet space.

In other words, it is becoming more and more obvious that both Putin and Nazarbayev stand on Eurasian positions and follow a Eurasian course. This course cannot be pursued alone, as it is about rapprochement with each other. different countries, peoples, cultures, economies, social systems. These processes are proceeding differently with Kazakhstan, at different speeds, but their general rhythm and general character are very similar.

Marat Shibutov, Yuri Solozobov, Natalia Malyarchuk

This review state of the art Cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan is based on an analysis of various aspects: political, economic, military, media, cultural, etc. A list of the main problems in the relationship between the two countries and a list of those factors that improve these relationships is also given. The report is intended for political scientists, geographers, economists, country experts, specialists in international relations.

Introduction

Kazakhstan and Russia are territorially and economically the largest CIS countries. However, little attention has been paid to their bilateral cooperation in recent years in the scientific community: either rather narrow topics are being studied, or everything is at the mercy of the media and politicians. As a result, the description of Russian-Kazakh relations is dominated by uninformative official rhetoric or, as a rule, emotional newspaper articles and television programs prevail. The analysis of mutual relations in the public field is practically not carried out.

This report is an attempt to summarize the systematic research conducted by a group of authors over the past few years, to present the public with a fundamentally new and as complete picture of Russian-Kazakh relations as possible. Therefore, this report provides statistical indicators that are not usually found in open publications. When preparing, I had to use various sources of statistics - Kazakhstani, Russian, Eurasian Economic Commission, which, of course, somewhat complicates the picture, but it allows you to see the difference in methodology.

1. Legal basis of relationships

At present, the following legal framework exists between Kazakhstan and Russia for the main cooperation agreements:

1. Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on joint efforts in the protection of external borders of 1993 (Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on joint efforts in the protection of external borders of 1993. 12/30/1999).
2. Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the Kazakh-Russian state border of 2005 (Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the Kazakh-Russian state border. 12.01.2006).
3. Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on good-neighborliness and alliance in the 21st century, 2013 (Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on good-neighborliness and alliance in the 21st century. 22.12.2014).
4. Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation of 2015 (Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on military-technical cooperation. 03/16/2015).
5. Program of long-term economic cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Russian Federation (until 2020).

The volume of the legal framework covers all the main areas of interaction and is at the very high level- treaties are used, not agreements and other formats. In total, the contractual and legal basis of Kazakhstani-Russian relations proper is more than 240 documents (Bilateral agreements. Search by the word “Kazakhstan”. 11/28/2018). But, in addition to this, there are also agreements within the framework of the CIS, the CSTO, the EAEU, the CU and the CES, which also affect Kazakh-Russian relations.

2. How are bilateral relations perceived by each side?

The attitude of one country to another is best formulated in the basic official documents, or rather in the Foreign Policy Concepts.

The Kazakhstan Foreign Policy Concept (Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2014-2020. Approved by Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 21, 2014 No. 741) regarding relations with Russia reads as follows:

• The chapter “Country and Regional Priorities” notes that “The Republic of Kazakhstan will continue to strengthen relations with the Russian Federation in all areas of political, trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation on the basis of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Alliance in the 21st century”
• Also, in the chapter “Priorities and objectives of the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, the support of such integration associations as the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Caspian Five, the CSTO is separately noted.

In general, Kazakhstan considers cooperation with Russia, both directly and through various integration associations, as one of the most important priorities of its foreign policy.

The Russian Foreign Policy Concept (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin on February 12, 2013) is less focused on relations with Kazakhstan:

• In Chapter 4 "Regional Priorities", paragraph "d" reads "to actively support the process of Eurasian economic integration, implementing, together with Belarus and Kazakhstan, the task of transforming the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and forming the Eurasian Economic Union, to promote the involvement of other EurAsEC member states in this work take steps to further develop and improve the mechanisms and regulatory framework of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, to help strengthen the Eurasian Economic Commission as a single permanent regulatory body of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space "
• The same chapter declares support for the CIS, the CSTO and the "format of the Caspian five."

In general, the Russian document does not specifically focus on cooperation with Kazakhstan - the priorities are completely different. As stated in the same chapter, "e) build relations with Ukraine as a priority partner in the CIS, promote its involvement in deep integration processes." How it was possible to build relations with Ukraine and involve it in the Customs Union became clear in the year 2014 following the approval of the concept.

In fact, for Russia there are no separate priority relations with Kazakhstan - they exist only as part of relations with the CIS countries (excluding Ukraine), that is, their political weight is very small. As you can see, Ukraine is a much more priority for the Russian authorities as a partner, and so far nothing has changed in the text of the concept.

During the preparation of this report, Russian colleagues expressed the opinion that this Foreign Policy Concept is inoperative and unused in the preparation of foreign policy. If this opinion is correct, then the situation is even worse for the following reasons:

• The Russian foreign policy position is uncodified, unstructured, and exists only in the minds of a few foreign policy decision makers. Moreover, these people may not have official positions, which makes their politics even less predictable.
• Accordingly, Russia's foreign policy position is absolutely subjective and sometimes even spontaneous; it does not take into account either the real interests of Russia or the allied interests of the partner countries.
• In general about foreign policy Russia in relation to Kazakhstan, with the exception of official rhetoric at protocol events, can only be spoken of as a series of unrelated reflexive reactions to some actions of Kazakhstan, Russian lobbyists, external environment and even a number of random events.

Such unpredictability of Russia's foreign policy creates certain problems for Kazakhstan, which is forced to adapt to it and, accordingly, receive foreign and domestic political problems because of Moscow's sudden decisions.

2.1. Methodology for studying Turkestan as a region and Kazakhstan in particular

Political analysis and regional studies in the study of Kazakhstan today have a significant methodological defect (Solozobov Yu., Shibutov M. Conflicts and risks in Central Asia: a new look. 05/17/2016). The research constantly focuses on risk analysis and the associated negative scenarios for the development of the situation in the countries studied. It is clear that the apocalyptic scenario sells well to the media and the authorities, but it explains little. Regarding Kazakhstan and the region in general, negative forecasts have been broadcast since 1991, but none of them has completely come true.

The dominant concept presents Kazakhstan and Central Asia as five "stans", identical in their post-Soviet and Asian squalor. Existing media and political myths depict them as unpromising, economically underdeveloped, unstable and totalitarian. The main reason for such a superficial analysis is not even a lack of competence or information, which exists only in relation to Turkmenistan. Rather, this is a template - the traditional desire to consider the countries of the region as a platform for the "Great Game", as well as the experience of studying the post-colonial countries of Africa and Asia, where indeed all possible alarmist forecasts used to come true.

The region is usually presented as an object where certain non-regional forces (Russia, the USA, the EU, China, Turkey, etc.) carry out their policies. Accordingly, few of the researchers consider the internal dynamics of the development of the countries of Turkestan. Or they just don't know much about it.

Usually, the main factors of destabilization of the countries of the region, which are mentioned by experts, are as follows:

1. Political

• Lack of continuity of power
• Permanent clash of clans
• Chinese expansion
• Smoldering separatism in a number of countries
• Russian expansion
• Border disputes

2. Social

• Interethnic conflicts
• Interfaith conflicts
• Labor conflicts
• Strong property stratification and problems with social elevators

3. Economic

• Falling living standards and associated social discontent
• "Dutch disease" in economics
• Degradation of infrastructure built during the Soviet era

4. Safety

• Afghan Taliban
• Islamic radicals
• drug trafficking

5. Natural

• Climate change leading to desertification
• Water and energy disputes

A small note. It should be noted that among the natural factors, climate change and related droughts, changes in the regime and volumes of river flow, possible glacial mudflows are usually mentioned, but earthquakes not mentioned are much more dangerous for the region, and there have been precedents for this - over the past 100 years as a result of such cataclysms the cities of Alma-Ata, Tashkent and Ashgabat were almost completely destroyed. Mudflows caused by earthquakes are also dangerous, and for the flat regions of Kazakhstan - floods. We should not forget about man-made disasters, which can also have rather detrimental consequences for both the population and the economy.

A typical risk analysis concludes that the key response to most threats is parliamentary democracy, civil society and joining global institutions like the WTO.

However, Kyrgyzstan, which followed this path, once a showcase for the IMF and the WTO, is not showing any success at all. Today it is a typical failed state, where power changes as a result of coups. There the government does not control anything, the economy lives off labor migrants, and the regions are ruled by crime. In general, the situation in Kyrgyzstan is not much better than in the survivor civil war Tajikistan.

What then is the real secret of state success in the region? How can social stability be maintained and modernization carried out?

In our opinion, it is necessary to study not only the risks, but also those factors that contribute to the stabilization of the situation, which in turn helps to carry out gradual modernization and, in the case of Kazakhstan, evolutionary, but consistent liberalization. It is necessary to show the instruments and mechanisms for stabilizing the countries of the region by internal and external forces.

These factors are not so few, but usually they are not talked about much. We present the following list.

1.Political factors

• “Reading forecasts” - in general, it is strange to think that members of the governments of the countries of the region are not familiar with either forecasts or risk assessment. As a rule, they basically order these works, and then make every possible effort to reduce the risks. Perhaps the representatives of the region's elites are not smart enough and cultured, but they know how to hold power very well. For example, Uzbekistan built railway"Angren-Pap", which allows him not to use railway transit through the territory of Tajikistan and, thus, have a double transport corridor to the Ferghana Valley. The Angren-Pap road allows not only the transfer of household goods, but also troops, regardless of the season. Thus, Uzbekistan reduced the main threat to its security - "destabilization of the Ferghana Valley" - at least twice. And there are many such actions to reduce risks in each country of the region.
• Tolerance. The region was originally extremely diverse in its ethnic and confessional composition. Its inhabitants constantly communicated with representatives of at least 5-7 peoples and representatives of several faiths. For example, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Persians, Indians, Russians, Arabs, Bukharan Jews, Ashkenazi Jews, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Armenians, Uighurs, etc. lived in Bukhara at the same time. and inability to build relationships with other ethnic or religious groups. In the 20th century alone, the region experienced at least five waves of migration, different in composition and purpose. Example: the state's conscious work with diasporas, the development of a new national policy. Creation of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan and the possibility of choosing from ethnic groups to the Parliament of Kazakhstan.
• Working on other people's mistakes. Lessons from the coups in Kyrgyzstan and work with diasporas and troubled separatist regions. Development of anti-crisis and strategic programs related to both single-industry towns and migration.
• Modernization. At least two major countries of the region out of five (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) have serious systemic programs of their own for the reindustrialization and modernization of society, which result in large industrial and infrastructure projects that make it possible to go beyond the economic matrix laid down by the USSR. In other countries of the region, this aspiration is less pronounced, but they are also trying to do something. Fortunately, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack the money for gigantic new dam projects in the mountains - which is good for the region's water balance. At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between the neoliberal modernization of Kazakhstan and the purely technocratic modernization of Uzbekistan.
• Chinese presence. Since China is vitally interested in the stability of the countries bordering the XUAR, it not only trades with them, but also implements large-scale economic projects on their territory. The Central Asia-China gas pipeline system not only delivers gas to China, but also provides gas to the southern regions of Kazakhstan. Such a thoughtful approach makes all the countries of the region cooperatively cooperate with each other. The same can be said about China's transport initiatives. All infrastructure projects with Chinese participation are under the diplomatic cover of China and its powerful intelligence agencies, which ensures additional stabilization of the situation in the region.
• Understanding by the elites of the need for compromise, as well as learning from their mistakes. This is especially true of mechanisms for coordinating intra-elite interests during various political crises, as well as in standard situations of conflict of business interests, during elections, etc. The basis for this was the nationalization of elites in each of the countries in the 90s. This sharply rallied the politicians of the countries of the region in relation to external forces and increased their desire to preserve the country and its sovereignty on their own. For this, public and non-public instruments of influence were created (media, power and propaganda machines, systems for working with NGOs and political parties).
• Development of programs for sustainable transit of power. It is now in full swing through collective informal bodies and an elite system of checks and balances. At the same time, there is no personalization of successors and there are no pre-announced "heirs and princes." On the other hand, there is not very noticeable, but constant work on building legal and political mechanisms for the formation of a stable mechanism for the transfer of power in the elites. So far, this is visible in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Somewhere this happens in the form of liberalization, the distribution of the balance of power, the development of strategic planning programs, somewhere - in the form of saturation of the elite with relatives, but nevertheless this work is being carried out. But it should be noted that even super-authoritarian Turkmenistan, which did not have such a mechanism, did not fall into a political crisis after the sudden death of Saparmurat Niyazov. The same example was demonstrated by Uzbekistan after the death of Islam Karimov. Kyrgyzstan seems to be an exception against this background, but we wrote about its specifics above.
• Joint work of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the media, these countries and their leadership are constantly presented as irreconcilable enemies, which has been a stereotype since Soviet times. In reality, there is constant cooperation in blocking and, to some extent, containing problematic policies on the part of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to prevent the destabilization of the entire region. It has already manifested itself more than once both in the case of the Kyrgyz coups and in the case of water and energy disputes.

2. Social factors

• Mahalla. One of the most powerful tools for grassroots self-organization and socio-economic assistance is mahalla, i.e. neighborhood organization. In the mahalla, neighbors help each other both with various ritual events (weddings, funerals, various religious events) and in ordinary Everyday life. This makes people's lives much easier. Mahalla is typical for the south of Kyrgyzstan, partly the south of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. In Uzbekistan, too, mahalla is given considerable importance, it is officially registered as the smallest administrative-territorial unit, and families of convicted terrorists are evicted from the mahalla as punishment.
• "Big Families". Most of the peoples of the region retain, to one degree or another, large families, where ties are maintained between several dozen and even hundreds of relatives. Thanks to this, relatives can help each other and thus maintain an acceptable standard of living.
• Common culture and linguistic unity. It manifests itself in two ways both in traditional folk culture and in the remnants of the Soviet heritage in the form of cultural practices and knowledge of the Russian language. The formal structure that supported this unity is the CIS. We believe that the CIS will need a radical renewal and transformation into something like the Francophonie or the British Commonwealth of Nations (with their famous passports) - so the CIS has the right to exist, but without unnecessary ambitions.
• The presence of numerous diasporas and irrident. Taking into account the centuries-old tolerance of the region, this leads to an unexpected moment for an external observer - it promotes cultural exchange, and also strengthens socio-economic ties, including with the outside world. The established institutions for the involvement of diasporas in the mechanisms of power and the encouragement of foreign economic activity in the designated areas of the economy make it possible to drastically reduce tension.

3. Economic factors

• Shadow economy. When talking about the economic indicators of the countries of the region and the socio-economic situation of the inhabitants, they always forget about this component. Meanwhile, even in the most liberal Kazakhstan it is at least 19-38%. In other countries of the region, this figure may be much higher. For example, Tajiks illegally mine gold, silver, turquoise, rubies, spinel in their mountains, which are then exported to the UAE for resale. This, of course, is not mass earnings, but it is necessary to take it into account when calculating the standard of living of the Pamirs. And there are a lot of such folk crafts from the micro to the macro level.
• Large-scale labor migration. With a constant population growth, labor migration reduces social costs, it also reduces the confrontation between the authorities and society - the most active and problematic part of it is outside the country most of the time. Migrants have already formed stable labor niches and grassroots mechanisms of mutual support in the Russian economy - an example, the Birge.ru website
• Single labor market of the Eurasian Economic Union. It has been operating since 2012, and since 2015 Kyrgyzstan has joined it. This change has had a significant impact on labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Russia - their number, unlike citizens of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, is not declining. Even with a sharp devaluation of the ruble, registration of Kyrgyz citizens according to official employment contracts with the social package turned out to be mutually beneficial.

4. Safety factors

• Unified Air Defense System of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia. The formation of a system of a common "closed sky" contributes to greater stability in Kazakhstan, as well as the security of Russia itself through the expansion of the radar zone, a single duty schedule for aircraft, etc. The opportunity to be protected from sudden air strikes became especially appreciated by the region's politicians after the "Arab Spring".
• Organization of the Collective Security Treaty. Today, the CSTO's lethargy is criticized by many, but the organization allows countries to share intelligence and buy weapons from Russia at a lower price, which increases stability and predictability in the region. In addition, the CSTO contributes to the interaction of headquarters and better understanding between the military organizations of the allied countries, and maintains a common command language.
• Real peacefulness and lack of expansion from Afghanistan. British, and then American and Russian propagandists created a fairy tale about invincible and warlike Afghans, although they have never organized invasions to the north over the past 2000 years, but rather, on the contrary, were under the rule of the states of Central Asia. Of course, terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan are dangerous, but this is not such a big problem.
• The fight against crime. In fact, everywhere except Kyrgyzstan, organized crime has been defeated in the fight against the state and the security forces. There is a separate situation in Tajikistan, but everything there is influenced by the economy destroyed after the war.
• A well-established scheme for combating Islamic extremism through counter-propaganda, powerful undercover work, and social isolation of terrorists' relatives. It is effective enough to keep the situation from getting out of control. In general, there is state support and regulation of the religious sphere, especially the Islamic Ummah, in order to maintain traditional religious forms without radicalism. Religious dialogue is also encouraged - for example, the Congress of World Religions in Kazakhstan.

The above factors lead to stability in the region for a long time: for example, there is a rather low level of social protest and crime (you can look at the statistics on intentional murders). There are few terrorists in the region - especially compared to neighboring Afghanistan and the Middle East. The political struggle takes place mainly within the legal framework, and the confrontation in society is not as great as is usually characteristic of the post-colonial countries of the Third World. All this taken together makes it possible to provide catch-up modernization and even move, as in the case of Kazakhstan, into a group of countries with an average income.

In fairness, it must be said that the stability of the region is largely ensured by the absence of a major conflict in this territory between world centers of power. But with a negative turn of events, not a single region of the world will survive, there should be no illusions. An example is Syria, where not only local and regional players clashed, but also global forces that wanted to change the map of the Middle East.

In principle, for a long time the region can be divided into three parts:

1. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - a direction towards gradual modernization and industrialization, evolutionary liberalization of the political system, there is a way out of the economic matrix laid down under the USSR.
2. Turkmenistan - the absence of political modernization, formal political neutrality, a powerful presence in the Chinese economy, the preservation of the raw material model of the economy.
3. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are in fact a failed state, in which the main hopes for the restoration of the country and improvement of the situation are associated with external actors (Russia and China)

Accordingly, it is impossible to talk about the fate of the region as a whole.

Attempts to consider the region as a whole, and even more so to attach other countries to it in geopolitical constructions, for example, Afghanistan, will be a big mistake. Therefore, the US plans to create a Greater Central Asia with the inclusion of Afghanistan there are not viable. It is understandable that Washington wants to implement this project in order to reduce the dependence of the countries of the region on China and Russia. But the internal contradictions between the countries of the region, and even more so the obvious foreignness of Afghanistan, will not allow this to be done.

As a result, we can come to the following conclusions:

1. Despite the partly common past in the Russian Empire and the USSR, each of the countries of the region chose its own path of development. At the same time, the differences between states are in many ways greater than with some of the neighbors that are not included in the region.
2. The typical scheme of threats, proposed for the countries of the region by external experts, was developed back in the 90s of the 20th century. And since then it has been uncritically repeated from one political science work to another. But more than twenty years have passed. And everything in the region has changed - society, states, political systems and so on. Accordingly, the time has come to modernize the point of view on the region, which, due to the inertia of thinking, is not happening yet.
3. To repel most of the threat factors in each of the countries of the region, there are well-established mechanisms to ensure stability with their own internal forces. This set of countermeasures makes it possible to neutralize, to one degree or another, the standard threats replicated in the media. Considering that, despite the gloomy predictions, the countries of the region, except for Kyrgyzstan, remain more or less prosperous, the forces of order turned out to be more powerful than the forces of entropy.
4. The information closeness of local regimes, the small number of books by local specialists, or simply the inability to properly present information leads to the flourishing of political mythology. Today, there is simply not enough information about the evolution of the countries of the region in the public domain, and this is the basis of ignorance and false judgments. It can be said that a "raiding political science" has been formed in relation to the region, that is, its study is discrete. Political studies are tied to individual bright events - elections, coups, catastrophes, and so on, which arouse media interest in the outside world. But there is still no permanent and systematic practice of research in the countries of the region.

Now a new stage of deep study of the region should be launched. We are approaching a milestone date when more than half of the population of the countries of the region will be people born after 1991. One can confidently say that the post-Soviet sovereign development prevails over all the remnants of the past (this, for example, can be seen from the different attitudes of the countries of the region towards the sacred date for Russia, May 9). What will be the future of the region, it is impossible to know without studying the present. This is what researchers need to find out, but already calmly and without relying on the myths of the past.

3. What does sociology say?

In measuring public opinion, it is always better to turn to professionals and their sociological data, and not rely on pathetic words about “brotherhood” and “great historical past” or on the analysis of media publications and social networks.

Below are collected in separate tables the sociological preferences of Kazakhstanis and Russians for 2012-2017 according to the EDB Integration Barometer (Eurasian Monitor. Research). We note in particular that this is a very accurate tool that allows you to make excellent predictions. For example, back in 2013, Ukraine showed third place after Georgia and Moldova in terms of hostility to Russia, that is, the beginnings of a future conflict within the “fraternal country” could already be seen if desired. If the rest of the countries hostility towards Russia falls within the range of up to 5%, then in Ukraine this level is 19%, that is, it is a very significant force in the political field.

3.1. The attitude of Kazakhstanis to Russia

The attitude of Kazakhs to Russia is very positive - no other country causes so much sympathy. For example, Belarus, which is in second place, is considered friendly by only 42%. It should be noted that neither the Ukrainian crisis, nor the confrontation between Russia and the West, nor the operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria had any effect on preferences.

Table 3.1.1. Assessment of Russia by citizens of Kazakhstan

	As a friendly country, %	As an unfriendly country,%

By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated February 7, 2018 No. 57, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Born in 1950 in Moscow.

Higher education: in 1973 he graduated from the Moscow state institute international relations. Speaks English and Chinese.

He has the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, awarded in September 2004.

In the diplomatic service - since 1975. He worked in various positions in the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and abroad. From 1999 to 2002 - Director of the Fourth Department of the CIS. From 2002 to 2004 - Russian Ambassador to Slovakia. From 2004 to 2008 - permanent representative Russia to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria. From 2008 to 2011 - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. From 2011 to 2018 - Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN office and other international organizations in Geneva, Switzerland, as well as Russia's permanent representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament and head of the Russian delegation to the UN Human Rights Council.

Awards - Order "For Merit to the Fatherland" IV degree, Order of Honor, Order of Friendship, Certificate of Honor of the President of the Russian Federation, thanks from the President of the Russian Federation

Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Russia Imangali Tasmagambetov is not a career diplomat, but a major one statesman. This is a political heavyweight who occupied the highest positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy of Kazakhstan. He is 62 years old.

Biography of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation Imangali Nurgalievich Tasmagambetov (Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Russian Federation. Biography of the Ambassador):

In 1979 he graduated from the Faculty of Natural Geography of the Ural Pedagogical Institute named after A.S. Pushkin with a degree in Geography and Biology.

He showed an active position in social and political life, working in responsible positions: First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of Kazakhstan (1989) and Chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Youth Affairs (1991).

Since 1993 - Assistant to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 1995 - Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 1997 - Deputy Prime Minister - Minister of Education and Culture of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 1997 - Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Head of the Organizational and Control Department of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 1998 - First Assistant to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 1999 - akim (governor) of Atyrau region;

Since December 2000 - Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 2002 - Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Since 2003 - State Secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

In 2004, he was appointed head of the presidential administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

From December 2004 to April 2008 - akim (mayor) of the city of Alma-Ata;

From April 2008 to October 2014 - akim (mayor) of the city of Astana;

On February 3, 2017, by decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Russian Federation.

Diplomatic rank - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Based on the biographies of the ambassadors, we can once again confirm the hypothesis of how the parties regard mutual relations:

• On the part of Kazakhstan, they usually send as an ambassador not a career diplomat, but one of the political heavyweights, who has direct access to the president and has great influence even outside the context of his position. The Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Russia usually has quite a lot of room for political maneuvering.
• From Russia to Kazakhstan, as well as to most CIS countries, they usually send a career diplomat of retirement or pre-retirement age, who acts strictly within the limits allotted to him. And they are rather narrow for Russian ambassadors - the main burden is borne by the central apparatus of the Foreign Ministry or other departments.

Dmitry Mazorenko,Vauthority

The recent visit of Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Serik Akhmetov to Moscow, it seemed, was one of the goals to relieve the tension that had arisen in Kazakh-Russian relations. However, immediately after it, it became known that Kazakhstan was considering the issue of conclusions from the lease of the city of Baikonur. And the question of tension in the relationship of "eternal friends" remained.

For the first time, observers pointed to a change in tone in Kazakh-Russian relations in September. Russian President Vladimir Putin "broke" the schedule of the cross-border cooperation forum in Pavlodar, arriving several hours late. Analysts saw this as a signal to the Kazakh side. The presidents of the two countries, however, made a standard set of statements about partnership and cooperation in Pavlodar.

On the day of the forum, the Kazakh media published an interview with Yerlan Karin, secretary of the ruling Nur Otan party, in which he categorically denied the possibility of creating a parliament of the Eurasian Union as a supranational body. A few days earlier, Karin and Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, Defense and Security Maulen Ashimbaev repeated this thesis during a conference in Moscow.

A brief new meeting between Nazarbayev and Putin in Moscow followed in mid-October. The parties agreed to develop a new treaty on good neighborliness and alliance in the 21st century.

However, already on October 12, Nazarbayev, being at the Kazakh-Turkish business forum in Istanbul, made a speech that caused a huge resonance in the media and the Internet, saying: “After the last Kazakh Khan was killed in 1861, we were a colony of the Russian kingdom , then Soviet Union. For 150 years, the Kazakhs almost lost their national traditions, customs, language, and religion. With the help of the Almighty, we declared our independence in 1991.” The Russian media in their publications classified this statement as anti-Russian, and a couple of days later the presidential press service stated that the speech was incorrectly translated.

After 10 years, during which only positive or neutral TV reports about Kazakhstan were on the air of Russian television, the Rossiya 24 TV channel allowed itself rather sharp criticism of the Kazakh parliament and the economic situation in the country in early November. The plot told that Kazakhstan has nothing to offer for the Customs Union and the country also has no purchasing power. On November 6, the reaction of the senators of Kazakhstan followed. They wondered why the nearest neighbor allowed himself to be unfriendly, asked to speak about himself only in a good way, and even offered to pay for it.

Already on November 9, the same TV channel Rossiya 24 aired an interview with the adviser to the President of Kazakhstan Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, during which he answered questions about the effectiveness of the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, about the second wave of privatization, about the normalization of the situation in Zhanaozen, about the struggle with terrorism and the previously mentioned speech of Nursultan Nazarbayev in Istanbul. In general, the tone of the interview was positive and indicated that the conflict was gradually fading away.

The visit of Prime Minister Serik Akhmetov to Moscow, which he made on November 12, should have said the same. Akhmetov discussed cooperation within the CU and the CES with Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, the parties noted that they were satisfied with the work done and the prospects for cooperation, and agreed on the need to intensify trade, economic and investment cooperation between the countries. Akhmetov emphasized that there can be no unsolvable and unresolved issues, since during the meetings of the heads of state and heads of government all these issues are resolved.

From Moscow, the prime minister of Kazakhstan went to the Kyzylorda region and visited Baikonur. A source of the Interfax-Kazakhstan agency said that the Kazakh side "insists on withdrawing the city from Russian lease." At present, Russia leases from Kazakhstan not only the cosmodrome, but also the city, and two administrations operate in it in parallel.

The news has not yet received an assessment from analysts, but it is clear that it is too early to talk about the end of the "cooling" in relations between the two countries.

The government asked politician and economist Petr Svoik and political scientist Adil Nurmakov to comment on the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia.

Petr Svoik, head of the Almaty Public Antimonopoly Commission, member of the Presidium of the National Social Democratic Party "Azat"

When we talk about the relations of these countries, it is necessary to single out the relations and interests of the Ak Orda and the Kremlin, and specifically Putin and Nazarbayev. The difference lies in the fact that the alliance of two presidents today has much more grounds than the economic and political alliance of states.

It is not worth writing off the conflict on the words uttered by Nazarbayev in Istanbul, their significance has been repeatedly exaggerated. It must be understood that Nazarbayev is pursuing a multi-vector policy, being the only person who represents Kazakhstan. And he has to in different audiences, on different languages and say different things in different contexts. In Istanbul, he said exactly what was required of him. And Russia's reaction indicates that Nazarbayev is under pressure.

In today's relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, no economic and political union is visible. Objectively, while it is not needed. The economy of Kazakhstan, basically, is determined by the export of raw materials, and Russia - only by the transit of these raw materials, and not by the consumer. What is important, Kazakhstan is a country that mostly buys what it does not produce itself. Therefore, the Russian manufacturer has the opportunity to supply goods to Kazakhstan. And therefore, Russia is interested in Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan is not interested in Russia, because it supplies little there.

In addition, we must not forget that our regime is ethnocratic. And according to the properties of this regime, Nazarbayev's demonstrative internationalism does not coincide with the Russophobic moods of most of the ruling elite. But this does not mean that Nazarbayev can ignore them.

Relations cannot be called conflict. For a number of reasons and positions, they have moved a little away from "eternal friendship", as the name of the well-known bilateral treaty says, but they are not in conflict.

Russia claims to restore its role as hegemon in the region, and if earlier its goals were either weak or pro-Western (or combining both characteristics) post-Soviet states, then Putin's third term shows a more straightforward and assertive approach to recreating "rallying around Great Rus'" ". This irritates not only the national patriots, but also the national elite itself, apparently not expecting that claims to the Kremlin's political dictates would follow so soon after the initiatives of economic integration.

The second reason is the ongoing "split personality" in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. We strive to have a good image as a democracy under construction in the West, but this desire is at odds with the nature of the political regime, which is still fundamentally rooted in the Soviet past - as in Russia. And each new manifestation of a multi-vector approach is painfully perceived in Russia. So, too, are Kazakhstan's regional integration initiatives, as over the past few years Moscow has regained control of almost every country south of our borders.

Ultimately, the foundation of relations between the two states was not shaken. And the misunderstanding with the Istanbul statements was inflated by journalists.

After the collapse of the USSR, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have become one of the most important components not only in the post-Soviet space, but also in the field of geopolitics. Diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan were established on October 22, 1992, and all this time Russian-Kazakh relations have been developing in the spirit of good neighborliness, alliance and strategic partnership.

On January 31, 2002, the official opening of the Russian embassy took place in the new capital of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Astana. In April 2002, the Russian consulate in Uralsk began to function. Since 2004, the Russian embassy has been operating in Astana (in Alma-Ata - the consular department of the embassy). There is a Consulate General of Kazakhstan in St. Petersburg and a Consulate of Kazakhstan in Astrakhan.

Kazakhstan was the first state of the CIS with which Russia signed on May 25, 1992 the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. According to the Treaty, the parties recognize the inviolability of the borders existing between them and agree to carry out equal and beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation. The treaty provides for the creation of a common military-strategic space, the joint use of military bases, training grounds and other military facilities.

Another fundamental bilateral document is the Declaration "On Eternal Friendship and Alliance Oriented in the 21st Century" signed in July 1998 during N. Nazarbayev's working visit to Moscow (neither Russia nor Kazakhstan has a similar agreement with any other country).

Over the past years, more than 270 agreements and agreements on cooperation have been signed between the two countries. Among them: Declaration on the expansion and deepening of Russian-Kazakh cooperation (1995), Agreement on the legal status of citizens of both republics (1995), Agreement on the simplified procedure for acquiring citizenship by them (1995), Agreement on the customs union (1995), Agreement on Russian participation in the development of the Caspian shelf and the gas field in Karachagalak (1995), the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the state border (2005) and others.

Cooperation is also actively promoted at the parliamentary level. On April 1, 2003, in Astana, Speaker of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation S. Mironov and Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan O. Abdykarimov signed a protocol on the development of cooperation.

Political contacts are maintained, primarily at the highest level:

In June 2000, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev made an official visit to the Russian Federation, following negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a joint statement was signed, as well as a Memorandum on the further development of cooperation on ensuring the functioning of the Baikonur complex.

On December 18-19, 2002, during the working visit of N. Nazarbayev to Russia, during a meeting with the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, the development of trade and economic relations between the two countries was discussed.

In February 2003, a working visit of the President of Kazakhstan to Russia took place, during which a meeting with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin took place, at which the state and prospects for the development of economic relations were discussed.

On January 9-10, 2004 the official visit of the President of the Russian Federation to Astana took place. At the talks between V.V. Putin and N.A. Nazarbayev, key issues of bilateral relations, interaction in integration structures, and cooperation in the international arena were considered.

On May 25-26, 2004 the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan DK Akhmetov was in Moscow on a working visit.

On January 12, 2005, a short one-day working visit of the President of the Russian Federation to Kazakhstan took place. The parties discussed issues of energy cooperation and border delimitation, as well as a number of international issues.

On January 17-18, 2005 the official visit of the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev to the Russian Federation took place. The presidents signed the "Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan on the state border".

In the presence of the presidents, intergovernmental agreements were signed on the creation of the Kazakh communications and broadcasting satellite Kazsat, as well as on the mutual protection of rights to the results of intellectual activity used and obtained in the course of bilateral military-technical cooperation.

On November 16, 2005, the State Duma of the Russian Federation ratified the Treaty on the Russian-Kazakh State Border, introduced by the President of the Russian Federation. The document is aimed at completing the international legal registration of the state border between the two countries and increasing the level of border security on the longest section of the state border of the Russian Federation, which is 7.5 thousand kilometers and passes through the territory of 11 constituent entities of the Federation.

Trade and economic cooperation.

In foreign economic relations Russia with the CIS countries Kazakhstan ranks third (after the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine). In the total trade turnover of the Russian Federation with the CIS countries, the share of the Republic of Kazakhstan is 15%. The share of the Russian Federation in the commodity exchange operations of the Republic of Kazakhstan is 24.7%.

The trade turnover between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation exceeded 8 billion dollars, reaching a record level over the past 10 years. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, expressed at a meeting with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev in May 2005, "according to the results of the current year, there is a chance to reach $10 billion," but in 2006 it already reached $6 billion in six months. As a result of the agreement signed in August 2006 on the joint transit of goods through the territory of Kazakhstan and Russian cargo through Kazakhstan to Central Asia, to China, the cargo turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia will increase by 30 percent.

In the structure of Russian exports to the Republic of Kazakhstan, the leading place is occupied by products of the fuel and energy complex and mechanical engineering, in imports from the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Republic of Armenia - raw materials, including energy carriers and ferrous metals, agricultural products.

Investment cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan is carried out, represented mainly by the activities in the republic of enterprises with the participation of Russian capital. In 2004, their number increased to 1.2 thousand.

At the level of the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, agreements on trade cooperation between the Kazakh side have been signed since the years. Moscow and St. Petersburg, Astrakhan, Sverdlovsk, Omsk and Chelyabinsk regions, the Republic of Tatarstan and a number of other Russian regions.

Interregional and border ties are supported. They account for up to 70% of foreign trade turnover. An impetus to the development of cross-border and interregional cooperation was given by the Forum of Border Regions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, held in Omsk in April 2003 with the participation of the presidents of the two countries.

Of the 27 constituent entities of the Russian Federation located along the border with the CIS states, 12 border on the Republic of Kazakhstan. This gives particular relevance to the expansion and deepening of cross-border cooperation between them. The most active trade and economic relations with the regions of the Republic of Kazakhstan are maintained by Moscow, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Orenburg, Tyumen, Astrakhan, Omsk, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Kurgan and Samara regions, as well as the Altai and Krasnoyarsk regions, the republics of Bashkortostan and Khakassia. These regions account for over 70% of the trade turnover between Russia and Kazakhstan, and cross-border cooperation - more than 60%.

Economic cooperation between the regions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan is carried out on the basis of cross-border economic schemes for the supply of Ekibastuz coal from the republic to the power plants of the Urals and Siberia with the sending of electricity in the opposite direction; mineral raw materials to mining metallurgy enterprises of the Southern Urals in exchange for their finished products; oil and gas condensate to Samara refineries, Orenburg region and Bashkiria for counter receipts of oil products and gas.
Cross-border cooperation issues are regulated by the Treaty and the Program on Economic Cooperation for 1998-2007. dated October 12, 1998, by the intergovernmental Agreement and the Program of cross-border cooperation between the regions of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan for 1999-2007. dated September 24, 1999

In February 2003, the presidents of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, as well as the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine, reached an agreement on the creation of a single economic space (CES) to accelerate economic growth in the Quartet countries. In September 2003, they also approved an agreement and a concept for the creation of the CES, according to which freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people should be ensured on the territory of the union.

In August 2005, the Russian-Kazakh joint venture KAMAZ-engineering was launched in Kazakhstan. The project to create "KAMAZ-Engineering" is one of the first large and most successful joint Russian-Kazakh projects in the field of automotive equipment production. The founders of "KAMAZ-Engineering" from the Kazakh side are the national company "Kazakhstan Engineering", from the Russian side - JSC "KAMAZ". The design capacity of the enterprise will be 2350 vehicles per year. Starting from 2006, the enterprise will begin work on organizing the production of dump trucks for KAMAZ vehicles and trailers, and starting from 2007, it is planned to organize the production of bus showrooms.

Military-technical cooperation.

After the collapse of the USSR, the largest military bases of Russia in the near abroad turned out to be on the territory of Kazakhstan. This is a powerful range complex, which is of paramount importance for the defense capability of Russia: nuclear test sites in Semipalatinsk, in Azgir, the Sary-Shagan test site / tests of strategic air and missile defense systems / and the Emba test site / military air defense systems /. In addition, on the territory of Kazakhstan there are so-called "battlefields" - areas where spent stages of missiles launched from the Kapustin Yar and Vladimirovka ranges /4th and 929th ranges/ fall. In the early 1990s, Kazakhstan declared all Soviet military installations to be its property. Russian-Kazakhstan negotiations on their use have begun.

On March 28, 1994, Russia and Kazakhstan signed the "Agreement on the Basic Principles and Conditions for the Use of the Baikonur Cosmodrome", according to which the complex was leased to the Russian Federation for a period of up to 20 years, with a subsequent prolongation for a period of 10 years and an annual rental cost of 115 million dollars ( On May 25, 2005, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation ratified an agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the development of cooperation in the effective use of Baikonur, which provides for an extension of its lease until 2050).
Since 1994, within the framework of the intergovernmental Treaty on military cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia dated March 28, 1994, more than 50 bilateral documents have been signed covering a wide range of issues of ensuring joint security. Among them are the Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Settlements in the Disposition of Nuclear Ordnance, the Agreement on Cooperation in the Process of Reducing Strategic Offensive Arms Located on the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Agreement on Compensation for Equipment and Armaments Removed to Russia from the Territory of Kazakhstan, the Agreement between Defense departments on joint planning of operational measures for the training of the Armed Forces of the two states, the Agreement on Guarantees for the Russian military serving in the Kazakh army under a contract, the Agreement on the status of Russian military formations temporarily located on the territory of Kazakhstan.

Since 1996, Russia and Kazakhstan have been on joint combat duty within the framework of the unified air defense system of the CIS. The parties regularly interact in terms of harmonizing defense doctrines, military-economic cooperation, as well as protecting the external borders of the CIS. Since January 2001, a bilateral commission on military-technical cooperation has been functioning.

In February 2000, the State Company "Rosvooruzheniye" signed a general agreement with the state enterprise "Kazspetsexport", which determined the main areas of military-technical cooperation, including the export of Russian military products to the Republic of Kazakhstan as a partial repayment of Russia's debt for the lease of the Baikonur Cosmodrome.

During the meetings of the Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev and V. Putin, in late 2002 and early 2003, an agreement was reached on the implementation of a project to create a new rocket space complex at Baikonur, and on December 22, 2004, an Agreement was signed on the creation at the Baikonur Cosmodrome space rocket complex "Baiterek". Completion of works on the construction of the complex is scheduled for 2007-2008.

During the official visit to Kazakhstan of the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on January 9-10, 2004, 11 documents were signed, including: an agreement on cooperation and interaction on border issues, an agreement on the development of cooperation on the effective use of the Baikonur complex, as well as on further development of cooperation on the issues of ensuring the functioning of this complex. An agreement was also signed on cooperation in the export of military products to third countries.

Kazakhstan and Russia are active participants in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, established in 2003 on the basis of a collective security treaty. According to the agreements reached, military-technical deliveries from Russia to Kazakhstan within the framework of the CSTO will be carried out at domestic Russian prices (the agreement on preferential terms of sale came into force on January 1, 2004).

A very important block of military-technical cooperation in Kazakhstan is the training of Kazakh officers in Russia. In 2002, the parties agreed that this training should be carried out according to uniform programs, on the basis of modern military doctrinal developments. In 2003, 254 cadets were sent from Kazakhstan to Russia to study at Russian military educational institutions. Kazakhstan attaches great importance to cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
On January 16, 2004, in Moscow, the Ministers of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, Mukhtar Altynbaev and Sergei Ivanov, respectively, signed an Agreement on joint planning for the use of troops (forces) in the interests of ensuring joint security. The document was prepared in development of the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of May 25, 1992 and the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992.

Cooperation in the field of culture.

The peak of cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in the field of culture was the holding in 2003 of the Year of Kazakhstan in Russia and in 2004 - the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan.

The main events within the framework of the Year of Kazakhstan in Russia.

On February 18, in Moscow, at the Bolshoi Theater, the grand opening of the Year of Kazakhstan in Russia took place. As part of the festive events on February 17-20, 2003, the Kremlin hosted the exhibitions "Golden Warrior: Treasures of the Saka burial mounds", the Week of Kazakhstani cinema, concerts of masters of arts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, etc. A gala concert of masters of arts of the Republic of Kazakhstan and a book exhibition "Recognized by the world of Kazakhstan" were held .
On March 14, at the Moscow State Linguistic University, the teaching of the Kazakh language began at the Faculty of Translation in the specialty "Linguistics and International Communication". In addition, the Center of the Kazakh Language and Culture was created on the basis of the university, designed to become the coordinator of interuniversity relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of student and teacher exchange and their joint scientific and educational activities.

On March 31, the opening of the representative office of the Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia (Roszarubezhtsentr) took place in Astana. In the field of activity of the representative office is a wide range of Russian-Kazakhstani and international cooperation in the humanitarian, scientific and business spheres. The beginning of the work of the representative office is the first stage in the creation of the Russian House of Science and Culture in the republic.

On June 30, the festival of arts "From Almaty with Love" opened in St. Petersburg, which was attended by Alibek Dnishev and Roza Rymbaeva, the folklore and ethnographic ensemble "Sazgen Sazy", the theater-studio "Samruk", the symphony orchestra of the Opera Theater named after. Abai and other artists. Also, an exhibition of the collection of the Russian avant-garde of the 1920s - 1930s began to work in the Russian Museum. from Almaty
From July 22 to August 1, the Academic Opera and Ballet Theater of Yekaterinburg hosted a tour of the Kazakh State Academic Opera and Ballet Theater. Abai. The fountain of Bakhchisarai, the operas La Traviata and Faust, the ballets Giselle and Swan Lake were shown on the stage.

On September 30, an international scientific-practical conference "Kazakhstan: History. Culture. Language" was opened in St. Petersburg, organized by the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the EurAsEC and St. Petersburg State University. During the forum, representatives of the national parliaments of the Eurasian Economic Community states, scientists, university professors, cultural figures of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation considered issues of interregional and cross-border cooperation, ensuring economic and information security.

The main events within the framework of the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan.

On April 5, at the invitation of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Kazakhstan and with the assistance of the Altyn Adam Foundation, Russian film director Yegor Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky visited Astana, showing his last (at that time) film "Antikiller-2" - the most successful commercial project of the last decade in the CIS.

On May 17-18, Pavlodar hosted the II Republican Festival of Student Youth of the Kazakh-Russian University (KRU), the program of which included a pop song and modern dance competition, a beauty contest, sports competitions, plenary and sectional sessions of a student scientific and theoretical conference, debates, performance of KVN teams.

On July 23, the historical and cultural ecological expedition "Zhaiyk-Ural" started in Orenburg, the participants of which - scientists, journalists, students and schoolchildren - sailed along the river in 16 days. The Ural is almost 400 km from the city of Uralsk. During the expedition, issues of environmental health were discussed.

September 10 in Astana in the Eurasian national university them. Lev Gumilyov hosted a republican meeting dedicated to summing up the results of the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan in the field of education. It was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Embassy in the republic, directors of republican educational institutions, representatives of public organizations.
In 2006, a monument to the outstanding Kazakh thinker Abai was unveiled in Moscow. The year 2006 was declared the year of Abay Kunanbaev in Russia. And in Kazakhstan it passes under the sign of Pushkin's poetry.

Organizations in which Russia and Kazakhstan cooperate

Russia and Kazakhstan cooperate within the framework of the CIS, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, in the process of forming the Common Economic Space.

The Russian-Kazakh Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation (IPC), founded in 1997, is in operation. Within the framework of the IGC, there are subcommittees on the Baikonur complex, cross-border cooperation, transport, investment and military-technical cooperation.