PHILOSOPHICAL DENIAL 1

(Experience of the philosophy of the new scientific spirit)

Foreword

Philosophical thought and scientific spirit

I

The use of philosophy in areas far removed from its spiritual origins is a subtle and often misleading operation. Being transferred from one soil to another, philosophical systems usually become sterile and easily deceived; they lose their inherent strength of spiritual connection, so tangible when we get to their roots with the scrupulous meticulousness of a historian, firmly convinced that we will not have to return to this twice. That is, one can definitely say that this or that philosophical system is suitable only for those goals that it sets for itself. Therefore, it would be a great mistake, committed against the philosophical spirit, to ignore such an inner goal that gives life, strength and clarity to the philosophical system. In particular, if we want to understand the problems of science, resorting to metaphysical reflection, and intend to obtain a certain mixture of philosophemes and theorems, then we will be faced with the need to apply, as it were, a complete and closed philosophy to open scientific thought, thereby risking dissatisfaction with everyone: scientists, philosophers, historians.

And this is understandable, because scientists consider metaphysical training useless; they claim to place their trust primarily in experiment if they work in the field of experimental sciences, or in the principles of rational evidence if they are mathematicians. For them, the hour of philosophy comes only after the end of the work; they perceive the philosophy of science as a kind of balance of the general results of scientific thought, as a set of important facts. Because science is never complete in their eyes, the philosophy of scientists is always more or less eclectic, always open, always unreliable.

Even if the positive results for some reason do not agree or agree weakly, this is justified. state scientific spirit as opposed to the unity that characterizes philosophical thought. Shortly speaking, for the scientist, the philosophy of science still appears as the realm of facts.

For their part, philosophers who are conscious of their ability to coordinate spiritual functions rely on this meditative ability itself, not caring much about the multiplicity and variety of facts. Philosophers may differ on the basis of such coordination, on the principles on which the pyramid of experiment is based. Some of them may, however, go quite far in the direction of empiricism, believing that normal objective experience is a sufficient basis for explaining subjective connection. But we will not be philosophers if we do not realize at some point the very coherence and unity of thinking, we do not formulate the conditions for the synthesis of knowledge. It is this unity, this connection and this synthesis that interests the philosopher. Science, on the other hand, appears to him in the form of a special set of ordered, good-quality knowledge. In other words, he only requires examples to confirm the harmonizing activity of the spirit and even believes that even without science, before any science, he is able to analyze this activity. Therefore, scientific examples are usually given and never developed. And if they are commented on, then they proceed from principles, as a rule, not scientific ones, turning to metaphor, analogy, generalization. Often, under the pen of a philosopher, a relativistic theory is thus transformed into relativism, a hypothesis into a simple assumption, an axiom into an initial truth. In other words, considering himself to be outside the scientific spirit, the philosopher either believes that the philosophy of science can be limited to principles science, some general questions, or, strictly limiting himself to the principles, he believes that the goal of the philosophy of science is the connection of the principles of science with the principles of pure thinking, which may not be interested in problems of effective explanation. For the philosopher, the philosophy of science never belongs only to the realm of facts.

Thus, the philosophy of science, as it were, tends to two extremes, to two poles of knowledge: for philosophers, it is the study of enough general principles, for scientists - the study of predominantly private results. It impoverishes itself as a result of these two opposite epistemological obstacles that limit all thought: general and immediate. It is evaluated now at the a priori level, now at the a posteriori level, without taking into account the changed epistemological fact that modern scientific thought constantly manifests itself between a priori and a posteriori, between experimental and rational values.

II

It seems that we did not yet have a philosophy of science that could show under what conditions - both subjective and objective - general principles lead to particular results, to random fluctuations, and in what conditions these latter again lead to generalizations that complement them. , - to dialectics, which develops new principles.

If it were possible to describe philosophically this double movement that animates scientific thought today, then we would first of all point out the fact of interchangeability, the alternation of a priori and a posteriori, that empiricism and rationalism are connected in scientific thinking by that truly strange and equally strong a bond that usually connects pleasure and pain. Indeed, here one succeeds by giving a foundation to the other: empiricism needs to be understood; rationalism is in being applied. Empiricism without clear, consistent, and deductive laws is unthinkable and cannot be taught; Rationalism without tangible evidence, in isolation from immediate reality, cannot fully convince. The meaning of an empirical law can be revealed by making it the basis of reasoning. But reasoning can also be legitimized by making it the basis of an experiment. Science, as the sum of proofs and experiments, the sum of rules and laws, the sum of facts and evidence, thus needs a “bipolar” philosophy. More precisely, it needs a dialectical development, since each concept is illuminated in this case from two different philosophical points of view.

That is, it would be wrong to see this as simply dualism. On the contrary, the epistemological polarity that we are talking about, in our opinion, testifies rather that each of the philosophical doctrines that we call empiricism and rationalism are effective in their complement to each other. One position completes another. To think scientifically means to occupy a kind of intermediate epistemological field between theory and practice, between mathematics and experience. To scientifically cognize the law of nature means to simultaneously comprehend it both as a phenomenon and as a noumenon.

At the same time, since in this introductory chapter we want to outline our philosophical position as clearly as possible, we must add that we nevertheless give preference to one of the indicated metaphysical trends, namely, that which goes from rationalism to experience. It is on this epistemological basis that we will attempt to characterize the philosophy of modern physics, or, more precisely, the advancement of mathematical physics.

This “applied” rationalism, a rationalism that has taken the lessons of reality to turn them into a program of realization, thus acquires, in our opinion, a new advantage. This seeking rationalism (unlike the traditional one) is characterized by the fact that it cannot be practically distorted; scientific activity guided by mathematical rationalism is far from agreement on principles. Implementation The rational program of the experiment determines the experimental reality without any trace of irrationality. We shall yet have the opportunity to show that an ordered phenomenon is richer than a natural phenomenon. In the meantime, it is enough for us that we have planted doubt in the mind of the reader about the popular idea of ​​the irrational nature of reality. Modern physical science is a rational construction: it eliminates irrationality from its materials of construction. Realizable the phenomenon must be protected from all manifestations of irrationality. Rationalism, which we defend, is opposed to irrationalism and the reality constructed on its basis. FROM points of view scientific rationalism, the use of scientific thought to analyze science does not represent defeat or

compromise. Rationalism wants to be applied. If it is applied badly, it changes. But at the same time, he does not abandon his principles, he dialectizes them. Ultimately, the philosophy of physical science is perhaps the only philosophy that is applied by questioning its principles. In short, she is the only open philosophy. Every other philosophy regards its principles as inviolable, its fundamental truths unchangeable and universal, and even takes pride in its closeness.

III

Therefore, can philosophy, which really strives to be adequate to the constantly developing scientific thought, be excluded from consideration of the impact scientific knowledge on the spiritual structure? That is, already at the very beginning of our reflections on the role of the philosophy of science, we are faced with a problem that, in our opinion, is poorly posed by both scientists and philosophers. This is the problem of the structure and evolution of the spirit. And here is the same opposition, for the scientist believes that one can start from a spirit devoid of structure and knowledge, while the philosopher most often relies on an allegedly already constituted spirit that has all the necessary categories for understanding the real.

For the scientist, knowledge arises from ignorance, just as light arises from darkness. He does not see that ignorance is a kind of fabric woven from positive, stable and interconnected errors. He does not realize that spiritual darkness has its own structure and that under these conditions any correctly set up objective experiment must always lead to the correction of some subjective error. But it is not so easy to get rid of all the errors one by one. They are interconnected. The scientific spirit cannot be formed otherwise than on the path of rejection of the unscientific. Quite often, the scientist trusts a fragmented pedagogy, while the scientific spirit should strive for a general subjective reform. Any real progress in the field of scientific thinking requires transformation. The progress of modern scientific thinking determines the transformation in the very principles of knowledge.

For the philosopher (who, by the nature of his activity, finds in himself the primary truths), the object, taken as a whole, easily confirms the general principles. Any kind of deviations, fluctuations, variations do not bother him. He either dismisses them as unnecessary details, or accumulates them in order to assure himself of the fundamental irrationality of the given. In both cases, he is always ready, when it comes to science, to develop a philosophy that is clear, quick, simple, but it nevertheless remains the philosophy of a philosopher. Truth alone is enough for him to part with doubts, ignorance, irrationalism: it is sufficient for the enlightenment of his soul. Its evidence sparkles in endless reflections. She is the only light. It has no varieties or variations. The spirit lives only by evidence. The identity of the spirit in the fact “I think” is so clear to the philosopher that the science of this clear consciousness immediately becomes the realization of a certain science, the foundation of his philosophy of knowledge. It is the confidence in the manifestation of the identity of the spirit in various fields of knowledge that leads the philosopher to the idea of ​​a stable fundamental and final method. How is it possible, in the face of such success, to raise the question of the need to change the spirit and set off in search of new knowledge? Methodologies that are so different, so flexible in different sciences, are noticed by a philosopher only when there is an initial method, a universal method, which should determine all knowledge, interpret all objects in a uniform way. In other words, a thesis similar to ours (interpretation of knowledge as a change of the spirit), allowing for variations that affect the unity and eternity of what is expressed in “I think”, should certainly confuse the philosopher.

And yet it is to this conclusion that we must come if we want to define the philosophy of scientific knowledge as open philosophy, as the consciousness of the spirit, which is formed by working with unknown material, which seeks in the real that which contradicts previous knowledge. We must first of all realize the fact that new experience denies old, without this (which is quite obvious) we cannot talk about a new experience. But this negation is not, at the same time, something final for the spirit, capable of dialectizing its principles, generating new evidence from itself, enriching the apparatus of analysis, without being tempted by the habitual natural skills of explanation with which it is so easy to explain everything.

In our book there will be many examples of such enrichment; but, without delaying the matter, to illustrate our point of view, we will give an example of this experimental transcendence from the realm of empiricism itself, the most dangerous for us. We believe that the underlined expression is quite correct for defining instrumental science as going beyond that which is limited to the observation of natural phenomena. There is a gap between sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge. So, we see the temperature on the scale of the thermometer, but usually do not feel it. Without theory, we would never know that what we see on the scale of the instrument and what we feel correspond to the same phenomenon. With our book, we will try first of all to answer the objection of the supporters of sensual the nature of scientific knowledge, which ultimately try to reduce any experimentation to reading instrument readings. In fact, the objectivity of verification in such a reading just indicates the objectivity of the verified thought. The realism of the mathematical function is immediately reinforced by the reality of the experimental curve.

If the reader has not followed our reasoning, according to which the instrument of analysis is considered as something outside our senses, then in the future we will have a whole series of arguments with the help of which we will concretely show that microphysics postulates its object outside the usual objects. . In any case, here we have a gap in objectification, and that is why we have reason to say that experience in the physical sciences is something beyond the ordinary, a kind of transcendence, that it is not closed in on itself. In this regard, rationalism, which provides this experience, must correlatively be open in relation to this empirical transcendence. Critical philosophy, the importance of which we emphasize, must be able to change precisely because of this openness. Simply put, since the scope of understanding and analysis must be softened and expanded, the psychology of the scientific spirit must be built on new foundations. Scientific culture must determine profound changes in thought.

IV

Since it is so difficult to delineate the field of the philosophy of science, we would like to make a number of additional reservations.

At the same time, we would ask philosophers for permission to use elements of philosophical analysis taken from the systems that gave rise to them. The philosophical power of the system is sometimes concentrated in some particular function. Therefore, is it worth scientific thought, which so needs philosophical guidance, to abandon this function? For example, is it really so unnatural to use such an excellent epistemological tool as Kant's category, and manifestation in this regard of interest in the organization of scientific thinking? If eclecticism in choosing ends unduly confuses all systems, then eclecticism of means is, I think, acceptable for a philosophy of science that seeks to consider all the tasks of scientific thought, to understand different types of theory, to measure the effectiveness of their application, and which, moreover, would like first of all to pay attention to the existence of various ways discoveries, no matter how risky they may be. I would like to persuade philosophers, therefore, to give up their pretensions to find some single and, moreover, rigidly fixed point of view in order to judge the entire field of such a vast and changeable science as physics. In order to characterize the philosophy of science, we will resort to a kind of philosophical pluralism, which alone is able to cope with such different elements of experience and theory, which are by no means at the same stage of philosophical maturity. We define philosophy of science as dispersed philosophy(une philosophie distribue), as a philosophy dispersed(une philosophie disperse) 2 . In turn, scientific thought will appear before us as a very subtle and effective method dispersion, suitable for the analysis of various philosophemes included in philosophical systems.

We will ask scientists for permission to forget for a while about the connections of science with its positive activity, with its striving for objectivity, in order to discover that subjective that remains in the most rigorous methods. We will begin by addressing them with what appear to be psychological questions, and gradually show that no psychology breaks with metaphysical postulates. The spirit can change metaphysics, but it cannot do without metaphysics. We would like to ask scientists: what do you think underlies your first steps in science, your first sketches, your mistakes? What makes you change your mind? Why are you so laconic when you talk about the psychological foundations of a certain new research? Share with us first of all your doubts, your contradictions, your obsessions, your unfounded beliefs, finally. We will make you realists. We will show that your philosophy, without halftones and without duality, without hierarchy, hardly corresponds to the diversity of your thoughts, the freedom of your hypotheses. Tell us what you don't think upon exit from the laboratory, and in those hours when, forgetting about Everyday life, you dive into scientific life. Present us not your evening empiricism, but your powerful morning rationalism, the a priori of your mathematical dreams, the audacity of your projects, your unspoken intuitions. I think if we continued this psychological survey of ours, then it would become almost obvious to us that the scientific spirit also manifests itself in the form of a real philosophical dispersion, because the root of any philosophical concept has its origin in thought. Miscellaneous problems scientific thought should receive different philosophical meanings. In particular, the balance of realism and rationalism will not be the same for all concepts. In our opinion, the tasks of the philosophy of science already arise at the level of the concept. Or I would say this: every hypothesis, every problem, every experience, every equation requires its own philosophy. That is, in this case we are talking about creating a philosophy of epistemological detail, about scientific differentiating philosophy, paired with integrating philosophy of philosophers. It is this differentiating philosophy that has to deal with the measurement of the formation of this or that thought.

In general terms, we see this formation as a natural transition or transformation of a realistic concept into a rational one. Such a transformation is never complete. No concept at the moment of its change is metaphysical.

Thus, only by reflecting philosophically on each concept, we can approach its exact definition, i.e., what this definition distinguishes, singles out, discards. Only in this case will the dialectical conditions of the scientific definition, which differ from the usual definition, become clearer for us, and we will understand (precisely through the analysis of the details of concepts) the essence of what we call philosophical negation.

V

This is our work plan.

In order to illustrate the previous remarks, which are still rather obscure, in the first chapter we will give a concrete example of that "dispersed philosophy" which alone, from our point of view, is capable of exploring the extreme complexity of modern scientific thought.

After the first two chapters, which will analyze the purely epistemological problem, we will consider efforts to disclosure scientific thought in three completely different areas.

First, at the level of one fundamental category, namely substance, we will acquaint the reader with an outline of a non-Kantian philosophy inspired by the ideas of Kant, but going beyond the framework of classical teaching. In doing so, we also turn to one philosophical concept, successfully used in Newtonian science, which, in our opinion, is necessary make it open to better navigate the chemical science of tomorrow. In this chapter, we will present appropriate arguments in defense of non-realism and non-materialism in order to deepen our understanding of realism and materialism. The chemical substance will be presented in this case as a simple object of the process of differentiation, and the real - as a moment of realized realization. Non-realism (which is, in essence, realism) and non-Kantianism (essentially, rationalism), considered in the context of the analysis of the concept of substance, will appear before us in the form of ordered (despite their opposition) and spiritually coordinated phenomena. We will show how between these two poles - classical realism and Kantianism - an intermediate, very active epistemological field is emerging, emphasizing that philosophical negation is precisely the expression of this reconciliation. Thus, the concept of substance, which is so contradictory, it would seem, if viewed from the one-sided position of realism or Kantianism, will enter the new teaching of non-substantialism in a more subtle way. Philosophical negation allows summing up at once all experience and all thoughts related to the definition of substance. After the category is open, we will see that it is able to combine all the nuances of modern chemical philosophy.

The second area where we will attempt to expand the philosophy of scientific thinking is related to perception. And here we will rely on precise examples, thanks to which it will become clear that natural perception is only one of the forms of perception and that freedom of synthesis is important for understanding the hierarchy of perceived connections. We will show the action of scientific thought in perspective working perception.

And finally, we will move on to the third area - logic. A special work could be devoted to this. But even a few references to scientific activity will suffice here to show that our ability to judge must be unfettered if we are to explore new ways of developing science. Any principles of orthodox reason can be dialectized and clarified with the help of a paradox.

After trying to expand the analysis into such diverse areas as category, perception, and logic, we will return in conclusion (not to be unfounded) to the principles of philosophical negation itself. We will constantly remind the reader that philosophical negation is not negativism, that it does not mean taking a nihilistic position in the face of nature. Against; it leads us to constructive activity. The striving of the spirit to work is the factor of evolution. Competently thinking about the real means taking into account the existing contradictions, because only in this way can one awaken and change thought. Dialectization of thinking is associated with scientific construction complex phenomena, with the resurrection to life of all the elements and variables of thought, which science (as well as everyday thinking) neglected in its first studies.

CHAPTER 1

Various metaphysical explications of one scientific concept

I

Before embarking on a philosophical consideration of the problem, we would like (for greater clarity) to turn to the analysis of one specific example. We are talking about a particular scientific concept, which, from our point of view, in terms of the general perspective of the philosophical approach, has the advantage that it can be consistently considered from the positions of animism, realism, positivism, rationalism, complex rationalism and dialectical rationalism. In what follows, we will define the last two terms more precisely using special examples; they will be combined for brevity in the concept of surrationalism, about which we have already written in general terms 3 . At the same time, we will show that the philosophical evolution of special scientific knowledge actually passes through all these stages in the order we have indicated.

Of course, not all scientific concepts have reached the same degree of maturity; many are still at the level of more or less naive realism; many are defined within a positivism that prides itself on its simplicity. Thus, considered in its particulars, the philosophy of the scientific spirit cannot be a homogeneous philosophy. If philosophical discussions about science continue to be vague, it is because the participants seem to want to answer all questions at once, even when everything is plunged into darkness. For example, they say that a scientist is a realist, and they list cases when he more realist. Or they say that a mathematician is a rationalist, proving this by the fact that he more Kantian.

However, how more, so already hardly able to convince us when it comes to philosophical truth. Thus, epistemologists say that the physicist is a rationalist, giving examples that indicate that he already a rationalist, since he deduces some experimental data based on known laws; others say that the sociologist is a positivist, referring to the fact that he already a positivist because he abstracts from values ​​in the name of facts. Philosophers who are prone to risky reasoning (of which the author of these lines can serve as an example) must also confess to this sin: after all, in order to justify their surrealist theories, they are sometimes forced to refer to a small number of examples capable of confirming that science in its recent , and therefore not quite confident manifestations already is dialectical... That is, the surrationalists themselves must admit that for the most part scientific thinking still remains at its original, from a philosophical point of view, stage of development; and they can become victims of crushing criticism. Everything refutes them: practical life, common sense, direct knowledge, industrial technology, science; even such a seemingly indisputable science as biology lacks rational pathos, although some of its problems could certainly get a faster solution if formal causality, underestimated and so easily refuted by realists, could be investigated in a new philosophical spirit .

In the face of so many facts presented by realists and positivists, the Surrationalist can easily feel overwhelmed. However, after showing a sense of humility, he himself can go on the offensive, considering that the plurality of philosophical interpretations of science is also a fact and that realist science should not raise metaphysical problems at all. The evolution of different epistemological approaches is another fact: the doctrine of energy completely changed its character at the beginning of our century. In short, whatever particular problem we take, the fact of epistemological evolution is clear and constant; the development of the particular sciences is moving in the direction of rational coherence. As soon as we learn about any two properties of an object, we immediately strive to connect them. The advancement of knowledge is always accompanied by an increase in the consistency of conclusions. The closer we are to the roots of realism, the less tangible is the influence of rational factors; as scientific thought progresses, an ever more noticeable increase in the role of theories is observed. From the point of view of science, only theories are able to assist in the discovery and study of the unknown properties of reality.

One can endlessly debate about moral progress, social progress, about progress in the field of poetry, etc. However, it is impossible, I think, to deny progress in the field of science, if we judge it on the basis of a hierarchy of knowledge (in their specifically intellectual aspect). It is progress in this sense that we make the axis of our philosophical research, and if, according to the abscissa of the graph of its deployment, philosophical systems are arranged in a certain constant order - with respect to any concept - in the order that goes from animism to surrationalism, through realism, positivism and simple rationalism, then we will have a certain right to speak about philosophical progress scientific concepts.

Let's dwell briefly on this concept. In pure philosophy, of course, this concept has little meaning. It would never occur to any philosopher to say that Leibniz is superior to Descartes or Kant-Plato. However, the meaning of the philosophical evolution of scientific concepts is so obvious that one can hardly doubt that it is scientific knowledge that organizes our thinking, that science organizes philosophy itself. It is scientific thought that sets the principle both for classifying philosophical systems and for studying the progress of reason.

II

But let us return to our promise and consider the philosophical maturation of scientific thought on the example of the scientific concept masses. We have already referred to this concept in our books The Inductive Significance of the Theory of Relativity and The Formation of the Scientific Spirit4 when characterizing the process active conceptualization, synchronous with the change in the definition of this concept. But we haven't had a chance to outline the perspective of conceptualization as a whole. As soon as the concept of mass, already mastered in the complex rationalism of the theory of relativity, finds an obvious and curious dialectic in Dirac's mechanics, it appears before our eyes in its entire philosophical perspective. Here are five levels of this concept, on which various (in the order of progressive development) concepts of scientific philosophy are based.

III

In its original form, the concept of mass is associated with a roughly quantitative and even, if you like, “gluttonous” assessment of reality. We evaluate mass with our eyes. For a hungry child, the best fruit is the largest, the one that visually corresponds to his desire, the one that is the substantial object of desire. The concept of mass concretizes the very desire to eat.

The first contradiction, as always, is the first knowledge. We acquire it from the contradiction of size and gravity. An empty shell is contrary to satisfying hunger. But out of this disappointment, knowledge is born, which the fabulist immediately turns into a kind of symbol of the experience acquired by “experienced people”. When something has been in our hands, we begin to understand that the biggest is not necessarily the most valuable. The intensity of the experience unexpectedly deepens our first impressions of quantity. As a result of this, the concept of mass immediately becomes voluminous. It becomes synonymous with wealth, depth, richness of content, concentration of goods. It becomes the subject of unexpected assessments, woven from a variety of animistic images. At this stage, the concept of mass acts as a concept-obstacle. It blocks knowledge, does not sum it up.

We may be reproached for having begun our exposition too far, for parodying scientific knowledge by speaking of those difficulties which by no means can stop the thinking mind. We will gladly leave this level of consideration, but on the condition, of course, that we stop basking in this primary fire and, consequently, renounce all metaphorical use of the concept of mass in those sciences where there is a danger of returning again to the original temptation. Is it not surprising, for example, that some psychologists speak of a supposedly clear concept of mass or load? Although they are well aware of how obscure this concept is. They themselves say that this is a simple analogy. But if so, then this obviously testifies to the animistic origin of the concept of mass. By resorting to it as supposedly clear, we support the concept-obstacle. And here is the proof: when a psychologist talks about mental overload, then undoubtedly he is talking about something clearly noticeable. Because it's funny to talk about small mass, about small mental load. Usually they don't say that. However, when examining an insensitive, inert, indifferent to everything patient, the psychiatrist most often rejects the concept of mental stress, imperceptibly parted with it, believing, apparently, that in this case it is not a matter of load. That this concept applies more to the big than to the small. A strange measure that is not suitable for what it is intended for!

From the point of view of dynamics, the animistic concept of mass is also just as vague as it is from the point of view of statics. For homo faber, mass is always massive. The massive is a tool for the manifestation of power, which means that its functions are not so easy to analyze. Accordingly, common sense neglects the mass when it comes to small, “insignificant” things. Summarizing, we can say that by mass is meant amount only when it is large enough. It is therefore not originally a concept suitable for universal application, as are the concepts formed by rationalist philosophy. If we develop these considerations in terms of the psychoanalysis of objective knowledge, by considering systematically the original ways of using the concept of mass, then we will better understand how the pre-scientific spirit created the concept of weightless bodies and why it so hastily rejected the universality of the law of gravity. Here we have an example of a kind of immature, inexperienced dialectic, which operates with things instead of working with axioms. That is why we want to take dialectical philosophy beyond the limits of rationalism in order to make rationalism itself more flexible. The use of dialectics at the level of realism is always vague and preliminary.

However one may take this metaphysical digression, I think we have shown quite clearly the fuzzy conceptual framework for dealing with the idea of ​​mass taken in its original form. The spirit that accepts this kind of concept has not yet reached the level of scientific culture. References to the fact that we are talking about analogy in no way reduce the danger of such a use of the concept. Animism can easily destroy the boundaries of definition and reopen the way into consciousness for evidence. There is a very curious symptom, which is usually not thought about, and that is the ease with which an animistic concept is perceived. Let's say just a few words are enough to explain what mental stress is. In our opinion, this is a bad sign. When it comes to theoretical knowledge of the real, i.e., knowledge that surpasses mere description (leaving aside also arithmetic and geometry), everything that is easy to teach is inaccurate. We will have the opportunity to return to this pedagogical paradox. For now, we would only like to demonstrate the complete incorrectness of the original concept of mass. In our opinion, the blurring of the meaning of any scientific concept can be overcome. To do this, before reaching any objective knowledge, one should subject the spirit to psychoanalysis, and not only in general, but also at the level of all particular concepts. Since a scientific concept is seldom subject to psychoanalysis from the point of view of its use, and since there is always a danger of substituting one definition for another, one should always (in relation to all scientific concepts) remember those meanings that have not yet been analyzed psychoanalytically. In the next chapter, we will return to the pluralism of meanings attached to the same concept. It is in this that we see the basis of the defense of scientific dispersed philosophy, to which this book is devoted.

IV

The second level at which we can study the concept of mass corresponds to a strictly empirical use of it; it is connected with attempts to define it strictly objectively. In this case, we are talking about scales, or rather, about the psychological perception of the mass after the appearance of scales, about faith in instrumental objectivity. Remember that for a long time the tool preceded the theory. Today the situation has changed, in truly active branches of science now the theory precedes the tool, so that the physical tool is a realized, concretized and essentially rational theory. However, with regard to the earlier conceptualization of mass, it is clear that the scales were used even before the theory of the lever was created. The concept of mass, without much thought, then seemed to be a direct replacement for the original experience, absolutely clear, simple and infallible. Note, however, that even in those cases where this concept functions in "composition", it is not conceived in composition; this is the case in the case of the steelyard, when the weight is determined by a complex function of the weight and the arms of the lever; the one who usually uses the steelyard does not pay any attention to this composition. In other words, we are confronted here with virtually the same driving us with scales, or with the formation of simple skills for handling them, which is the case with using the shopping cart studied by Pierre Janet to characterize one of the primary forms of human intelligence. This driving, or this use of scales, has been around for centuries, passed down in all its simplicity as a basic experience. This is just one example of our usual attitude towards an inherently complex mechanism; they could be cited, naturally, innumerable; examples all the more striking in our time, when the most complex mechanism turns out to be simple and managed simply just because we don't think about rational connections empirical concepts almost certainly related.

Such a simple and positive concept, such a simple and positive handling of an instrument (even complex from a theoretical point of view) corresponds to empirical thinking, strong, clear, positive, immobile. We readily admit that such an experience is a sufficient basis for the justification of any theory. To weigh is to think, to think is to weigh. Philosophers endlessly repeat this aphorism of Lord Kelvin, who hoped not to go beyond the boundaries of "the physics of weights and the arithmetic of accounts." Empirical thought, connected with such undoubted experience, is not accidental so easily given the name of realistic thought.

Even in a highly developed science, this variety is preserved. realistic approach. Even in practice based entirely on theory, returns to realism are possible, given that the rationalist theorist always needs to be understood by the experimenter; therefore he is not afraid to appeal to the animistic origins of language; he is not embarrassed by simplifications, because in ordinary life he is really a realist. Rational values ​​are his late flower, they are ephemeral, rare, fragile, like all high values, Dupreel said. In the realm of the spirit, realism always encroaches on rationalism. But the epistemologist who studies the enzymatic formations of scientific thought must constantly extract from the discovery its dynamic principle. Let us dwell in this connection on rational aspect, which acquires the concept of mass.

V

The third aspect appears in all its purity at the end of the 17th century, when Newton created rational mechanics. That was the time conceptual unity. After the period when the concept was used as simple and absolute, the time has come for its use in connection with other concepts. The concept of mass was now defined in system of concepts and was no longer treated as a primary element of immediate and direct experience. Mass was defined by Newton as the quotient of force divided by acceleration. Force, acceleration, and mass were defined, respectively, in a clear rational relation, since this relation was perfectly amenable to analysis by means of the rational laws of arithmetic.

From a realistic point of view, these three concepts are separated from each other as much as possible. Combining them in one formula must seem at least an artificial procedure that could not be qualified as realistic in every respect. But why should we give the realist the right to such an eclecticism of realistic interpretations? Why don't we get him to give a definite answer to the following question: "What reality he sees in force, mass and acceleration?” If, as is his wont, he answers, "Everything is real," shall we adopt a method of discussion which, as a result of an obscure principle, obliterates all philosophical distinctions and eliminates all well-posed questions?

In our opinion, as soon as we establish the relationship of these three concepts, we immediately go beyond the boundaries of the fundamental principles of realism, because each of them can be defined by means of substitutes, followed by various realistic ideas.

In particular, the concept of mass, so obviously realistic in its original form, becomes in a sense more “subtle” when Newtonian mechanics moves from considering its static aspect to the dynamic one. Before Newton, mass was studied in its being, as the amount of matter. After Newton, it is studied in becoming phenomena as a factor of becoming. In this connection, along the way, the following remark suggests itself: the need to understand becoming just rationalizes the realism of being; rationalistic values ​​develop as they philosophical complexity. That is, already from the first steps, rationalism here, as it were, foreshadows the emergence of surrationalism. The mind is not simplified in any way. On the contrary, his ability to clarify and enrich concepts develops in the direction of increasing complexity, as we will show this more clearly when we move on to the next epistemological levels of the concept of mass.

In any case, in order to interpret in a realistic way the relationship of the three concepts (force, mass and acceleration), it is necessary to move from the realism of things to the realism of laws. That is, two levels of reality should be accepted. However, we will not allow the realist to use this convenient division. He will have to answer our endless objections, realizing more and more diverse types of laws. When the simplicity of realism that attracts us disappears and we can at least briefly look at it as a whole, at the level of all its concepts, we will find that with the help of its simple principles it is not able to cope with the hierarchy of levels. Why then not present the levels of the real and their hierarchy as a function of the very principles that divide and hierarchize, that is, as a function of rational principles?

This our methodological remark can be strengthened. It is important to remember that once the fundamental relationship of dynamics has been established, mechanics becomes truly rational in all its branches. Special mathematics enters into experience itself and rationalizes it; rational mechanics appears in all its apodictic value; it allows one to draw formal conclusions, it enters the realm of boundless abstraction, it finds its expression in the most diverse symbolic equations. Lagrange, Poisson, Hamilton introduced “mechanical forms” of an increasingly general nature, where mass is just a moment of rational construction. Rational mechanics occupies in relation to mechanical phenomena the same position as pure geometry in relation to phenomenological description. It quickly acquires all the functions of the Kantian a priori. Newton's rational mechanics is a scientific theory already imbued with the Kantian philosophical spirit. Kant's metaphysics is based on Newton's mechanics. But at the same time, Newtonian mechanics itself can be explained from rationalistic positions. It satisfies the spirit regardless of experimental tests. If experience refutes it, makes adjustments, then this means that there is a need to change the spiritual principles themselves. Extended realism cannot be satisfied with partial fixes. Whatever the mind corrects, reorganizes it. Let us show how the kaleidoscope of multiple philosophical constructions rebuilds the system of “natural light”.

VI

Newton's rationalism determines the development of the entire mathematical physics of the 19th century. As the elements that he considers as fundamental, at that time appeared: absolute space, absolute time, absolute conserved mass; in all constructions they remain simple and always recognizable elements. They form the basis of practical measurement systems, such as the CGS system, which is suitable for measuring anything. These elements correspond to what might be called conceptual atoms: there is no point in trying to analyze them. They are the a priori of metrical philosophy. Everything that is measured must and can be based on these metric foundations.

But now - with the advent of the theory of relativity - the era comes when rationalism, essentially fettered by Newtonian and Kantian concepts, opens like anew. Let's see how it goes opening in connection with the concept of mass, which interests us.

This discovery affects, so to speak, primarily inside concepts. Today we already know that the concept of mass has internal functional structure, while previously all the functions of this concept were in a certain sense external, since they were only found in compositions with other simple concepts. However, the concept of mass, which we would characterize as conceptual atom, turns out it can be analyzed. For the first time this atom can be decomposed; we arrive at the following metaphysical paradox: an element is also a complex phenomenon. That is, as a result, we come to the conclusion that the concept of mass only seems simple. With the advent of the theory of relativity, it becomes clear that mass, which was once considered, by definition, independent of speed, absolute in time and space, the real support of the system of absolute entities, is a complex function of speed. The mass of an object depends on the motion of that object. In vain we believed that it was possible to determine the rest mass, which, in fact, characterized the object. Absolute peace has no meaning, just as the concept absolute mass. It is impossible to do without a relativistic approach both in relation to mass and to the definitions of space-time characteristics.

This internal complexity of the concept of mass turns out to be connected with significant external difficulties; the mass does not behave the same in the case of tangential and in the case of normal acceleration. Therefore, it cannot be defined as simply as in Newtonian dynamics. Another conceptual complication: in relativistic physics, mass and energy are no longer heterogeneous.

In short, the simple concept gives way in this case to the complex concept, without ceasing at the same time to play the role of an element. Mass remains a basic concept, and this basic concept is complex. Only in some cases can a complex concept be simplified. It is simplified at the moment of use, if we ignore some of the subtleties of this process. Outside the problem of use and, therefore, at the level of a priori rational constructions, the number of internal functions of the concept multiplies. In other words, both in relation to a particular concept and in relation to an elementary concept, rationalism is multiplied, divided into segments, becomes pluralistic; depending on the degree of approximation, the element with which the mind works will always be more or less complex. Traditional rationalism is undergoing a profound upheaval in connection with this varied use of elementary concepts. Three related expressions appear in the new system of concepts: approximation, explication and rationalization, recalling in this sense code of laws, fixing the organization of private law. By multiplying, rationalism becomes conditional. And he is affected by relativity; organization is rational with respect to a set of concepts. There is no absolute mind. Rationalism is functional. He is versatile and mobile.

Let us return to our polemic with the Realist. Does he admit defeat? He will always be allowed to expand his definition of the real. Not so long ago, in the heat of polemics, over the realism of things and facts, he allowed the realism of laws. Now he is ready to accept a series of levels of this realism of laws: he distinguishes between the reality of a universal and simple law, and the reality of a more complex law; it relies on the realism of degrees of approximation, on the realism of orders of magnitude. As this hierarchy grows, it becomes clear that it is losing touch with the basic philosophical function of realism, for which given never associated with any preference. For the most obvious function of any given is precisely the rejection of all preferences.

Therefore, the realist who establishes the hierarchy of scientific reality, once again fails, because he regards his own mistakes as reality. In fact, science transforms the internal structure of basic concepts not under the influence of realism. There is only one way to advance science, and that is to criticize the science that already exists, or, in other words, to change its structure. The realist is hardly disposed to this, since it seems to him that, professing the philosophy of realism, he is always right, that there are grounds for everything in it. Realism is a philosophy that assimilates everything, or absorbs everything. Realism is not constituted for he always regards himself as constituted. A fortiori it never changes its constitution. It is a philosophy that never assumes any obligations, while rationalism always does, risking each new experience. But even in this case, success comes at the price of even greater risk. Any hierarchy that is established through concepts is the result of an effort of theoretical reorganization undertaken by scientific thought. The hierarchy of concepts appears as a progressive expansion of the sphere of rationality, or, more precisely, as an orderly formation of various spheres of rationality, each of these spheres being refined by additional functions. None of these extensions is the result of a realistic study of the phenomenon. All of them are noumenal. Initially, they appear as noumena aimed at finding their own phenomenon. Mind is thus an autonomous activity that seeks to complete itself.

VII

But modern rationalism is enriched not only by internal multiplication, by the complication of its basic concepts, it develops at the same time on the basis of a kind of external dialectic, which realism is not able to describe and, naturally, even less able to invent. The concept of mass can give us another excellent example in this sense. We will show in what new philosophical aspect the mass appears in Dirac's mechanics. Below we turn to a concrete example of what might be called an element of dialectical surrationism, which is the fifth level of dispersed philosophy.

Dirac's mechanics, as is well known, is part of an equally universal, just as all-encompassing concept, as is the phenomenon movements(propagation). If we immediately ask: “The movement of what?”, then this will perhaps manifest the need for the same naive and hasty realism that always wants to see the object as something that exists before phenomena. In the field of the mathematical organization of knowledge, one must first prepare the field of definition before defining; just as in laboratory practice one must dissect a phenomenon in order to reproduce it. Modern scientific thought begins with era, i.e., with the conclusion of reality in brackets. Therefore, in a somewhat paradoxical form (which will help us to clarify the essence of the matter), we could say that Dirac mechanics first investigates the movement of "brackets" in configuration space. This mode of movement then determines what moves. Thus, the Dirac mechanics at first turns out to be derealized. And only then (we will see this later), at the end of its development, will it find its realization, or, more precisely, its realizations.

Dirac starts with pluralization equations of motion. As soon as we stop assuming that it is moving an object(which, if we follow the naive notions of realism, bears all its characteristics), we can introduce as many motion functions as there are moving objects. Pauli had already realized that, since the electron is apparently capable of having a double spin, at least two functions are needed to describe the motion of this double characteristic that produces the phenomena. Dirac took the pluralism of movement even further. He went to great lengths to ensure that nothing was lost from the functional properties of the mechanical elements in order to save the various variables from degenerating. Only in this case, you can do the calculations. Matrices dialectically generalize moving objects, giving each of them what is supposed to be, and accurately fixing their relative position. Instead of a kind of mathematical melodies, accompanying the once skillful work of physics, in this case the entire harmony movements are mathematically recorded in the score. Quite right: in Dirac's mechanics, a mathematician, in the strict sense of the word, must, as it were, conduct a quartet in order to control the four functions associated with any movement.

Since in a philosophical book we have to confine ourselves to a vague image of the "idealism" of Dirac's mechanics, let us go straight to the results and deal only with the concept of mass.

Calculus gives us this concept, together with magnetic and electric moments, with backs, preserving to the end the fundamental syncretism so characteristic of complete rationalism. But here's a surprise: as a result of calculations, we get the concept of mass in a strange way dialectized. We only needed one mass, and the calculation gives us two, two masses for one object 5 . One of these masses summarizes everything that was known about mass in four previous philosophies: naive realism, pure empiricism, Newtonian rationalism, and advanced Einsteinian rationalism. But the other mass, the dialectical continuation of the first, is negative weight. This is a completely unassimilable concept for the four previous philosophies. Consequently, one half of Dirac's mechanics rediscovers and continues classical mechanics and relativistic mechanics, while the other part diverges from them with respect to the basic concept; she offers something different; it gives rise to an external dialectic that would never have been discovered by reflecting on the essence of the concept of mass, carefully studying the Newtonian and relativistic concept of mass.

What should be the reaction of the new scientific spirit in the face of this concept? How would a scientist, such as a 19th-century physicist, deal with this phenomenon?

We do not doubt his reaction. For a 19th-century scientist, the concept of negative mass would have been a monstrous concept. It would be, from the point of view of his theory, a sign of a fundamental error. And even if we use as a matter of course all the rights of the expression in the spirit of philosophy “as if”, here the limits of this freedom are immediately revealed; and "as if" philosophy can never interpret a negative quantity as if it were a mass.

That is why the dialectical philosophy “why not?”, which is characteristic of the new scientific spirit, enters the scene. Why wouldn't mass be negative? What is the essential theoretical change could justify negative mass? By what experiment can it be discovered? What is the characteristic that in its motion would manifest itself as a negative mass? In short, the new emerging theory, without hesitation, at the cost of abandoning a number of old provisions, tries to develop an essentially new concept without any roots in the usual reality.

So, implementation preferred over reality. And this priority, as it were, transfers reality to a lower level. The physicist knows reality only when he has realized it, when he becomes the master of the eternal return, and when he himself practices the eternal return of the mind. The realization ideal is very demanding: a theory that realizes partially must realize the whole thing. She can't be partially right. A theory is a mathematical truth that has not yet found its full realization. The scientist must seek this complete realization. We must force nature to go as far as our spirit goes.

VIII

In the course of our exposition, when we try, using the concept of mass as an example, to give an idea of ​​the dispersed philosophy corresponding to this concept, the reader may doubt. He may object that the concept of negative mass has not yet found experimental confirmation and therefore our example of dialectical rationalization hangs in the air. In any case, he can put such a question. It is surprising, however, that such a question arises at all. This possibility just points to the research potential of mathematical physics. Let us pay closer attention to the nature of this question: it is theoretically definite question concerning completely unfamiliar phenomenon. it certain unknown there is a "negative" indefinite irrational, to which realism all too often ascribes weight, function, reality. A question of this type is incompatible with realistic philosophy, with empirical philosophy, with positivist philosophy. Only open rationalism is able to understand this question. Only when it appears in the context of the mathematical construction that precedes it, does it become discovery.

Our position, naturally, would lose much of its force if we could not refer to other examples of the already carried out interpretation of some fundamental dialectic concept. Such is the case with negative energy. The concept of negative energy appears in Dirac's mechanics in exactly the same way as the concept of negative mass. With regard to this concept, we could hear the same criticisms that were made above. That is, that it would have seemed terrible in the nineteenth century; the very appearance of it in a theory would then be considered a gross mistake that threatened to destroy the very theoretical construction. However, Dirac would not accept such an objection to his system. On the contrary, since his equations of motion led to the concept of negative energy, Dirac set himself the task of finding a phenomenological interpretation of this concept. His witty interpretation seemed at first pure speculation. But the experimental discovery of the positive electron by Blackett and Occhialini gave unexpected confirmation of Dirac's views. Frankly speaking, it was by no means the concept of negative energy that forced the search for a positive electron. As it often happens, in this case we are dealing rather with a random combination of theoretical and experimental discoveries. Since the bed was ready, the new phenomenon fell into it as if by measure. There was a theoretical prediction that was just waiting to be confirmed. In a certain sense, one can say (following Dirac's construction) that the dialectic of the concept of energy has found here a double realization.

IX

But back to negative mass. What is the phenomenon that would correspond to the concept of negative mass, which appeared in Dirac's mechanics? Since we are not in a position to answer this question in the language of mathematics, we will answer it by asking at first the vague philosophical questions that come to our mind.

Is negative mass a property to be discovered in the process of dematerialization, as opposed to positive mass attributed to matter as a consequence of some materialization? In other words, are the processes of material creation and destruction connected - so new to the scientific spirit! - with a deep dialectic of basic concepts, such as positive and negative energy? Is there a connection between negative energy and negative mass?

By asking such vague, indefinite questions - in none of our previous works we have ever allowed ourselves such a thing - we are pursuing one goal. We would like the reader to feel that it is in the realm of dialectical surrationism that the scientific spirit indulges in dreams. It is here, and not elsewhere, that a kind of mystical dream is born, pushing us to risky ideas (which thinks and thinks riskily), which tries to illuminate thought with the help of thought itself and gains sudden intuition in the transcendental areas of scientific thinking. Ordinary dream operates at the other extreme, in the field of depth psychology, succumbing to temptations libido, personal temptations, vital evidence of realism, the joy of possession. We can only penetrate into the psychology of the scientific spirit by distinguishing between these two types of dreams. Jules Romain understood the reality of this distinction, putting it in the following short form: “I myself, in a sense, surrationist 6 . In our opinion, the turning to reality occurs later than Jules Romain believes; thinking teaches the dream, making it a function of its learning, much longer.

The mystical dream in its modern scientific manifestation, in our opinion, is primarily related to mathematics. It strives for greater mathematization, for the formation of more complex and numerous mathematical functions. When you follow the efforts of modern thought directed at comprehending the atom, you involuntarily begin to think that the atom really obliges us to do mathematics. First of all, mathematics... And for this, to prefer faux pas... In short, the poetic art of physics is created with the help of numbers, groups, spins, excluding monotonous distributions, repeating quanta, so that nothing that functions ever stops. What poet would glorify this pan-Pythagoreanism, this synthetic arithmetic, beginning with endowing everything that exists with its four quanta, a number of four digits, as if the simplest, poorest, most abstract of electrons had more than a thousand faces. Electrons are a beautiful thing in a helium or lithium atom, their registration number has four digits: a group of electrons is as complex as a regiment of foot soldiers ...

But let's stop. Alas! We needed an inspired poet, but we came across the image of a colonel counting soldiers in his regiment. The hierarchy of things is more complex than the hierarchy of people. The atom is a real mathematical society that has not yet revealed its secret to us; it is impossible to command this society with the help of military arithmetic.

CHAPTER 2

The concept of an epistemological profile

I

On the example of one concept, we were able to identify the continuity of philosophical teachings going from realism to surrationalism. One single concept was enough to disperse philosophy, to show that each of them was based on one aspect, illuminated one side of the concept. Having a certain system of arguments, we will now try to localize different points of view within the framework of scientific philosophy in order to prevent possible confusion of arguments.

Since a realist is an unshakably calm philosopher, let us resume our discussion by posing the following questions.

Is a scientist always a realist? Is he a realist when he assumes something; Is he a realist when he summarizes, schematizes, makes mistakes? Is he really a realist when he claims something?

Is there a different understanding of reality behind the different thoughts of the same person? Does realism discourage the use of metaphors? Does the metaphor have to do with reality? Does it retain on different levels the same vision of reality or unreality?

Doesn't this vision differ depending on concepts, depending on the evolution of concepts, depending on the theoretical concepts of the epoch?

By asking all these questions, we are sure to force the realist to introduce a hierarchy into his experience.

But we will not be satisfied with a general hierarchy. We have shown that in relation to such a concept of a special science as the concept of mass, the hierarchy of knowledge is distributed depending on the nature and method of its use. In view of this, I think the phrase “a scientist is a realist” loses its meaning. However, if we free the realist from something, then, apparently, we should “load” the rationalist. It is necessary to trace it a priori and return its true weight a posteriori. It is necessary to constantly show what remains of ordinary knowledge in scientific knowledge. It must also be proved that the a priori forms of space and time need the same type of experience. Nothing can justify once and for all absolute, unchanging, final rationalism.

In conclusion, let us recall the diversity of philosophical culture. In our opinion, only taking into account this circumstance, the psychology of the scientific spirit allows us to reveal what we would call epistemological profile various conceptualizations. It is by this mental profile that one can judge the psychological activity of different philosophies in the process of cognition. Let us explain our idea on the example of the concept of mass.

II

Thus, we are aware that the five philosophies we have considered (naive realism - pure and positivist empiricism - Newtonian or Kantian rationalism - complete rationalism - dialectical rationalism) orient in different directions the various uses of the concept of mass. We will attempt to show, in a very crude way, their relative importance, by arranging on the abscissa in succession philosophy, and on the ordinate that quantity by which (if it could be accurate) one can measure the frequency of the actual use of the concept, the relative importance of our beliefs. Remembering the rudeness of such measurement, we obtain the following scheme for our personal epistemological profile of the concept of mass.

We proceed from the fact that this scheme makes sense only if we do not break with the individual spirit that operates the concept, and with the specific level of its cultural assimilation. It is precisely this double concretization that is of interest to the psychology of the scientific spirit.

For a better understanding of what has been said, let us comment on our epistemological profile by making a brief digression into the area of ​​culture that is related to the concept of interest to us.

It can be seen from our scheme that it attaches special importance to the rationalistic concept of mass, i.e., to the concept formed within the framework of classical mathematical education, associated with a long practice of teaching elementary physics. In most cases, the concept of mass appears for us through the prism of classical rationalism. When we speak of the mass as a clear concept, we mean, first of all, a rational concept. But at the same time, if necessary, we can also focus on the meaning of this concept, given by relativistic or Dirac mechanics. However, both of these orientations, especially the Dirac one, are difficult to understand. If we are not on the alert, then the usual rational attitude will lead us astray. Ordinary rationalism is an obstacle to developed rationalism and, in particular, to dialectical rationalism. This, by the way, is the reason why even the most healthy philosophies, such as Newtonian and Kantian rationalism, can at some point become an obstacle to the progress of scientific culture.

Let us now consider the concept of mass in its empirical form, that is, at a different level of culture. As far as we are concerned, we attach rather great importance to it, in the sense in which it interests us.

Indeed, we have already mentioned the phenomenon of scales and past habits of handling them. It was in those distant times when we took our first steps in chemistry and weighed valuable letters in the post office with all the official zeal. The subtleties of the financial business require, among other things, ability to handle laboratory scales. Since we are all accustomed to counting, we are usually surprised when a minter weighs his coins instead of counting them. Note, however, that such confidence in laboratory scales and their treatment, which fosters an absolute respect for the concept of the masses, by no means makes the practice of their treatment clear. It is no coincidence that many students are surprised at the slowness of accurate measurements. In our opinion, one cannot look at everything through the empirical concept of mass, considering it to be automatically a clear concept.

Since each of us is subject to the temptations of realism, and even in relation to such a concept mastered in the process of education as a mass, we should subject ourselves to a more thorough psychoanalysis. Sometimes we too quickly trust all sorts of metaphors, as a result of which an indefinite amount becomes an exact mass. We dream of things that can give us strength, of weight that turns into wealth, and of many other mythical powers supposedly inherent in the depths of our being. Meanwhile, at the moment of developing clear ideas, we must part with all this. That is why our diagram represents the realm of realism.

III

To make our method clearer, let us apply it to a concept related to the concept of mass, i.e., to the concept of energy.

After careful analysis, we arrive at the following epistemological profile.

Without dwelling prematurely on predominantly logical questions, let us turn to the characterization of indeterminism. It is based on the idea of ​​unpredictable behavior. For example, we know nothing about the atom unless it is seen as colliding in the model used by the kinetic theory of gases. In particular, we know nothing about the time of atomic collisions; how can this elementary phenomenon be foreseen if it is "invisible", i.e., not amenable to exact description? The kinetic theory of gas, therefore, starts from an elementary indefinable or undefinable phenomenon. Of course, indefinability here is not a synonym for indeterminacy. But when a scientist argues in favor of the thesis that a phenomenon is indeterminate, he owes it to the method that causes this phenomenon to be considered indeterministic. He arrives at indeterminism from the fact of indeterminacy.

To apply some method of determination in relation to some phenomenon means to assume that this phenomenon is affected by other phenomena that determine it. In turn, if we assume that a certain phenomenon is not determined, this means thereby assuming that it is independent of other phenomena. That huge multitude, which are the phenomena of intermolecular collisions of a gas, is revealed as a kind of integral diffused phenomenon in which the elementary phenomena are completely independent of each other. It is with this that the emergence of probability theory on the scene is connected.

In its simplest form, this theory starts from the absolute independence of the elements. The existence of even the slightest dependence would confuse the world of probabilistic information and would require great effort to reveal the interaction between real dependence relationships and purely probabilistic laws.

This, in our opinion, is the conceptual basis for the emergence of the theory of probability in scientific thinking. As already mentioned, the psychology of probability has not yet matured; it is opposed by the whole psychology of action. Homo faber does not count with Homo aleator ; realism does not recognize speculation. The consciousness of some (even famous) physicists resists the perception of probabilistic ideas. In this regard, Henri Poincaré recalls such a curious fact from the biography of Lord Kelvin: “It is strange,” says Poincaré, “Lord Kelvin at the same time inclined towards these ideas and resisted them. He never understood the general meaning of the Maxwell-Boltzmann equation. He believed that this equation must have exceptions, and when he was shown that the exception he allegedly found was not such, he began to look for another. Lord Kelvin, who "understood" natural phenomena with the help of gyroscopic models, apparently believed that the laws of probability were irrational. Modern scientific thought is engaged in the development of these laws of chance, probabilistic connections between phenomena that exist without any relation to real connections. Moreover, it is pluralistic already in its basic assumptions. In this sense, we are, as it were, in the realm of working hypotheses and various statistical methods, naturally limited in their own way, but equally accepted by us. The principles of Bose-Einstein statistics, on the one hand, and the principles of Fermi statistics, on the other hand, contradict each other and are used in various branches of physics.

Despite its uncertain foundations, probabilistic phenomenology has already made significant progress in overcoming the existing qualitative division of knowledge. Thus, the concept of temperature is interpreted today from the standpoint of kinetics and, frankly, is more verbal than real. As Eugene Blok rightly remarked: “The principle of the equivalence of heat and work is materialized from the very beginning by the fact that we created heat”, But it is no less true that one quality is expressed through another and that even in the assumption of mechanics as the basis of the kinetic theory of gas, real explanatory power belongs to the combination of probabilities. Therefore, one must always take into account probabilistic experience. The probable takes place in the form of a positive moment. True, it is difficult to place it between the space of experience and the space of reason.

Of course, one should not think that probability coincides with ignorance, that it is based on ignorance of causes. Margenau subtly remarked on this: “There is a big difference between the expressions: “The electron is somewhere in space, but I don’t know where, and I can’t know” and “Each point is an equiprobable location of the electron.” Indeed, the last statement contains a clear confidence that if I make a large number of observations, then their results will be evenly distributed throughout space. Thus, the completely positive nature of probabilistic knowledge is born.

Further, one should not identify the probabilistic with the unreal. The experience of probability has its basis in the coefficients of our psychological expectation of more or less accurately calculated probabilities. Although this problem is vaguely posed, connecting two obscure, vague things, it is by no means unreal. Perhaps one should even speak of a causal connection in the realm of the probable. It is worth thinking about the probabilistic principle proposed by Bergman: "An event with a greater mathematical probability appears in nature with a correspondingly greater frequency." Time is aimed at realizing the probable, making the probability effective. There is a transition from law, in a sense static, calculated on the basis of the current possibility, to development in time. And this is not because probability is usually expressed as a measure of the chance that the phenomenon it predicts should occur. There is the same gulf between a priori probability and a posteriori probability as between a priori logical geometry and a posteriori geometric description of the real. The coincidence between the supposed probability and the measured probability is perhaps the most subtle and convincing argument in favor of the fact that nature is permeable to the mind. The way to rationalize the experience of probability is indeed through the correspondence between probability and frequency. It is no coincidence that Campbell attributes to the atom something like a real probable: "The a priori atom is more disposed to be in one of the more advantageous states than in one of the less advantageous." Therefore, lasting reality always ends by embodying the probable into being.

In short, be that as it may, from a metaphysical point of view, at least the following is clear: modern science teaches us to operate with real probabilistic forms, statistics, objects that have hierarchical qualities, that is, all that the constancy of which is not absolute. We have already talked about the pedagogical effect of the process of "combining" knowledge about solid and liquid bodies. In this case, over the layer of initial indeterminism, we could discover a topological determinism of a general order, which simultaneously accepts both fluctuations and probabilities. Phenomena, taken at the level of non-determinism of elements, can, however, be connected by probability, which gives them the form of integrity. It is to these forms of wholeness that causality is relevant.

Hans Reichenbach brilliantly showed in several pages that there is a connection between the idea of ​​cause and the idea of ​​probability. He writes that the most stringent laws require a probabilistic interpretation. “The conditions to be calculated are never actually realized; Thus, when analyzing the motion of a material point (for example, a projectile), we are not able to take into account all the acting factors. And if, nevertheless, we are capable of foresight, we owe this concept of probability, which allows us to formulate a law regarding those factors that are not considered in the calculation. Any application of causal laws to reality, Reichenbach believes, involves considerations of a probabilistic nature. And he proposes to replace the traditional formulation of causality with the following two:

if the phenomenon is described by a certain number of parameters, then the next state, also determined by a certain number of well-defined parameters, can be predicted with probability 2;

probability 2 approaches unity as the number of parameters taken into account increases.

If, therefore, it were possible to take into account all the parameters of some real experiment - if the word "everything" had a meaning in relation to a real experiment - then one could say that the derivative phenomenon is determined in all details, that it is, in essence, predetermined. By reasoning in this way, one approaches the limit, and this approach to the limit is done without the apprehension that is characteristic of deterministic philosophers. Mentally, they take into account all the parameters, the entire set of circumstances, without asking, however, the question of whether they are calculable. Or, in other words, can this "data" actually be given? In contrast, the scientist's actions are always oriented towards the first statement; he is interested in the most characteristic parameters in relation to which science makes its prediction. These parameters form, as it were, the axes of foresight. And the very fact that some elements are ignored leads to the fact that prediction is expressed here necessarily in a probabilistic form. Ultimately, experience tends to lean towards determinism, but to define the latter in any other way than in terms of convergent probability is to commit a gross error. As Reichenbach rightly remarks: “Often we forget about such a definition by means of a convergent probabilistic statement, due to which completely erroneous ideas about the concept of cause appear, such, in particular, that the concept of probability can be eliminated. These erroneous conclusions are similar to those that appear when the concept of a derivative is defined through the ratio of two infinitesimal quantities.

Reichenbach goes on to make the following extremely important observation. Nothing proves a priori, he says, that the probability of any type of phenomena must necessarily reduce to one. "We anticipate that causal laws may, in fact, necessarily be reduced to statistical laws." Continuing this comparison, we can say that statistical laws without reduction to causality are the same as continuous functions without a derivative. These statistical laws would be associated with the negation of Reichenbach's second postulate. These laws open the way for non-causal physics in the same sense in which the rejection of Euclid's postulate meant the birth of non-Euclidean geometry. Indeed, Heisenberg argued convincingly against Reichenbach's postulate. According to Heisenberg, non-deterministic physics is far from a crude and dogmatic rejection of classical determinism. Heisenberg's non-deterministic physics seems to absorb deterministic physics, clearly revealing the conditions and boundaries in which a phenomenon can be considered practically deterministic.

Philosophy of Science. Reader Team of authors

GASTON BACHELARD. (1884-1962)

GASTON BACHELARD. (1884-1962)

G. Bashlyar (Bachelard)- French philosopher, methodologist of science. In his theoretical and methodological constructions, an entire era in the development of modern Western philosophy is refracted: the radical rethinking of classical ideals and schemes and his complete rejection of the cult of mysticism and irrationalism ultimately lead to a kind of rationalistic orientation, in which even a collision with "irrational" situations allows enriching the system rationalism, opens up new possibilities of rationalistic approach in modern philosophy. Bachelard's conceptual methodological position is by no means limited to relying on the latest natural science and its positive results, since a high culture of philosophical thinking is put at the forefront.

The ideological richness of the substantive characteristics of Bashlyar's epistemological experience is caused by his peculiar approach to the study of science: scientific activity is considered by him as a sociocultural phenomenon, understanding and rational comprehension of which is possible only when the phenomenon of science is immersed in social, psychological and historical contexts. Bachelard's epistemology is a "complex scientific discipline" that combines the philosophy and methodology of science, the history of science, its sociology and psychology, and the result of his logical and methodological reflections is the creation of a holistic image of science, including both rational (in the strict sense) parameters of scientific research, and sensual - his volitional characteristics.

I.L. Shabanova

Texts are cited from the following editions:

1. Bachelor G.new rationalism. M., 1987.

2. Bachelor G.Psychoanalysis of fire. Per. from fr. A.P. Kozyrev. M., 1993.

3. Bachelor G.Favorites. T. 1. Scientific rationalism. M.; SPb., 2000.

New scientific spirit

<...>for scientific philosophy there is neither absolute realism nor absolute rationalism, and therefore it is impossible for scientific thought, based on any one philosophical camp, to judge scientific thinking. Sooner or later, it is scientific thought that will become the main topic of philosophical discussions and will lead to the replacement of discursive metaphysics by directly visual ones. After all, it is clear, for example, that realism that has come into contact with scientific doubt will no longer remain the same realism. Just as rationalism, which has changed its a priori positions in connection with the expansion of geometry into new areas, cannot remain a more closed rationalism. In other words, we believe that it would be very useful to accept scientific philosophy as it is and to judge it without the prejudices and restrictions introduced by traditional philosophical terminology. Science does create philosophy. And philosophy also, therefore, must be able to adapt its language to convey modern thought in its dynamics and originality. But we must remember this strange duality of scientific thought, which requires both a realistic and a rationalistic language for its expression. It is this circumstance that prompts us to take as a starting point for reflection the very fact of this duality or metaphysical ambiguity of scientific evidence, which is based both on experience and on reason and is related to both reality and reason.

At the same time, it seems that it is not difficult to find an explanation for the dualistic basis of scientific philosophy, given that the philosophy of science is a philosophy, having application it is unable to preserve the purity and unity of speculative philosophy. After all, whatever the initial moment scientific activity, it assumes that two conditions are met: if there is an experiment, one should reflect; when you think, you should experiment.<...> (1, p. 29)

Since we are primarily interested in the philosophy of the natural, physical sciences, we should consider the realization of the rational in the field of physical experience. This realization, which corresponds to technical realism, seems to us one of the characteristic features of the modern scientific spirit, completely different in this respect from the scientific spirit of previous centuries and, in particular, very far from positivist agnosticism or pragmatist tolerance and, finally, having nothing to do with traditional philosophical realism. Rather, here we are talking about realism, as it were, of the second level, which is opposed to the usual understanding of reality, which is in conflict with the immediate; about realism realized by the mind, embodied in the experiment. Therefore, the reality corresponding to it cannot be attributed to the realm of the unknowable thing-in-itself. It has a special, noumenal wealth. While the thing-in-itself is obtained (as a noumenon) through the exclusion of phenomenal, appearing characteristics, it seems clear to us that reality in the scientific sense is created from a noumenal context designed to guide experimentation. A scientific experiment is, therefore, proven reason. That is, this new philosophical aspect of science prepares, as it were, the reproduction of the normative in experience: the necessity of experiment is comprehended by theory before observation, and the task of the physicist becomes the purification of certain phenomena in order to find the organic noumenon in a secondary way. Reasoning by construction, which Goblo discovered in mathematical thinking, also appears in mathematical and experimental physics. The whole doctrine of a working hypothesis seems to us doomed to a quick decline: insofar as such a hypothesis is intended for experimental verification, it must be considered as real as the experiment. It is being implemented. The time of incoherent and fleeting hypotheses is over, as is the time of isolated and curious experiments. From now on, a hypothesis is a synthesis. (1, p. 31)

<...>in our opinion, really new epistemological principles should be introduced into modern scientific philosophy. Such a principle will be, for example, the idea that complementary properties must necessarily be inherent in being; one must break with the tacit certainty that being necessarily means unity. Indeed, if being-in-itself is a principle that communicates to the spirit - just as a mathematical point enters into connection with space through a field of interactions - then it cannot act as a symbol of some kind of unity.

It is therefore necessary to lay the foundations for an ontology of the additional, dialectically less rigid than the metaphysics of the contradictory. (l.c.39)

In view of the foregoing, let us now consider the problem of scientific novelty in purely psychological terms. It is clear that the revolutionary movement of modern science must profoundly affect the structure of the spirit. The spirit has a changeable structure from the very moment when knowledge acquires history, for human history, with its passions, its prejudices, with all the immediate impulses of its movement, can be an eternal repetition from the beginning. But there are thoughts that are not repeated from the beginning; these are thoughts that have been cleared, expanded, supplemented. They do not return to their limited, non-solid form. The scientific spirit in its essence is the correction of knowledge, the expansion of the scope of knowledge. He judges his historical past, condemning it. Its structure is the awareness of its historical mistakes. From a scientific point of view, the true is thought of as a historical process of liberation from a long series of errors; The experiment is thought of as a cleansing of common and initial errors. The whole intellectual life of science plays on this increment of knowledge on the border with the unknown, since the essence of reflection is to understand what was not understood. Non-Baconian, non-Euclidean, non-Cartesian thoughts are summed up by historical dialectics, which is the cleansing of errors, the expansion of the system, the addition of thought. (1, p. 151)

Philosophical negation

<...>can philosophy, which really strives to be adequate to the constantly developing scientific thought, avoid considering the impact of scientific knowledge on the spiritual structure? That is, already at the very beginning of our reflections on the role of the philosophy of science, we are faced with a problem that, in our opinion, is poorly posed by both scientists and philosophers. This is the problem of the structure and evolution of the spirit. And here is the same opposition, for the scientist believes that one can start from a spirit devoid of structure and knowledge, while the philosopher most often relies on an allegedly already constituted spirit that has all the necessary categories for understanding the real.

For the scientist, knowledge arises from ignorance, just as light arises from darkness. He does not see that ignorance is a kind of fabric woven from positive, stable and interconnected errors. He does not realize that spiritual darkness has its own structure and that under these conditions any correctly set up objective experiment should lead to the correction of some subjective error. But it is not so easy to get rid of all the errors one by one. They are interconnected. The scientific spirit cannot be formed otherwise than on the path of rejection of the unscientific. Quite often, the scientist trusts a fragmented pedagogy, while the scientific spirit should strive for a general subjective reform. Any real progress in the field of scientific thinking requires transformation. The progress of modern scientific thinking determines the transformation in the very principles of knowledge. (1, p. 164)

<...>Methodologies that are so different, so flexible in different sciences, are noticed by a philosopher only when there is an initial method, a universal method, which should determine all knowledge, interpret all objects in a uniform way. In other words, a thesis similar to ours (interpretation of knowledge as a change of the spirit), allowing for variations that affect the unity and eternity of what is expressed in "I think", should certainly confuse the philosopher.

And yet it is to this conclusion that we must come if we want to define the philosophy of scientific knowledge as open philosophy, as the consciousness of the spirit, which is formed by working with unknown material, which seeks in the real that which contradicts previous knowledge. We must first of all realize the fact that new experience denies old, without this (which is quite obvious) we cannot talk about a new experience. But this negation is not, at the same time, something final for the spirit, capable of dialectizing its principles, generating new evidence from itself, enriching the apparatus of analysis, without being tempted by the habitual natural skills of explanation with which it is so easy to explain everything. (1, pp. 165-166)

<...>In order to characterize the philosophy of science, we will resort to a kind of philosophical pluralism, which alone is able to cope with such different elements of experience and theory, which are by no means at the same stage of philosophical maturity. We define philosophy of science as dispersed philosophy(une philosophic distribute) like philosophy dispersed(une philosophical dispersee). In turn, scientific thought will appear before us as a very subtle and effective method of dispersion, suitable for the analysis of various philosophies included in philosophical systems. (1, p. 167)

<...>the scientific spirit also manifests itself in the form of a real philosophical dispersion, for the root of any philosophical conception has its origin in thought. Different problems of scientific thought should receive different philosophical meanings. In particular, the balance of realism and rationalism will not be the same for all concepts. In our opinion, the tasks of the philosophy of science already arise at the level of the concept. Or I would say this: every hypothesis, every problem, every experience, every equation requires its own philosophy. That is, speech in this case goes on the creation of a philosophy of epistemological detail, on the scientific differentiating philosophy, paired with integrating philosophy of philosophers. It is this differentiating philosophy that has to deal with the measurement of the formation of this or that thought. In general terms, we see this formation as a natural transition or transformation of a realistic concept into a rational one. Such a transformation is never complete. No concept at the moment of its change is metaphysical.

Thus, only by philosophical reflection on each concept, we can approach its precise definition, i.e. to the fact that this definition distinguishes, highlights, discards. Only in this case will the dialectical conditions of the scientific definition, different from the usual definition, become clearer for us, and we will understand (precisely through the analysis of the details of the concept) the essence of what we call philosophical negation. (1, pp. 168-169)

Psychoanalysis of fire

<...>Now another line - no longer of objectification, but of subjectivation - we would like to explore in order to give an example of a double perspective that can be applied to any problems posed by the knowledge of a particular, albeit well-defined, reality. If we were right about what really follows from subject and object, then we would have to distinguish more clearly between the pensive person and the thinker, without, however, hoping that this distinction will ever be carried through to the end. In any case, it is the pensive man that we want to study here, the pensive man in his dwelling, alone, when the fire gleams like the consciousness of loneliness. We will have many more cases to show the danger of first impressions, sympathetic affection, careless dreams for scientific knowledge. We can easily observe the observer in order to discover the principles of his interested observation, or rather this hypnotic observation, which is always the observation of fire. Finally, this state of mild hypnotism, the persistence of which we have noticed, is quite suitable for the beginning of a psychoanalytic examination.<...>(2, p. 9-10)

Indeed, we are talking about discovering the operation of unconscious values ​​at the very foundation of experimental and scientific knowledge. We need to show the opposite light, which constantly goes from objective and social knowledge to subjective and personal knowledge, and vice versa. It is necessary to show traces of childhood experience in scientific experiment. Only in this way will we have a basis for talking about unconscious scientific spirit, about the heterogeneous nature of some evidence, and to see how in the study of a particular phenomenon the beliefs formed in the most various fields. (2, p. 19)

<...>If in knowledge the sum of personal convictions exceeds the sum of knowledge that can be clearly formulated, taught, proved, then psychoanalysis is necessary. The psychology of the scientist must strive towards a distinctly normative psychology; the scientist must refuse personalization of one's own knowledge; in this regard, he must force himself socialize your beliefs.(2, p. 105)

Applied rationalism

The sciences of physics and chemistry, in their modern development, can be characterized epistemologically as areas of thought that break with ordinary knowledge in an obvious way. What contradicts the statement of this deep epistemological discontinuity is that the "scientific education", which is considered sufficient for a "general culture", endorsed only "dead" physics and chemistry, in the sense that Latin language is a "dead" language. There is nothing reprehensible in this, if only they want to focus on the fact that there is a living science. Emile Borel himself showed that classical mechanics, "dead" mechanics, remains a culture necessary for the study of modern mechanics (relativistic, quantum, wave). But the rudiments are no longer sufficient to define the fundamental philosophical characteristics of science. The philosopher must realize the new characteristics of the new science.

We believe, therefore, that as a result of modern scientific revolutions, one can speak, in the style of Comte's philosophy, about the fourth period the first three correspond to antiquity, the Middle Ages, the New Age. This fourth period: it is in the modern era that there is a gap between ordinary and scientific knowledge, between ordinary experience and scientific technology. For example, from the point of view of materialism, the beginning of the era of this fourth period could be associated with the moment when matter is determined by its electrical properties, or, more precisely, through its electronic properties. It is there that the characteristics take place, to which we paid special attention in our book on wave mechanics. In this paper, we want to try to present, first of all, the philosophical aspect of the new experimental methods. (3, p. 97)

What will be the human consequences, the social consequences of such an epistemological revolution? Here's another issue we haven't touched on yet. It's hard to even measure psychological scale these profound intellectual changes. A special kind of intellectuality, which develops in the form of a new scientific spirit, is localized in a very narrow, very closed space of a scientific city. But there is something more. Modern scientific thinking, even in the mind of the scientist himself, is separated from ordinary thought. In the end, the scientist turns out to be a man with two behaviors. And this bifurcation worries all philosophical discussions. It often goes unnoticed. And besides, he is opposed by lightweight philosophical declarations about the unity of the spirit, about spiritual identity. The scientists themselves, when they explain the spider to the profane, when they teach it to their students, try to link scientific knowledge and everyday knowledge into a continuous sequence. Only after the fact should it be stated that scientific culture determined the transformation of knowledge, the reform of the known being. Scientific history itself, when presented in a short preamble as the preparation of the new by the past, multiplies the evidence for continuity. However, in such an atmosphere of psychological uncertainty, it will always be difficult to identify the specific features of the new scientific spirit. The three states outlined by Auguste Comte demonstrate the features of continuity inherent in the spirit as a whole. The imposition of some fourth state - so incomplete, so specific, so weakly rooted - is thus almost incapable of affecting the value of the proof. But perhaps it is precisely in one of the cultural influences on the value of proof that the price of scientific thinking could be better defined. But no matter how it is with these common themes we will try to bring extremely simple examples to show the discontinuity of the process of routine evolution and the evolution of modern technology, built on a scientific basis. (3, p. 99)

Rational materialism

Studying modern scientific thinking and realizing all its relevance, timeliness, it is necessary to pay attention to its pronounced social character. Scientists unite in a community (“a city of scientists”) not only to learn, but also to specialize in order to go from clearly defined problems to extraordinary solutions. Specialization in itself, which has yet to substantiate itself socially, is not a purely individualistic phenomenon. The intensive socialization of science clearly has a consistent coherent character; solidified in its foundations and specialization, it is another undeniable and real fact. Not to recognize this means to fall into an epistemological utopia, a utopia of the individuality of cognition.

It is necessary to bear in mind this social character of science, since truly progressive materialistic scientific thinking springs precisely from this social character of science, resolutely breaking with all "natural" materialism. From now on, the movement of science in the context of culture is ahead of the movement of nature. To be a chemist means to be in the context of culture, to occupy a place in the city of scientists, defined by the modernity of research. Any individualism here would be a complete anachronism. At the first steps of culture, this anachronism is still palpable. In order to make a psychological analysis of the scientific spirit, it is necessary to investigate the direction of the development of science, to experience the very growth of knowledge, the genealogy of progressive truth. The progress of scientific knowledge is characterized by the ascending nature of truth, the expansion of the field of evidence. (3, p. 200)

We think that it is necessary to investigate materialism of matter, materialism, generated by an infinite variety of types of matter, materialism is experimental, active, developing, productive. We will show that after several rational attempts in modern science, a materialistic rationalism. We will also try to provide a number of new evidence in favor of the theses put forward by us in the works "Applied rationalism" (Paris, 1949) and "The rationalistic activity of modern physics" (Paris, 1951). Materialism itself enters an era of active productive rationalism. Scientific knowledge is characterized by the emergence mathematical chemistry similar mathematical physics. It is rationalism that determines the nature of experiments conducted with matter, as a result of which its new types appear. symmetrical applied rationalism one can speak of ordered materialism. (3, p. 201)

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BASHLYAR (Vashe1ad) Gaston (1884-1962) - French philosopher and methodologist, psychologist, culturologist. The founder of neo-rationalism (integral rationalism, applied rationalism, dialectical rationalism, new materialism). Self-identified as "rural

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LEVIS, Gaston de (Levis, Pierre Marc Gaston Duc de, 1764–1830), duke, French writer26 Nobility obliges. // Nobless oblige. "Maxims and Meditations" (1808) Perhaps the appearance of this formula was associated with the formation of a new nobility after the establishment of the empire (1804). ? Boudet, p.

through methodical education, and surprise at its results is not yet participation in its meaning, then this belief is a superstition. True science is knowledge, which includes knowledge of the methods and limits of knowledge. If, however, one believes in the results of science, which are known only as such, and not in connection with the method by which they are achieved, then this superstition, in an imaginary understanding, becomes a surrogate for genuine faith. Confidence is created in the imaginary strength of scientific achievements.<...>(S. 371-372)

Scientific superstition easily turns into hostility to science, into a superstition that seeks help from forces that deny science. He who, in his belief in the omnipotence of science, has silenced his thinking in the face of a knowledgeable person who knows and points out what is right, turns away in disappointment when he fails and turns to a charlatan. Scientific superstition is akin to fraud.

The superstition that opposes science, in turn, takes the form of science as a genuine science, in contrast to school science. Astrology, exorcism by incantations, theosophy, spiritualism, clairvoyance, occultism, and so on, bring mist into our age. This force is found today in all parties and ideologically expressed points of view; it crushes everywhere the substance of man's rational existence. The fact that so few people acquire, down to their practical thinking, genuine scientificity is the phenomenon of a vanishing self-existence. Communication becomes impossible in the fog of this confusing superstition, which destroys the possibility of both genuine knowledge and real belief. (p. 373)

scientific superstition should be enlightened and overcome. In our era of unbridled disbelief, science has been turned to as a supposed solid support, believed in the so-called scientific results, blindly obeyed supposedly knowledgeable people, believed that through science and planning it is possible to bring order to the world as a whole, began to expect from science the goals of life which science can never give, to wait for the knowledge of being as a whole, which is unattainable for science. (p. 506)

GASTON BACHELARD. (1884-1962)

G. Bachelard - French philosopher, methodologist of science. In his theoretical and methodological constructions, an entire era in the development of modern Western philosophy is refracted: the radical rethinking of classical ideals and schemes and his complete rejection of the cult of mysticism and irrationalism ultimately lead to a kind of rationalistic orientation, in which even a collision with "irrational" situations allows enriching the system rationalism, opens up new possibilities of rationalistic approach in modern philosophy. Bachelard's conceptual methodological position is by no means limited to relying on the latest natural science and its positive results, since a high culture of philosophical thinking is put at the forefront.

The ideological richness of the substantive characteristics of Bashlyar's epistemological experience is caused by his peculiar approach to the study of science: scientific activity is considered by him as a sociocultural phenomenon, understanding and rational comprehension of which is possible only when the phenomenon of science is immersed in social, psychological and historical contexts. Bachelard's epistemology is a "complex scientific discipline" that combines the philosophy and methodology of science, the history of science, its sociology and psychology, and the result of his logical and methodological reflections is the creation of a holistic image of science, including both rational (in the strict sense) parameters of scientific research, and sensual - his volitional characteristics.

I.L. Shabanova

New scientific spirit

<...>for scientific philosophy there is neither absolute realism nor absolute rationalism, and therefore scientific thought is impossible, based on what

Texts are cited from the following editions:

1. Bashlyar G. New rationalism. M., 1987.

2. Bashlyar G. Psychoanalysis of fire. Per. from fr. A.P. Kozyrev. M., 1993.

3. Bashlyar G. Favorites. T. 1. Scientific rationalism. M.; SPb., 2000.

anyone of one philosophical camp, to judge scientific thinking. Sooner or later, it is scientific thought that will become the main topic of philosophical discussions and will lead to the replacement of discursive metaphysics by directly visual ones. After all, it is clear, for example, that realism that has come into contact with scientific doubt will no longer remain the same realism. Just as rationalism, which has changed its a priori positions in connection with the expansion of geometry into new areas, cannot remain a more closed rationalism.

In other words, we believe that it would be very useful to accept scientific philosophy as it is and to judge it without the prejudices and restrictions introduced by traditional philosophical terminology. Science does create philosophy. And philosophy also, therefore, must be able to adapt its language to convey modern thought in its dynamics and originality. But you need to remember this

strange duality of scientific thought, requiring at the same time a realistic and rationalistic language for its expression. It is this circumstance that prompts us to take as a starting point for reflection the very fact of this duality or metaphysical ambiguity of scientific evidence, which is based both on experience and on reason and is related to both reality and reason.

At the same time, it seems that it is not difficult to find an explanation for the dualistic basis of scientific philosophy, given that the philosophy of science is a philosophy, having application it is unable to preserve the purity and unity of speculative philosophy. After all, whatever the initial moment of scientific activity, it presupposes the observance of two mandatory conditions: if there is an experiment, one should reflect; when you think, you should experiment.<...> (1, p. 29)

Since we are primarily interested in the philosophy of the natural, physical sciences, we should consider the realization of the rational in the field of physical experience. This realization, which corresponds to technical realism, seems to us one of the characteristic features of the modern scientific spirit, completely different in this respect from the scientific spirit of previous centuries and, in particular, very far from positivist agnosticism or pragmatist tolerance and, finally, having nothing to do with traditional philosophical realism. Rather, here we are talking about realism, as it were, of the second level, which is opposed to the usual understanding of reality, which is in conflict with the immediate; about realism realized by the mind, embodied in the experiment. Therefore, the reality corresponding to it cannot be attributed to the realm of the unknowable thing-in-itself. It has a special, noumenal wealth. While the thing-in-itself is obtained (as a noumenon) through the exclusion of phenomenal, appearing characteristics, it seems clear to us that reality in the scientific sense is created from a noumenal context designed to guide experimentation. A scientific experiment is, therefore, proven reason. That is, this new philosophical aspect of science prepares, as it were, the reproduction of a normative

in experience: the necessity of experiment is comprehended by theory before observation, and the task of the physicist becomes the purification of certain phenomena in order to find the organic noumenon in a secondary way. Reasoning by construction, which Goblo discovered in mathematical thinking, also appears in mathematical and experimental physics. The whole doctrine of a working hypothesis seems to us doomed to a quick decline: insofar as such a hypothesis is intended for experimental verification, it must be considered as real as the experiment. It is being implemented. The time of incoherent and fleeting hypotheses is over, as is the time of isolated and curious experiments. From now on, a hypothesis is a synthesis. (1, p. 31)

<...>in our opinion, really new epistemological principles should be introduced into modern scientific philosophy. Such a principle will be, for example, the idea that complementary properties must necessarily be inherent in being; one must break with the tacit certainty that being necessarily means unity. Indeed, if being-in-itself is a principle that communicates to the spirit - just as a mathematical point enters into connection with space through a field of interactions - then it cannot act as a symbol of some kind of unity.

It is therefore necessary to lay the foundations for an ontology of the additional, dialectically less rigid than the metaphysics of the contradictory. (1.p.39)

In view of the foregoing, let us now consider the problem of scientific novelty in purely psychological terms. It is clear that the revolutionary movement of modern science must profoundly affect the structure of the spirit. The spirit has a changeable structure from the very moment when knowledge acquires history, for human history, with its passions, its prejudices, with all the immediate impulses of its movement, can be an eternal repetition from the beginning. But there are thoughts that are not repeated from the beginning; these are thoughts that have been cleared, expanded, supplemented. They do not return to their limited, non-solid form. The scientific spirit in its essence is the correction of knowledge, the expansion of the scope of knowledge. He judges his historical past, condemning it. Its structure is the awareness of its historical mistakes. From a scientific point of view, the true is thought of as a historical process of liberation from a long series of errors; The experiment is thought of as a cleansing of common and initial errors. The whole intellectual life of science plays on this increment of knowledge on the border with the unknown, since the essence of reflection is to understand what was not understood. Non-Baconian, non-Euclidean, non-Cartesian thoughts are summed up by historical dialectics, which is the cleansing of errors, the expansion of the system, the addition of thought. (1, p. 151)

Philosophical negation

<...>can philosophy, which really strives to be adequate to the constantly developing scientific thought, avoid considering the impact of scientific knowledge on the spiritual structure? That is, already at the very beginning of our reflections on the role of the philosophy of science, we

We are dealing with a problem which, as it seems to us, is ill-posed both by scientists and philosophers. This problem

structure and evolution of the spirit. And here is the same opposition, for the scientist believes that one can start from a spirit devoid of structure and knowledge, while the philosopher most often relies on an allegedly already constituted spirit that has all the necessary categories for understanding the real.

For the scientist, knowledge arises from ignorance, just as light arises from darkness. He does not see that ignorance is a kind of fabric woven from positive, stable and interconnected errors. He does not realize that spiritual darkness has its own structure and that under these conditions any correctly set up objective experiment should lead to the correction of some subjective error. But it is not so easy to get rid of all the errors one by one. They are interconnected. The scientific spirit cannot be formed otherwise than on the path of rejection of the unscientific. Quite often, the scientist trusts a fragmented pedagogy, while the scientific spirit should strive for a general subjective reform. Any real progress in the field of scientific thinking requires transformation. The progress of modern scientific thinking determines the transformation in the very principles of knowledge. (1, p. 164)

<...>Methodologies that are so different, so flexible in different sciences, are noticed by a philosopher only when there is an initial method, a universal method, which should determine all knowledge, interpret all objects in a uniform way. In other words, a thesis similar to ours (interpretation of knowledge as a change of the spirit), allowing for variations that affect the unity and eternity of what is expressed in "I think", should certainly confuse the philosopher.

And yet it is to this conclusion that we must come if we want to define the philosophy of scientific knowledge as open philosophy, as the consciousness of the spirit, which is formed by working with unknown material, which seeks in the real that which contradicts previous knowledge. First of all, it is necessary to realize the fact that the new experience denies the old one, without this (which is quite obvious) we cannot talk about new experience. But this negation is not, at the same time, something final for the spirit, capable of dialectizing its principles, generating new evidence from itself, enriching the apparatus of analysis, without being tempted by the habitual natural skills of explanation with which it is so easy to explain everything. (1, pp. 165-166)

<...>In order to characterize the philosophy of science, we will resort to a kind of philosophical pluralism, which alone is able to cope with such different elements of experience and theory, which are by no means at the same stage of philosophical maturity. We define philosophy of science as

dispersed philosophy(une philosophie distribuée), as a philosophy dispersed(une philosophie dispersee). In turn, scientific thought will appear before us as a very subtle and effective method of dispersion, suitable for the analysis of various philosophies included in philosophical systems. (1, p. 167)

<...>the scientific spirit also manifests itself in the form of a real philosophical dispersion, for the root of any philosophical concept has its origin in the mental

whether. Different problems of scientific thought should receive different philosophical meanings. In particular, the balance of realism and rationalism will not be the same for all concepts. In our opinion, the tasks of the philosophy of science already arise at the level of the concept. Or I would say this: every hypothesis, every problem, every experience, every equation requires its own philosophy. That is, in this case we are talking about creating a philosophy of epistemological detail, about scientific differentiating philosophy, paired with the integrating philosophy of philosophers. It is this differentiating philosophy that has to deal with the measurement of the formation of this or that thought. In general terms, we see this formation as a natural transition or transformation of a realistic concept into a rational one. Such a transformation is never complete. No concept at the moment of its change is metaphysical.

Thus, only by philosophical reflection on each concept, we can approach its precise definition, i.e. to the fact that this definition distinguishes, highlights, discards. Only in this case will the dialectical conditions of the scientific definition, different from the usual definition, become clearer for us, and we will understand (precisely through the analysis of the details of the concept) the essence of what we call philosophical negation. (1, pp. 168-169)

Psychoanalysis of fire

<...>Now another line - no longer of objectification, but of subjectivation - we would like to explore in order to give an example of a double perspective that can be applied to any problems posed by the knowledge of a particular, albeit well-defined, reality. If we were right about what really follows from subject and object, then we would have to distinguish more clearly between the pensive person and the thinker, without, however, hoping that this distinction will ever be carried through to the end. In any case, it is the pensive man that we want to study here, the pensive man in his dwelling, alone, when the fire gleams like the consciousness of loneliness. We will have many more cases to show the danger of first impressions, sympathetic affection, careless dreams for scientific knowledge. We can easily observe the observer in order to discover the principles of his interested observation, or rather this hypnotic observation, which is always the observation of fire. Finally, this state

slight hypnotism, the constancy of which we have noticed, is quite suitable for the beginning of a psychoanalytic examination.<...>(2, p. 9-10)

Indeed, we are talking about discovering the operation of unconscious values ​​at the very foundation of experimental and scientific knowledge. We need to show the opposite light, which constantly goes from objective and social knowledge to subjective and personal knowledge, and vice versa. It is necessary to show traces of childhood experience in scientific experiment. Only in this way will we have a basis for talking about unconscious scientific spirit, about the heterogeneous nature of some evidence, and to see how beliefs formed in the most diverse areas converge in the study of a particular phenomenon. (2, p. 19)

<...>If in knowledge the sum of personal convictions exceeds the sum of knowledge that can be clearly formulated, taught, proved, then psychoanalysis is necessary. The psychology of the scientist must strive towards a distinctly normative psychology; the scientist must refuse personalization of one's own knowledge; in this regard, he must force himself socialize your beliefs.(2, p. 105)

Applied rationalism

The sciences of physics and chemistry, in their modern development, can be characterized epistemologically as areas of thought that break with ordinary knowledge in an obvious way. What contradicts the statement of this deep epistemological discontinuity is that the "scientific education", which is considered sufficient for a "general culture", endorsed only "dead" physics and chemistry, in the sense that Latin language is a "dead" language. There is nothing reprehensible in this, if only they want to focus on the fact that there is a living science. Emile Borel himself showed that classical mechanics, "dead" mechanics, remains a culture necessary for the study of modern mechanics (relativistic, quantum, wave). But the rudiments are no longer sufficient to define the fundamental philosophical characteristics of science. The philosopher must realize the new characteristics of the new science.

We believe, therefore, that as a result of modern scientific revolutions, one can speak, in the style of Comte's philosophy, about the fourth period the first three correspond to antiquity, the Middle Ages, the New Age. This fourth period: it is in the modern era that there is a gap between ordinary and scientific knowledge, between ordinary experience and scientific technology. For example, from the point of view of materialism, the beginning of the era of this fourth period could be associated with the moment when matter is defined by its electrical properties, or, more precisely, by its electronic properties. It is there that the characteristics take place, to which we paid special attention in our book on wave mechanics. In this paper, we want to try to present, first of all, the philosophical aspect of the new experimental methods. (3,

What will be the human consequences, the social consequences of such an epistemological revolution? Here's another issue we haven't touched on yet. It's hard to even measure psychological scale these profound intellectual changes. A special kind of intellectuality, which develops in the form of a new scientific spirit, is localized in a very narrow, very closed space of a scientific city. But there is something more. Modern scientific thinking, even in the mind of the scientist himself, is separated from ordinary thought. In the end, the scientist turns out to be a man with two behaviors. And this bifurcation worries all philosophical discussions. It often goes unnoticed. And besides, he is opposed by lightweight philosophical declarations about the unity of the spirit, about spiritual identity. The scientists themselves, when they explain the spider to the profane,

when they teach it to their students, they try to link scientific knowledge and everyday knowledge into a continuous sequence. Only after the fact should it be stated that scientific culture determined the transformation of knowledge, the reform of the known being. Scientific history itself, when presented in a short preamble as the preparation of the new by the past, multiplies the evidence for continuity. However, in such an atmosphere of psychological uncertainty, it will always be difficult to identify the specific features of the new scientific spirit. The three states outlined by Auguste Comte demonstrate the features of continuity inherent in the spirit as a whole. The imposition of some fourth state - so incomplete, so specific, so weakly rooted - is thus almost incapable of affecting the value of the proof. But perhaps it is precisely in one of the cultural influences on the value of proof that the price of scientific thinking could be better defined. But whatever the case with these general themes, we will try to give extremely simple examples to show the discontinuity of the process of routine evolution and the evolution of modern technology, built on a scientific basis. (3, p. 99)

Rational materialism

Studying modern scientific thinking and realizing all its relevance, timeliness, it is necessary to pay attention to its pronounced social character. Scientists unite in a community (“a city of scientists”) not only to learn, but also to specialize in order to go from clearly defined problems to extraordinary solutions. specialization itself,

NEW RATIONALISM (G. BASHLYAR)

French philosopher, esthetician, researcher of the psychology of artistic creation, founder of the new rationalism Gaston Bachelard(1884-1962) believes that a critical attitude towards science, scientific methodology today is a sign of the times. Criticism of science proceeds from the fact that science is a matter of man and that to understand science means to understand man.

According to Bachelard, K. Marx at one time correctly noted that the mind did not always exist in a reasonable form. One of the first to criticize scholastic reason was F. Bacon; he demanded to verify in experience everything that claims to be true: truth is the daughter of time, not authority. I. Kant proposed a more radical path - the path of criticism of reason itself, taken in pure form regardless of experience. Yes, Kant declared, all knowledge begins with experience, but is not limited to it; part of our knowledge has an experimental, a priori character, moreover, empirical knowledge is singular, and therefore, in essence, random; a priori knowledge is universal and necessary. Kant's apriorism is fundamentally different from R. Descartes' teaching about innate ideas, Bashlyar notes, because, according to Kant, the forms of knowledge are experimental, while the content of our knowledge comes entirely from experience. In addition, Kant's pre-experimental forms of knowledge are not innate, they have their own history of development. And yet, if we consider the problem of criticism of science in the historical aspect, it is obvious that this tradition is primarily French, notes Bachelard.

English philosophy is dominated by the tradition of empiricism, which grew out of the philosophy J. Locke, D. Berkeley and first of all D. Huma. The German philosophy of modernity was formed under the decisive influence of classical German philosophy, the largest representatives of which were I. Kant, I. Fichte, F. Schelling, G. Hegel. French philosophers relied primarily on M. Montaigne, B. Pascal and especially on R. Descartes, outrageous critics of science. Between the First and Second World Wars in France, this trend was especially vividly expressed by A. Bergson and L. Brunschwig.

Henri Bergson(1859-1941) ultimately dissolves the object in the subject, the material world - in consciousness. “We perceive the external world, and this perception - rightly or wrongly - seems to be something that simultaneously exists both in us and outside of us: on the one hand, it is a state of consciousness, on the other hand, it is a surface layer of matter, where the perceiver merges with the felt. Thus, to each moment of our inner life there corresponds a moment of our body and of all the matter surrounding us, which is “simultaneous” to the first moment ... ”And only in the fusion of object and subject can one comprehend absolute, which, according to Bergson, is pure duration, impulse, movement, change as such, freed from matter (i.e., some kind of consciousness). Bergson believes that there are two ways to comprehend reality: instinct and intelligence. Instinct is inherent in insects and animals; it excludes analysis, its result is automatically error-free actions. Instinct is also inherent in man; it manifests itself in a feeling of sympathy and antipathy for objects real world; morality and religion are formed on the basis of instinct. Absolute, pure duration, Bergson emphasizes, can only be known with the help of intuition, in a fit of sympathy, because in this case we are transported inside the object, merge with it, with what is inexpressible in it. This is how reality is made; it is the result of a creative revolution, constantly creating something new. In this regard, Bergson considers art as a way of intuitive comprehension of reality. Art is a direct vision generated by intuition, free from objective reality. With the help of intuition, the artist "sees the inner essence of things through forms and color." As for the intellect, intellectual knowledge, according to Bergson, it is limited to practical interests, it expresses our desire to master things, to subordinate them to ourselves.

The philosophy of Leon Brunschwig (1869-1944) is characterized by the trend of historicism. Consciousness, in his opinion, focuses not on the fact, not on the given, but on how the process unfolds in history. Consciousness precedes objects; concepts and theories - the ego is not a reflection of reality by consciousness, but the result of the activity of the spirit, which in this way comes to awareness of itself. Philosophy, emphasizes Brunschwig, is nothing but the self-consciousness of the creative activity of the spirit in the history of mankind. With regard to the problem of man, Brunschwig reflects in the classical traditions of Moitey and Pascal. He does not recognize any goods outside of man or above him. He considers criticism of science to be the starting point of an attempt to understand the existence of man and mankind.

This is how G. Bachelard characterizes the past of philosophy.

In modern conditions, Bashlyar believes, criticism of science should be strengthened; needed today new rationalism. Like P. Feyerabend, Bachelard rejects theoretical and methodological dogmatism: for scientific philosophy there is neither absolute rationalism nor absolute realism; it is impossible, he emphasizes, to judge scientific thinking based on any one philosophical camp. Meanwhile, Bachelard believes, the history of science shows us "alternative rhythms" of atomism and energyism, realism and positivism. And the philosophy of science also seems to gravitate towards two extremes, two poles of knowledge: for philosophers it is the study of fairly general principles, for scientists it is the study of predominantly particular results. However, the philosophy of science impoverishes itself as a result of these two opposite epistemological obstacles that limit all thought - general and immediate. It is evaluated either at the a priori level, or at the a posteriori level, without taking into account the changed epistemological fact that modern scientific thought manifests itself constantly. between a priori and a posteriori, between experimental and rational values.

Bachelard emphasizes: our reason, our epistemology must start from a more or less mobile synthesis of mind and experience; we need to overcome the immobility of our thinking. In order to have any guarantee of a unanimous opinion on a given problem, it is necessary that we, at least a priori, do not adhere to the same opinion. Two people seeking to truly understand each other must first contradict each other. Truth is the daughter of discussion, not the daughter of sympathy, the philosopher notes. At the same time, he strongly rejects agnosticism. The negation must not break entirely with the knowledge originally acquired; it must leave room for dialectical generalization. This generalization by negation must include what is negated: thus non-Euclidean geometry includes Euclidean geometry; non-Newtonian mechanics includes Newtonian mechanics. Bachelard also rejects positivist phenomenologism. The mind has no right to exaggerate direct experience, it must, on the contrary, rise to the level of the most richly structured experience. Under all circumstances, the immediate must give way to the constructed. Science learns, is tested, verified on what it constructs. The mind must create in itself a certain structure corresponding to the structure of knowledge. The traditional doctrine of an absolute and immutable mind is just an outdated philosophy.

At the same time, although Bachelard distances himself from hypostatized rationalism, he defends rationalism. They say, the thinker notes, that a rationalist always repeats the same thing, for example, that twice two is four, that rationalists are boring, boring people who are only interested in the guiding principles of knowledge, such as the principle of contradiction, consistency or identity - and that’s it! On the contrary, Bachelard emphasizes, truly rational thought is by no means occupied with repetition, but with reconstruction, organization. Genuine rationalism is open, evolving, progressive, dialectical, because there are no great problems known in advance; great problems are born, appear imperceptibly, and only in the course of time their important consequences are revealed. It is not so easy to discover a problem, to open a perspective, for this you need to know the culture of the past, the culture of your time, you need to have the ability to synthesize cultures.

The scientist does not accept the position according to which the goal of knowledge is the comprehension of being in the form of an object. This is not enough; the goal of science is not so much to comprehend the given (the answer to the question “how? what?”), but to identify new opportunities (in the spirit of the principle “why not”), because, as F. Nietzsche said, everything most important is born in spite of. And the ego, notes Bachelard, is true both for the world of thought and for the world of activity. Every new truth is born in spite of evidence, just as every new experience is born in spite of the direct evidence of experience.

In the history of science, Bachelard singles out three epochs. The first is the pre-scientific state (beginning with Antiquity and up to the 18th century). The second era is scientific (XVIII-XIX centuries). The third - the modern era - begins in 1905 (ie, with A. Einstein's revision of the classical concepts of length and simultaneity). In the pre-scientific state, there is neither experiment nor theory (in its modern meaning). Prescientific thinking is utilitarian; it has a certain "primary empiricism" and instead of theory - natural philosophical and mythological interpretations. In the scientific era, ideas about the world are based on the empiricist induction of F. Bacon and the provisions of R. Descartes on the deduction of complex phenomena from “simple foundations”; the object in these cases acts as indifferent to the cognitive activity of the subject. In the modern era, the world is perceived as a world of objectified reason, i.e. the world as a creation of the cognizing subject, the objectification of its rational schemes. “The epistemological vector leads from the rational to the real, and in no way vice versa, as all philosophers have taught, starting from Aristotle ...” But this is not idealism, emphasizes Bachelard; this is - mind construct to explore and transform reality. In general, the philosopher considers the history of science as the history of the progress of some knowledge: to think historically within the framework of scientific thinking means to describe it from less to more; if sometimes the decline of a particular theory is described (for example, the decline of Cartesian physics), then this means that the progress of scientific thought has opened up another axis of increase in the degree of understanding (for example, Newtonian physics), which quite positively reveals some naivety in previous science.

In art, progress is just a myth, Bashlyar believes. Works of art, in a way, have a primordial finality (the same can be said about philosophical systems). A rock drawing of a prehistoric person, a painting by a Renaissance master and modern works of art, which were created using technical means that change the sound or color background, holographic technology and other exotic techniques cannot be placed in ascending order of the degree of progress and, accordingly, the sequence of historical eras, because they do not change only material, tools, value systems of reference, but the object itself. Only by imagining the rather absurd, from the point of view of aesthetics, situation, in which we would compare the images of a buffalo created in different historical eras, solely in terms of correspondence to the original, we could speak of "indisputable progress." He, this progress, is, but it does not apply to the essence of the object of art and aesthetics. But, of course, as far as the cognitive process is concerned, both in philosophy and in aesthetics it is possible to fix the progress of knowledge, similar to that which occurs in the experimental sciences. And yet, Bachelard concludes, the development of science, especially today, is not so much continuous as discrete. “Modern mechanics: relativistic, quantum, wave mechanics are sciences without ancestors... The atomic bomb, so to speak, dispelled a large area of ​​the history of sciences, since in the thinking of a nuclear physicist there is no longer a trace of the fundamental concepts of traditional atomism,” Bashlyar writes.

The philosopher rejects the principle of continuity in relation to the sphere of life. In this regard, he sharply criticizes Max Schsler, who in his book "Man's Place in Space" argues that human activity is just a continuation of the same line of adaptation, in accordance with which develops and animal world. "Between the intelligent chimpanzee and Edison," writes Scheler, "when Edison is regarded as an engineer, there is only a difference of degree." The philosopher resolutely rejects such ideas as an undoubted myth. Yes, Bachelard agreed, Edison is an electrician, but can a dog or a chimpanzee be trained so that they can also invent the electric light bulb? We will not deal with psychological utopias and mythical pedagogy on this score, but we will be aware that the concept of electricity is, of course, the result of experience, but such a result that breaks with the knowledge that was acquired through direct experience. Edison's invention is conceivable only under the condition that a person overcomes the continuity of experience, Bachelard emphasizes. Scheler, on the other hand, ignores the essential historicity of scientific knowledge; he neglects the fact that the Edison phenomenon could only appear at a certain point in the history of science. Only a utopian attitude to reality can lead us to imagine that this phenomenon could have appeared a whole century earlier. The problem of the essential historicity of electrical engineering must also be looked at from an epistemological point of view, the philosopher continues. After all, our understanding of electricity is based on strict theoretical provisions. How is it possible to create an entire electric lighting system if we do not realize the rationality of the laws that relate the concepts of current strength, voltage and resistance? In other words, Bachelard notes, are not this theoretical knowledge and this rationality, which underlie modern analysis, connected precisely with the a priori force that Scheler himself points to as a special force inherent in man?

The philosopher critically distances himself from the "pragmatists" who "pulverize" the truth, since the desire for knowledge is associated with some benefit or benefit brought by knowledge. No, objects Bachelard, knowledge is valuable in itself; it is a factor of life. Today, human cognition, Bachelard emphasizes, is subject to the dynamics of self-determination. Science, especially since the beginning of the 20th century, has been in a state of continuous epistemological revolution. The scientific spirit brings with it not only new answers, but also new methods in the search for knowledge (as Alfred Whitehead figuratively put it, "the greatest invention of the 19th century is the invention of methods of invention"). Moreover, the scientist notes, today we are faced with an amazing thing: science owns the spirit without enslaving it. The modern scientific spirit is, in principle, free from all dogmatism, by virtue of the fact that it is constantly being renewed. That is why the sphere of scientific activity now appears, should appear before us as an open sphere. Bachelard appeals to G. W. F. Hegel, who at one time wrote in The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807): "The spirit that knows itself in such a development as a spirit is a science." And further: science is in reality "and the kingdom that he (spirit) creates in himself, in his own element." Modern man one way or another enters the world created by the scientific spirit, the world of humanized nature. The consciousness of being is actually multiplied today by the consciousness of becoming, which requires us to always be people of our time, says Bashlyar.

The philosopher strongly opposes specializations; it already appeared in Schiller and Goethe; at a time when there was no question of specialization. In particular, F. Schiller, like J. J. Rousseau, he believed that culture itself had inflicted a severe wound on humanity, leading, thanks to art and learning, to the “shattering” of the inner spirit of man. If organic life was characteristic of the Greek city-states, each individual enjoyed an independent life, and when the need arose, he could merge with the whole, now society is likened to a skillful clockwork in which, from the combination of an infinite number of lifeless parts, a whole mechanical life arises. Now the state and the church, laws and customs, were divided; pleasure was separated from work, means from end, effort from reward. Eternally chained to a separate small fragment of the whole, a person himself becomes a fragment; hearing the eternally monotonous noise of the wheel that he sets in motion, a person is not able to develop the harmony of his being, and, instead of expressing the humanity of his nature, he becomes only the imprint of his occupation, his science. The dead letter replaces the living mind, and a developed memory serves as a better guide than genius and feeling, wrote F. Schiller.

Undoubtedly, these judgments reflect important point truth, but Bachelard is also right, whose judgments and assessments are very harsh, but nevertheless fair. So, in his opinion, the phobia of specialization is a kind of monomania of philosophers who judge science from the side without doing it. Bashlyar believes that growing specialization does not undermine culture. On the contrary, it awakens to life and stimulates the development of those ideas that belong to its most diverse areas. A narrow specialist cannot but strive for knowledge and possess a breadth of thinking, due to which, in fact, he becomes a specialist and which determines his place in science. A true specialist cannot be a retrograde. If in the philosophical world there are still erroneous ideas about scientific specialization, then this, according to Bachelard, is due to the fact that philosophers do not pay attention to the integrating ability of scientific thought. Indeed, in the modern era, the development of science is possible only where the results and conclusions of other sciences are taken into account and taken into account. Specialization needs to be complemented, associated with an integrated, interdisciplinary approach. In essence, the interdisciplinary approach in modern conditions is becoming the principle of scientific work in general.

An integrated, interdisciplinary approach is necessary for both natural science and the social sciences, and especially for philosophy, both at the level of its “internal” relationships (for example, the theory of knowledge and methodology, the theory of development and the doctrine of man, etc.), and at the level of its "external" relationships (in particular, for the theory of knowledge, the relationship with such branches of knowledge as psychology, biology, linguistics, etc.) is of particular importance. Strengthening the work at the interface of sciences is necessary, because the very social reality and its development are becoming more and more complex. If before radical changes were concentrated in any one area, for example, production (industrial revolution), scientific (revolution in natural science at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries), cultural (Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment), today changes capture the entire set of social, economic, political and cultural-spiritual relations and institutions, as well as thinking. It is precisely this interaction between economics, politics and ideology, between objective and subjective factors, between national and international, between society and nature, man and technology that objectively requires the cooperation of social scientists themselves, as well as commonwealth with scientists working in the field of natural and technical sciences. and medicine.

Many prominent natural scientists noted that philosophical ideas have always had and continue to have a fairly strong influence on natural science. In particular, Max Born admitted that much of what physics thinks about was foreseen by philosophy: “We physicists are grateful to it for this; for what we strive for is a picture of the world which not only corresponds to experience, but also satisfies the requirements of philosophical criticism. However, our picture of the world, perhaps, does not fit any of the known systems. It is neither idealistic nor materialistic; neither positivist nor realist, neither phenomenological nor pragmatic, nor any of the other existing systems. It takes from all systems that which best satisfies the empirical data. Of course, here one could accuse Born of inconsistency, methodological eclecticism, and so on. But we will not do this, but emphasize something else: the natural scientist rejects the positivist opposition of science and philosophy, recognizes the influence, the impact of philosophy on natural science.

Bashlyar believes that scientific thought is by its nature directed towards the future; it activates all the intellectual abilities of a person, which is why one of the important consequences of modern science is the activation of mental activity. In this regard, he, a philosopher, criticizes A. Bergson and his supporters for being too subject to the empiricism of the intimate duration of time, being interested in the flow of what is experienced mainly at the level of superficial, fleeting, temporary impressions, in which the will and reason do not actually participate. I believe, declares Bachelard, that the tension of thought that arises at the moment of rationalization of cognition has a completely different dimension, a different direction, and therefore should be attributed to a deeper level of our being. The ever-changing curve of Bergsonian duration should not make us forget the ever-straight line of predictive thought. The intellect does not try to deftly wriggle out, primarily because it strives for the clarity of knowledge.

Bergson, continues Bachelard, considers the human mind as being in an unchanged, original form, but he is mistaken: the scientific spirit develops, it is a becoming spirit. The mentality of Homo faber, associated, as Bergson showed, with the observation of solid bodies, today has been replaced by the mentality of a person who begins to control invisible and intangible energy. If a man of the pre-electric era were asked any question related to the nature of electricity, for example, is it possible to use the energy of a waterfall in the Alps, then such a question would be incomprehensible to him, such a question from the point of view of Homo faber is absurd. In order for it to make sense, one must live in the age of electricity and have a different type of thinking. Napoleon, when he was shown a steamer going along the Seine, was completely indifferent to this fact; he did not understand the revolutionary significance - both in the scientific and social sense - of this event. The modern scientific spirit, emphasizes Bachelard, has completely overcome its former dependence on everyday direct experience. The world of scientific thought today clearly rises above the natural, natural world. Modern science, modern knowledge is not the registration of facts, but a kind of clutch of knowledge A that defines the hierarchy of facts. As never before, today science is an activity. Interhumanism(i.e. the mutual exchange of scientific knowledge and human experience) is inherent in modern science and has a much higher value than the universalism of classical rationalism: interhumanism, in fact, is universalism, but embodied universalism, i.e. universalism in action.

It is difficult not to share Bachelard's judgments about the lofty purpose of science. Still, those thinkers who note the negative aspects of social life due to the development of science and technology are also right. So, M. Born, arguing in his book "My Life and Views" about the new social and moral situation in the world, resulting from the barbaric use of weapons of mass destruction against the civilian population, notes that if, from a personal point of view, engaging in science gave him satisfaction and joy, then “objectively, science and its ethics have undergone changes that make it impossible to preserve the old ideal of service knowledge for its own sake, the ideal that my generation believed in. We believed that this ministry could never turn into evil, since the search for truth is good in itself. It was a beautiful dream from which we were awakened by world events.

Quite a few specialists are really "narrow" specialists, people who are not able to morally judge anything that goes beyond the scope of their "subject" with knowledge of the matter. Dangerous impact on people means mass media which "stamp" our tastes, mind, interests, souls. Are we becoming programmed machines without realizing it? - the famous Soviet scientist asked N. I. Konrad(1891 - 1970). And he himself answered: “No, I am an optimist, but not in the spirit of Voltaire's Pangloss. I remember words II. Kapitsa, said by him in a speech dedicated to the memory of Rutherford: “Although we all hope that people will have enough intelligence to ultimately turn the scientific and technological revolution on the right path for the happiness of mankind, nevertheless, in the year of Rutherford’s death, that happy and free scientific work which we enjoyed so much in our youth. Science has lost its freedom. It has become a productive force. She has become rich, but she has become a prisoner, and part of her is covered with a veil. I'm not sure if Rutherford would still be joking and laughing now. The words are bitter enough, Konrad notes, but, he continues, I also recall such wonderful words: “The first and most important of the innate properties of matter is movement - not only as a mechanical and mathematical movement, but even more as an aspiration, a vital spirit; tension or, to use the expression of Jacob Boehme, flour (Qual) of matter. Yes, there were, are and will be torments, but it is to them, Konrad emphasizes, that we owe the birth of all that wonderful that mankind has created in its culture.

Bachelard is right in striving to create a new theory of knowledge corresponding to a new level of development of science. He rightly notes that science is constantly being updated. However, he does not like it when he opposes the idea of ​​continuous renewal of science to the idea of ​​some primary knowledge in philosophy. Bachelard rejects all philosophical principles as metaphysical, ideological; he rejects both idealism and materialism, since they recognize some kind of absolute beginning, in which case they turn knowledge into a copy of the absolute, which ultimately leads to "immobilism of thought." There is, of course, a moment of truth in these judgments. Today, the sharp opposition of rationalism and empiricism, subject and object, matter and idea must be overcome... Nevertheless, the thinker, philosopher must be committed to certain primary, absolute principles, values, etc., which determine his cognitive and practical aspirations. A dry rationalistic view of the world, moreover, an absolutized, hypostatized view, reducing nature to rational formulas, laws, reasons and other necessary correlations, cutting through the integrity, unity of nature and society, makes them, true, simple and understandable, but at the same time mechanical and dead. Instead of life, organic integrity, a fatal, mechanical necessity is affirmed.

Bachelard quite rightly rejects such an approach both in science and in philosophy. The task of true philosophy is to embody and explain everything that is inherent in life. It is this philosophy that a person needs, science needs, including any specific science. Perhaps, F. Engels noted in his time, some scientists believe that they do not need any philosophy. This is a delusion, it is a sure sign that they have fallen into the hands of the worst kind of philosophy. The scientist must consciously engage in philosophy. Only in this case will he get rid of the captivity of all kinds of scholastic metaphysical constructions. Without philosophy, he can stall his work, come to the wrong conclusions in his professional activities.

And Bachelard is undoubtedly right: true philosophy is not some kind of a priori rational system, but thinking that is constantly open to experience - both everyday, practical human experience, and scientific experience. Philosophy is an eternal thought, its ideas are really eternal ideas, but by no means frozen, not unchanging; they change, refine, develop. If we want the scientific spirit to become becoming Marx, K. Op. / K. Marx, F. Engels. - T. 2. S. 142.

Konrad, II. I. Selected Works. - M., 1974. - S. 282.

It is noteworthy that here his views echo the views of T. Kuhn, who believes that science, if it wants to develop, must be "fluffy, clean, independent of the efforts of society."

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