MGB USSR. MGB (Ministry of State Security) is being created in Russia

The Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia is celebrating its 20th anniversary. April 3, 1995 Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the law "On the bodies of the federal security service in Russian Federation". In accordance with the document, the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) was transformed into the Federal Security Service.

In 2014, terrorist crimes were committed 2.6 times less than in 2013. Last year, the Service stopped the activities of 52 personnel officers and 290 agents of foreign intelligence services, in the same period it was possible to prevent damage to the state from corruption in the amount of about 142 billion rubles

AiF.ru tells about the FSB and its predecessors, who stood guard over the state interests of the USSR.

Cheka (1917-1922)

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was established on December 7, 1917 as an organ of the "dictatorship of the proletariat". The main task of the commission was the fight against counter-revolution and sabotage. The body also performed the functions of intelligence, counterintelligence and political search. Since 1921, the tasks of the Cheka included the elimination of homelessness and neglect among children.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Vladimir Lenin called the Cheka "a smashing weapon against countless conspiracies, countless attempts on Soviet power by people who were infinitely stronger than us."

The people called the commission "extraordinary", and its employees - "chekists". Headed the first Soviet state security agency Felix Dzerzhinsky. Under new structure the building of the former mayor of Petrograd, located at Gorokhovaya, 2, was assigned.

In February 1918, employees of the Cheka received the right to shoot criminals on the spot without trial or investigation in accordance with the decree "The Fatherland is in danger!".

The death penalty was allowed to apply to "enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies", and later "all persons involved in White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions."

The ending civil war and the decline of the wave of peasant uprisings made the continued existence of an overgrown repressive apparatus, whose activities had practically no legal restrictions, meaningless. Therefore, by 1921, the party faced the question of reforming the organization.

OGPU (1923-1934)

On February 6, 1922, the Cheka was finally abolished, and its powers were transferred to the State Political Administration, which later became known as the United (OGPU). As Lenin emphasized: "... the abolition of the Cheka and the creation of the GPU does not simply mean a change in the name of the bodies, but consists in changing the nature of all the activities of the body during the period of peaceful state building in a new situation ...".

Until July 20, 1926, Felix Dzerzhinsky was the chairman of the department, after his death this post was taken by the former people's commissar of finance Vyacheslav Menzhinsky.

The main task of the new body was still the same fight against counter-revolution in all its manifestations. Subordinate to the OGPU were special units of the troops necessary to suppress public unrest and combat banditry.

In addition, the following functions were assigned to the department:

protection of railway and waterways;
combating smuggling and border crossing by Soviet citizens);
fulfillment of special instructions of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

On May 9, 1924, the powers of the OGPU were significantly expanded. The department began to obey the police and the criminal investigation department. Thus began the process of merging the state security agencies with the internal affairs agencies.

NKVD (1934-1943)

On July 10, 1934, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was formed. The People's Commissariat was all-Union, and the OGPU was included in it as a structural unit called the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB). The fundamental innovation was that the judicial board of the OGPU was abolished: the new department was not supposed to have judicial functions. The new People's Commissariat headed Heinrich Yagoda.

The NKVD was responsible for political investigation and the right to extrajudicial sentencing, the penal system, foreign intelligence, border troops, and counterintelligence in the army. In 1935, traffic control (GAI) was assigned to the functions of the NKVD, and in 1937 NKVD departments for transport were created, including sea and river ports.

On March 28, 1937, Yagoda was arrested by the NKVD, during a search of his house, according to the protocol, pornographic photographs, Trotskyist literature and a rubber dildo were found. In view of the "anti-state" activities, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks expelled Yagoda from the party. The new head of the NKVD was appointed Nikolay Yezhov.

In 1937, the "troikas" of the NKVD appeared. A commission of three people handed down thousands of sentences in absentia to "enemies of the people", based on the materials of the authorities, and sometimes simply according to the lists. A feature of this process was the absence of protocols and the minimum number of documents on the basis of which a decision was made on the guilt of the defendant. The verdict of the Troika was not subject to appeal.

During the year of work by the "troikas" 767,397 people were convicted, of which 386,798 people were sentenced to death. The victims most often became kulaks - wealthy peasants who did not want to voluntarily give their property to the collective farm.

April 10, 1939 Yezhov was arrested in the office George Malenkov. Subsequently, the former head of the NKVD confessed to being homosexual and preparing a coup d'état. The third people's commissar of internal affairs was Lavrenty Beria.

NKGB - MGB (1943-1954)

On February 3, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats - the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

This was done in order to improve the intelligence and operational work of the state security agencies and the distribution of the increased workload of the NKVD of the USSR.

The tasks assigned to the NKGB were:

conducting intelligence work abroad;
combating the subversive, espionage, and terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR;
operational development and liquidation of the remnants of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various sections of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, Agriculture;
protection of party and government leaders.

The tasks of ensuring state security were assigned to the NKVD. The military and prison units, the police, and the fire brigade remained under the jurisdiction of this department.

On July 4, 1941, in connection with the outbreak of war, it was decided to merge the NKGB and the NKVD into one department in order to reduce the bureaucracy.

The re-creation of the NKGB of the USSR took place in April 1943. The main task of the committee was reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the rear of the German troops. As we moved west, the importance of work in the countries of Eastern Europe increased, where the NKGB was engaged in the "liquidation of anti-Soviet elements."

In 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed into ministries, respectively, the NKGB became the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. At the same time, he became Minister of State Security Viktor Abakumov. With his arrival, the transition of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of the MGB began. In 1947-1952, the department was transferred internal troops, police, border troops and other units (the camp and construction departments, fire protection, escort troops, courier communications remained in the composition of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

After death Stalin in 1953 Nikita Khrushchev displaced Beria and organized a campaign against the illegal repressions of the NKVD. Subsequently, several thousand unjustly convicted were rehabilitated.

KGB (1954-1991)

On March 13, 1954, the State Security Committee (KGB) was created by separating departments, services and departments from the MGB that were related to issues of ensuring state security. Compared with its predecessors, the new body had a lower status: it was not a ministry within the government, but a committee under the government. The chairman of the KGB was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but he was not a member of the highest authority - the Politburo. This was explained by the fact that the party elite wanted to protect themselves from the emergence of a new Beria - a person who could remove her from power for the sake of implementing their own political projects.

The area of responsibility of the new body included: foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, operational-search activities, security state border USSR, protection of the leaders of the CPSU and the government, organization and provision of government communications, as well as the fight against nationalism, dissent, crime and anti-Soviet activities.

Almost immediately after its formation, the KGB carried out a large-scale staff reduction in connection with the beginning of the process of de-Stalinization of society and the state. From 1953 to 1955, the state security agencies were reduced by 52%.

In the 1970s, the KGB intensified its fight against dissent and the dissident movement. However, the department's actions have become more subtle and disguised. Such means of psychological pressure as surveillance, public condemnation, undermining professional career, preventive talks, forced travel abroad, forced imprisonment in psychiatric clinics, political trials, slander, lies and compromising evidence, various provocations and intimidation. At the same time, there were also lists of those "not allowed to travel abroad" - those who were denied permission to travel abroad.

A new "invention" of the special services was the so-called "exile beyond the 101st kilometer": politically unreliable citizens were evicted outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Under the close attention of the KGB during this period were, first of all, representatives of the creative intelligentsia - figures of literature, art and science - who, due to their social status and international authority, could cause the most extensive harm to the reputation of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

In the 1990s, changes in society and the system of state administration of the USSR, caused by the processes of perestroika and glasnost, led to the need to revise the foundations and principles of the activities of state security agencies.

From 1954 to 1958, the leadership of the KGB was carried out I. A. Serov.

From 1958 to 1961 - A. N. Shelepin.

From 1961 to 1967 - V. E. Semichastny.

From 1967 to 1982 - Yu. V. Andropov.

From May to December 1982 - V. V. Fedorchuk.

From 1982 to 1988 - V. M. Chebrikov.

From August to November 1991 - V.V. Bakatin.

December 3, 1991 President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev signed the law "On the reorganization of state security agencies." On the basis of the document, the KGB of the USSR was abolished and, for the transitional period, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) were created on its basis.

FSB

After the abolition of the KGB, the process of creating new state security agencies took about three years. During this time, departments of the disbanded committee moved from one department to another.

December 21, 1993 Boris Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation (FSK). The director of the new body from December 1993 to March 1994 was Nikolai Golushko, and from March 1994 to June 1995 this post was held by Sergei Stepashin.

Currently, the FSB cooperates with 142 special services, law enforcement agencies and border structures of 86 states. Offices of official representatives of the bodies of the Service are functioning in 45 countries.

In general, the activities of the FSB bodies are carried out in the following main areas:

counterintelligence activities;
fight against terrorism;
protection of the constitutional order;
combating particularly dangerous forms of crime;
intelligence activities;
border activities;
security information security; fight against corruption.

The FSB was headed by:

in 1995-1996 M. I. Barsukov;

in 1996-1998 N. D. Kovalev;

in 1998-1999 V. V. Putin;

in 1999- 2008 N. P. Patrushev;

since May 2008 - A. V. Bortnikov.

The structure of the FSB of Russia:

In assessing the activities of state security agencies, emphasized Yu.V. Andropov, “there should always be a concrete historical approach. Here it is important to take into account the requirements of the current moment, the means and methods used by the enemy, specific tasks in the field of ensuring the security of the Soviet state. One of the conditions for successfully solving problems at a high professional level, emphasized Yu.V. Andropov “lies in the skillful use of accumulated experience. We must highly value this experience, persistently and creatively enrich it. On its basis, we can and must always take the initiative in the confrontation with the enemy in all directions, impose our will and conditions of struggle on him, and actively influence negative processes in a way that is beneficial to us.

On November 20, 1945, the International Military Tribunal for the main war criminals began its work in the German city of Nuremberg, designed to pass a sentence on the initiators of the Second World War.

4 weeks before that, the countries initiating the creation of the "universal international organization to maintain peace and security" - the USSR, USA, Great Britain, China and France, ratified the Charter of the United Nations. And on January 10, 1946, the first session of the UN General Assembly opened at the Palace of Westminster in London.

These events gave contemporaries hope for the beginning of the creation of a new civilization, a new system of interstate and international relations on the planet.

However, yesterday's allies in the anti-Hitler coalition set themselves different, including antagonistic goals. Therefore, an analysis of the history of relations between states in the post-war period will be incomplete without considering the views of the US leadership on the goals, objectives and means of American policy towards the Soviet Union, which was perceived in the West as "big Russia", the heir to the Russian Empire.

As early as January 5, 1946, in a conversation with Secretary of State J. Beers, US President G. Truman for the first time put forward the concept of creating an "American world" (Pax Americana), which became the basis of his foreign policy doctrine of "Containment" of a geopolitical competitor and enemy, which, without embarrassment, a recent ally in the anti-fascist struggle was called - Soviet Union.

In U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff document No. JCS-1769/1, April 29, 1947, U.S. Assistance to Other Countries in terms of national security”, for the first time it was officially proclaimed that “the United States is ready to assume responsibility and fulfill the obligations of a world leader”, for which it is necessary to be able to “resist our ideological opponents on all fronts” .

A July 1947 article in Foreign Affairs magazine, "The Origins of Soviet Behavior," explicitly stated that the United States "continues to view the Soviet Union not as a partner, but as an opponent on the political stage."

So, in a document entitled "Forecast of the possible development of the political situation in the world until 1957" (December 11, 1947) The Joint Strategic Planning Committee named "the ideological conflict and clash of interests between the Soviet bloc and the Western democratic powers" as one of the most important factors in world development, since "no other value system is so contradictory to ours, is so unshakable in its goals" .

National Security Council (NSC) Directive No. 68 of April 14, 1950, "The National Security Tasks and Programs of the United States," frankly admitted: "We must ... also try to change the situation in the world in a way that excludes war. We must strive to destroy the Kremlin's plans and hasten the collapse of the Soviet system! To do this, it was proposed: “in addition to affirming our values, our policies and actions should be aimed at causing fundamental changes in the nature of the Soviet system, frustrating the Kremlin’s plans is the first and most important step towards these changes. It is quite obvious that it will cost less and be more effective if the changes are the result of the action of the internal forces of Soviet society.

In NSC Directive 20/1 of August 18, 1948, “US Aims towards Russia”, they were formulated very clearly: “with regard to Russia, we face only two tasks:

A. Weaken Moscow's power and influence to such an extent that it no longer poses a threat to the peace and stability of the international community.

B. To make a fundamental change in the theory and practice of international relations, which the government in power in Russia adheres to.

Moreover, the first of these tasks "can be pursued not only in case of war, but also in peacetime and can be achieved by peaceful means." But, at the same time, it was not hidden that “one can say that our primary task in peacetime is the systematic weakening of the influence and power of Russia while balancing on the brink of war, as well as the transformation of the current satellites of Russia into independent states acting independently in the international arena…”.

The named “peaceful means” of achieving geopolitical goals also include the conduct of covert operations (TO) by the US Central Intelligence Agency, the right to carry out which was granted to it by Directive of the National Security Service No. NSC 10/2 of June 18, 1948 “On the CIA Special Projects Department”. At the same time, “covert operations” were understood as “all actions that are carried out or organized by our government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups, but which are planned and conducted in such a way that any responsibility for them of the US government is not was obvious to unauthorized persons, and if disclosed, the US government could plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them…”.

US NSC Directive 20/4 of November 23, 1948 was no less straightforward: “We must strive to achieve our main goals, without resorting to war, by implementing the following tasks:

A. Contribute to the gradual weakening of Soviet power - from the current borders to primordially Russian territories, as well as the transformation of the satellites of the USSR into independent states.

B. To contribute to the development in the minds of the Soviet people of a mood that can help change the current political course of the USSR and make it possible to revive the independence of peoples who are ready for it and able to support it.

C. To dispel the myth that makes the peoples living outside the reach of the Soviet military machine dependent on Moscow, and to make the world see and understand the true essence of the Communist Party and the USSR and develop an appropriate attitude towards them.

D. To create situations that will force the government of the USSR to recognize the practical inexpediency of actions based on current concepts, as well as the need to act in accordance with the principles of international law ... ".

As a way to “weaken the potential of the USSR”, it was proposed to initiate “increasing internal contradictions in the USSR and disagreements between the USSR and its allies”!

At the same time, the authors of this directive were not embarrassed that it was precisely the tasks of the “policy towards Moscow” listed above that were the most convincing and obvious violations of the “principles of international law”, which they accused the Soviet Union of!

As former US CIA Deputy Director Ray Kline later admitted, “Scientists know that the fate of peoples is shaped by a complex of subtle social, psychological, and bureaucratic forces. Ordinary people whose life, for better or worse, depends on the play of these forces, rarely understands this, except in a vague and very superficial way. Intelligence has become one of these forces since the early 1940s.”

US National Security Council Directive No. 68 "Problems and Programs of US National Security", approved by H. Truman on September 30, 1950, demanded "to multiply military preparations" and "to sow the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system." It bluntly declared the US determination to wage "open psychological warfare aimed at encouraging the mass refusal of the population to remain loyal to the Soviets and undermine the plans of the Kremlin in every way."

To achieve these goals, it was envisaged "to strengthen active and timely measures and operations by covert means in the field of economic, political and psychological warfare with the aim of inciting and maintaining discontent and rebellious sentiments in certain strategically important satellite states", as well as "improving and increasing the activity of intelligence operations ".

After a number of disappointing organizers of campaigns to illegally drop leaflets and other propaganda materials into the territory of the USSR and its allies, the CIA found a stable channel for ideological and political penetration into these countries: “non-governmental” broadcasting from the territory of the FRG of radio stations “Freedom” / “Free Europe” ( RFE/RS). Formally, it was organized by the "National Committee for a Free Europe" and began on July 4, 1950 (the Russian service, called "Radio Liberation", began broadcasting to the USSR on March 3, 1953). The political adviser of the National Committee for a Free Europe, O. Jackson, speaking to the editorial staff in November 1951, did not hide the fact that “RFE is a service of psychological warfare. Our organization was established to provoke internal unrest in the countries to which we broadcast. Military intervention in general makes sense only if the peoples of the countries of interest to us are instilled with an impulse for armed actions within the country.

In this regard, one can hardly consider unfounded the thesis from the article “Undercover Intelligence”, published in the first volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia back in 1955, the authors of which emphasized: “Along with espionage, A[gentournaya].r[intelligence]. capitalist states is also engaged in economic, political and ideological sabotage.

On March 15, 1946, the session of the Supreme Council adopted a law on the transformation of the Council of People's Commissars into the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and the people's commissariats into ministries. In accordance with the law on the formation of the government of the USSR on March 19, I.V. Stalin.

By order of the Minister of State Security V.N. Merkulov No. 00134 dated April 15, 1946. The People's Commissariat for State Security was transformed into the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. Accordingly, its territorial bodies were renamed into departments and departments of the MGB.

However, the structure of the ministry itself was expected to undergo significant changes. Most of them happened in early May 1946, when Viktor Semenovich Abakumov was appointed the new Minister of State Security of the USSR, who from April 18, 1943 headed the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" (GUKR "Smersh") of the People's Commissariat of Defense / Ministry of Armed Forces USSR. The GUKR "Smersh" of the MVS itself was transformed into the 3rd Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security (military counterintelligence).

The following departments were formed in the Ministry of State Security:

2nd Main (counterintelligence, head - P.V. Fedotov);

3rd Main (military counterintelligence, N.N. Selivanovsky);

4th (detective: carried out accounting and management of the search for "foreign intelligence agencies abandoned in the USSR, and other enemy elements", V.P. Rogov);

5th (operational, P.G. Drozdetsky);

6th (encryption-decryption);

Transport (Chekist service of transport enterprises, S.R. Milshtein);

Security Directorate No. 1 (personally I.V. Stalin) and No. 2 (other leaders of the party and government);

Office of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin (N.K. Spiridonov);

Investigative unit for especially important cases (on the rights of management, A.G. Leonov).

In addition, some of its independent departments also played an important role in the implementation of the functions of the new ministry:

- "K" (Chekist observation at nuclear facilities, I.S. Pisarev);

- "O" (operative work on the clergy of all confessions, G.G. Karpov);

- "R" (radio counterintelligence, V.M. Blinderman);

- "C" (translation and processing of materials on the atomic problem, P.A. Sudoplatov. But in the same 1946, the functions of this department were transferred to the 1st Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security);

- "T" (the fight against "persons expressing threats of a terrorist nature against party and Soviet leaders", A.M. Ivanov).

It should be noted that on May 30, 1947, the 1st Main Directorate was withdrawn from the Ministry of State Security of the USSR and, together with the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, was transformed into the Information Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Structural and functional changes in the ministry also led to corresponding transformations in the territorial bodies subordinate to it.

So, for example, in the largest territorial division of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR - the Office for the City of Moscow and the Moscow Region, departments were formed:

2nd - counterintelligence support of important industrial, national economic and research facilities (on the direct instructions of the MGB and not serviced by units of its central office); protection of state secrets, access of employees to work with secret and top secret documents and products;

4th - wanted by the units of the central apparatus of the MGB for agents of both the former special services of fascist Germany and other foreign states - Japan, Great Britain, the USA, accomplices of the German invaders, members of foreign emigrant and nationalist, as well as reactionary clerical organizations, members of individual anti-Soviet groups ; search for persons who made threats of a terrorist nature;

9th - participation in the implementation of measures to protect members of the party and government;

Investigation Department;

Human Resources Department.

In addition, the management structure included district and city departments (departments) that, within the limits of the corresponding administrative-territorial entities, performed the functions of the 2nd, 4th and, if necessary, the 9th departments of the MGB administration for Moscow and Moscow region. The conduct of the investigation into cases of "counter-revolutionary" crimes was under the jurisdiction of the investigative department of the department.

The number of district (within the administrative boundaries of Moscow) and city - in the districts of the region departments (branches) periodically changed, both due to the creation of new production and scientific centers in the Moscow region, and changes in the zoning itself.

By 1949, there were 10 district and about 30 city departments of the UMGB in the region. In the future, the number of the latter was consistently reduced due to the entry into Moscow of nearby districts and cities - Kuntsevo, Perovo, Babushkin and others.

On July 13, 1946, Lieutenant General I. I. Gorgonov was appointed head of the UMGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region. He replaced A.S. Blinov, who has been in this post since May 7, 1943, and was appointed Deputy Minister of State Security.

The main activities of all the state security agencies of the Soviet Union were determined both by the characteristics of the operational situation in their area of responsibility, and directly by the instructions of the leadership - the minister and his deputies, the orientations of the leading departments of the central apparatus of the MGB.

Consider the main activities of the metropolitan government
MGB of the USSR in 1946 - 1954

Of the 86 directives sent by the head of the UMGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Lieutenant General I.I. Gorgonov in 1946 to subordinate district and city departments, almost a quarter - 18, concerned the operational search for established agents of the former German special services, as well as traitors to the Motherland.

This work was carried out by the territorial security agencies on the basis of the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00252 dated May 29, 1945, which announced “Instructions for registering and searching for intelligence agents, counterintelligence, punitive and police agencies that fought against the USSR countries, traitors, proteges and accomplices of the German fascist occupiers."

The indicated directives of the head of the UMGB were prepared on the basis of orientations, subsequently, as the initial data were systematized, on the basis of the wanted alphabetical lists of the USSR Ministry of State Security in relation to the identified agents of the German intelligence and counterintelligence agencies who graduated from the intelligence schools of the Abwehr and the RSHA, as well as persons who served in punitive, police and other formations of the invaders.

As the incoming directive documents of the MGB were processed, these orientations were circularly sent to all district and city departments of government. In some of them there were instructions on the search for from several dozen to hundreds of persons.

In total, in 1946, 1,232 people were put on the local wanted list in Moscow and the Moscow region. In the same year, the Gorgonovs were given instructions to stop the search for 101 people. The grounds for the termination of the search for suspects by the Chekists could be the establishment of: the facts of their death, the absence of corpus delicti (for example, cooperation with the Soviet underground or partisans, performing tasks of Soviet intelligence), their presence abroad.

In this regard, the directive of the head of the UMGB for Moscow and the Moscow region No. 74 dated December 4, 1946 is characteristic: “On the basis of the cipher telegram of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR ... to stop the search for Tagants ... T.I., born in 1913, a native ..., since the latter’s affiliation with German intelligence was not confirmed (Alphabetical list No. 2 of the Smersh Main Intelligence Directorate, Art. 623).”

It should also be emphasized that various degrees of informativeness about the wanted persons were present: some of them contained almost complete identification data (last name, first name and patronymic, year of birth or age, signs, presence and place of residence of relatives, including in Moscow and the Moscow region), the presence of documents for fictitious names, verbal portraits. The presence of photographs of wanted persons was rather an exception to general rule.

In other orientations, only the name or surname (sometimes also a pseudonym during the period of study at one or another German intelligence school) of the wanted persons, individual facts of their biography and signs were indicated. Of course, the last "orientations" were clearly insufficient for the organization of a full-fledged and effective operational search.

Active members of various foreign anti-Soviet organizations established by the MGB were also put on the wanted list - from the Anti-Bolshevik Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR), the People's Labor Union (NTS), to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the like.

These directives prescribed "Upon receipt of data on persons resembling those wanted, report to the 4th department of management", in order to carry out further in-depth verification of their documents and biography facts.

In this regard, the second most important and significant in the first post-war years the direction of activity of the state security organs was the implementation of "filtration" (checking) of persons returning to the USSR - both former Soviet military personnel and civilians exported to Germany, as well as emigrants and re-emigrants.

The initial filtering was carried out in the liberated territories by the Smersh military counterintelligence agencies. So, from February 1 to May 4, 1945, 58,686 people were checked at ten collection and transit points of the 3rd Ukrainian Front alone, which were engaged in filtering citizens who wanted to return to the USSR. Among them - 16,456 former soldiers of the Red Army and 12,160 persons of military age who were forcibly taken to work in Germany; all of them, according to the results of the check, were called up to the Red Army by field military registration and enlistment offices. 17,361 people not subject to conscription were sent to the USSR, and 1,117 citizens of other states were repatriated to their homeland. Of the verified persons, 378 people were detained on suspicion of belonging to the agents of enemy special services, aiding the invaders, committing military crimes, and serving in the ROA 378 people.

The territorial security agencies carried out the work of checking arriving repatriates on the basis of a joint order of the NKVD and the NKGB of the USSR No. 00706/00268 dated June 16, 1945 “On the procedure for checking and filtering at the place of permanent residence of repatriated Soviet citizens returning to their homeland.”

Subsequently, the directives of the UMGB indicated that repatriates who arrived in the capital and the region from the western occupation zones of Germany, who had been there for a long time in camps for displaced persons, deserved priority attention.

Later, orientations on the search for agents of the British and American intelligence who were preparing to be thrown or abandoned in the Soviet Union began to be sent to subordinate territorial departments of management - the 2nd department of the UMGB was to be informed about this category of wanted people.

The first such orientation No. 41 was dated September 28, 1946, and it stated that "As a result of filtering and undercover and investigative work, a number of British agents were identified by the MGB bodies ...".

In connection with the intensification of reconnaissance and subversive activities against the USSR by foreign special services, the fight against espionage is given ever-increasing importance. The fundamental document in this regard was the order of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 0048 dated February 2, 1947 "On intensifying the fight against agents of American and British intelligence." Although, for the sake of historical fairness, it should be emphasized that until the early 1950s, American intelligence, from October 1947 - the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was in the position of junior partner of the more experienced British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or Mi-6 ).

In 1952, Viktor Ivanovich Alidin later recalled, “we became aware that at night the Americans flew a sabotage group across the border to the Moscow region and dropped it by parachute. This group included our agent, who had been introduced into the German intelligence school during the war. During the defeat of the Germans in Germany, the Americans used the possibilities of this school, trained in it saboteurs against our country.

The agent said that the saboteurs landed successfully, spy equipment and weapons were buried in the forest, and now they are already in Moscow. He indicated at what time they would appear on October 25 Street, near the pharmacy. The task of our employees is to detect this group on the street in the stream of people and capture it. Everything went as planned, the saboteurs were captured by us in the middle of the day. Dazed unexpected meeting with the Chekists, they did not even put up any resistance. Soon all their espionage and sabotage equipment was found and delivered to Moscow.

And although the Chekists of the capital's administration were not directly involved in the conduct of this operation, nevertheless, it characterizes the real operational situation of that time in Moscow.

So that readers do not form an opinion about the "far-fetchedness" of such facts and accusations, we recommend that they familiarize themselves with the archive documents of the MGB - FSB published on this subject.

The development and approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, initially of the "List of information constituting state secrets, the disclosure of which is punishable by law" (June 8, 1947), and then the "Instructions for Ensuring the Preservation of State Secrets" also served the same goal - strengthening the fight against espionage. in institutions and enterprises of the USSR” (March 1, 1948).

This information related to the military and mobilization, economic, scientific and technical spheres of state administration and production.

The bulk of the work to ensure state secrets and security (prevention of sabotage, accidents and disasters, fires, etc.) in the fields of science and technology fell on the district and city departments of government.

Another feature of the operational situation in the capital region was the dispatch of prisoners of war of the armies of the states that fought with the Soviet Union in accordance with the joint directive of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR dated April 2, 1946 No. 29/77 “On the procedure for using German and Japanese prisoners of war at work in industrial enterprises ".

This special contingent, the operational study and monitoring of which was assigned to the UMGB units in Moscow and the Moscow Region, in different years numbered from 50 to 100 thousand people, located in about 20 prisoner of war camps. Foreign prisoners of war were involved both in the restoration of residential and industrial buildings destroyed and damaged during the war years, and in the construction of new ones, as well as work at individual enterprises. In particular, prisoners of war in the early 1950s worked on the construction of the main building of the Moscow state university on the Lenin Hills.

On April 4, 1946, a directive from the Deputy Minister of State Security, Lieutenant General A.S., was sent to the district city departments of the administration. Blinov No. 18 on ensuring public order and preventing anti-Soviet manifestations during Easter services in Orthodox churches in the capital. Paragraph 4 of the directive prescribed: "About all emergencies during the days of Easter, and especially on Easter night, to inform the UMGB immediately."
It was also instructed to pay attention to both the positive and negative nature of the statements of believers, as well as identifying places of prayer for illegal churchmen and sectarians.

Similar directives, timed to coincide with major religious holidays of various religious denominations, were published regularly until the end of the 1980s.

In the report of the UMGB for this and subsequent years, it was noted that no emergencies, as well as actions that had an "anti-Soviet coloring" on Easter days, were recorded. Separate, both patriotic and negative statements were given by the participants in the divine services.

In the reports of the Office until the mid-1950s, it was noted that the vast majority of parishioners on Easter days were elderly women, as well as a small number of children and adolescents of school age.

At the same time, it should be noted that during this period of time in Moscow and the Moscow region there were 194 Orthodox churches, in which 197 priests served, five Old Believer churches. There was also a mosque, communities of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, an illegal group of followers "Truly Orthodox Church”, 4 synagogues (Moscow Choral, in Cherkizovo, Maryina Roshcha and Malakhovka) and a significant number of prayer houses (minions).

In March 1952, the new head of the UMGB for Moscow and the Moscow region, M.N. Golovkov, issued a directive to intensify the fight against manifestations of local terror.

The grounds for its appearance were the facts of the attack on June 29, 1951 on the deputy of the Abramtsevo Village Council of the Balashikha District A.F. Murasheva (he survived), as revenge for the active struggle against violations of labor discipline and theft of socialist property. As a result of the investigation, all five attackers were identified and arrested. In court, they pleaded guilty and were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

December 29, 1951 Chairman of the Pobeda collective farm, Dmitrovsky District, Moscow Region, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Hero socialist labor, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU I.S. Egorov received an anonymous letter demanding his resignation under threat of murder. The anonymous author was identified, and, as it turned out, he acted out of a sense of personal revenge for Yegorov's principled positions.

It should be noted that the state security agencies have always attached the most serious attention to identifying the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents containing threats of a terrorist nature, reasonably believing that they may be followed by real attempts to realize criminal intent. This is how, in particular, failed terrorists V. Ilyin (1969) and A. Shmonov (1990) acted.

However, it should be noted right away that no other terrorist manifestations were recorded on the territory of Moscow and the Moscow region until 1969, before the assassination of V. Ilyin.

In March-April 1952, the capital's security officers were involved in ensuring the security of the International Economic Conference in Moscow, which was attended by more than 500 foreign participants, including about 300 citizens of capitalist states.

In November 1952, a directive was sent to the city district authorities on the organization of "Chekist studies" with the personnel. Their bosses were instructed to organize these classes twice a month, from 10 am to 12 pm, “by the method of active conversation,” that is, in fact, the exchange of experience in operational work.

Earlier, the personnel department of the MGB of the USSR sent to the department a list for selection for admission to the Higher School of the MGB of the USSR with a three-year period of study of 8 applicants. For admission to study, applicants, in addition to passing the general university (for legal specialties) entrance exams, were also required to have at least three years of operational experience.

On March 5, 1953, I.V. died. Stalin. At the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which took place on the same day, a decision was made to merge the internal affairs and state security agencies into a single USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Marshal of the Soviet Union L.P., Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, was appointed minister. Beria.

The head of the new department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow and the Moscow Region, Vasily Stepanovich Ryasnoy, in his instructions, demanded that work be intensified on identified foreign anti-Soviet formations and their connections living in Moscow.

It should be noted that this year the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs repeatedly informed the territorial administrations about the planned parachuting agents, and several agents were actually arrested in different cities of the country. In this regard, the minister's briefings emphasized: "Given the possibility of these persons appearing on the territory of Moscow and the Moscow Region, I propose to take urgent measures to search for them."

In the instruction of the head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 4 of April 9, 1953, it was reported that “the sending of anti-Soviet literature to the NTS spy-terrorist organization has intensified recently. Leaflets, newspapers and other anti-Soviet publications of the NTS are sent from Germany and Belgium with various import cargoes, mail to the addresses of institutions and individuals, as well as using balloons. On March 27, NTS leaflets were found in large numbers in the Kaliningrad, Novgorod and Pskov regions. More than 100 NTS leaflets were also found in the cargo from Belgium at the Perovo station in the Moscow region…”.

In this regard, the district and city departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were instructed to "take active measures to search for emissaries and agents of the NTS and to detain them."

Later, in one of the official documents of the KGB of the USSR, it was noted:

“In 1951-1954. state security agencies captured several British and American paratrooper agents from among the NTS participants, abandoned with espionage and sabotage missions.

The leaders of the NTS periodically send their emissaries and liaisons from among foreigners in order to establish contacts, study and recruit them, as well as spread through them slanderous information about domestic politics, the illegal export of anti-Soviet ideologically flawed libel."

The attention and interest shown by the CIA and SIS to the NTS and its contingent are explained by the following circumstance. In 1949, in the program brochure "On the Theory of Revolution under the Conditions of a Totalitarian Regime", an active member of the NTS and later its chairman (1955-1972) V.D. Poremsky outlined, in his opinion, “an ideal project for an organization without organization,” which fully met the goals of a “psychological war” against the USSR:

A) there is a center abroad;

B) he sends to all like-minded people and groups of like-minded people (“molecules” in the USSR) one-sided unaddressed information in order to activate their actions;

C) if the “molecules” are not connected to each other, but act, they kind of “signal” to others about the existence of the organization, explaining “for what” and “against what” it is fighting, at the same time, without endangering the existence of members of other similar associations.

How exactly one should "fight" - the foreign center also informs about this, including in the form of illegal sending of leaflets, brochures, newspapers, magazines and other propaganda publications.

On the one hand, the “avalanche-like increase in signals” about the actions of opponents of Soviet power, according to the ideologists of the NTS, should have “radically changed the psychological climate in the country.” On the other hand, even the elimination of such a “molecule” by law enforcement agencies should not automatically lead to the cessation of the “permanent struggle”.

The apparent simplicity, logical validity and "effectiveness" of this project attracted the CIA, which adopted the Poremsky scheme into service when working with other foreign anti-Soviet organizations.

Although, as historians of the NTS themselves admit, by 1988 in the USSR there were as many as four “open” members of the NTS who did not hide (after the trial) their ties with this organization.

It should be noted that the lack of mention in the orientations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs of information about the beginning of broadcasting to the Soviet Union of the Liberation radio station (since May 1959 - Radio Liberty (RS), Radio Liberty) looks somewhat surprising. Therefore, we will continue to call this radio station by this more familiar and well-known name). Although a considerable number of members of its first edition were also members of the NTS.

Formally, this “independent”, “private” radio station, which is now no longer hidden by its leadership, was established by the “American Committee for the Liberation from Communism”, which brought together all the “displaced persons” from the USSR who were ready to cooperate with the US CIA in their operations. "cold war".

Broadcasting of Radio Liberty in the USSR began on March 1, 1953 with the announcement of the Statement of the "Coordinating Council of the Anti-Soviet Struggle."

In one of the later official documents of the KGB, it was noted: “The activities of Radio Liberty from the day of its foundation are directly aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of the USSR, discrediting the internal and foreign policy The CPSU, inciting national hatred within our country, pursues the goal of undermining and weakening the state and social system in the USSR.

The directive of the leadership of Radio Liberty stressed that "the programs broadcast by the radio station should have a political impact on public opinion in the country, on representatives of science, cultural figures and, above all, young people."

An analysis of the activities and content of radio broadcasts shows that Radio Liberty is one of the main subversive centers of the US intelligence agencies, carrying out anti-state actions of ideological sabotage against the USSR.

After the arrest on June 26, 1953, Minister L.P. Beria and some other leaders of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Colonel General Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov was appointed the new Minister of Internal Affairs, which, however, was reported by the press only on July 10. S.N. Kruglov was the minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs since March 1946, and since March 1953 he was the first deputy minister.

Due to the short existence of state security in the structure of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, this period did not lead to significant changes in the tasks of the activities of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow and the Moscow Region. With the exception of the increase in instructions-directives on issues of ensuring public safety: assisting the criminal investigation apparatus, preventing fires, etc.

We also note that in 1953 pioneer camps were opened for the first time for the children of employees of the UMGB department, and pensioners of the security agencies began to receive vouchers for sanatorium treatment.

In total, according to the available archival information, the Department of the MGB - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR for Moscow and the Moscow Region in 1946 - 1953. 4,921 investigative cases were initiated against 5,509 people. Of these, until 1954, 536 investigative cases for 520 people were terminated.

In total, during this period, according to the materials of the UMGB in Moscow and the Moscow region, 2,821 people were convicted, of which out of court, that is, by decision of the Special Meeting under the Minister of State Security of the USSR - 999.

Of the total number of those sentenced to death, 35 people were sentenced to death.

Notes

1. See: Khlobustov O.M. The Andropov phenomenon: personality and its role in history. // Historical readings on the street. Andropova, 5. History of security agencies: materials of the VI international scientific conference dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. (Petrozavodsk, June 1–3, 2015). Petrozavodsk, 2016, p. 257.

2. See: Donovan R.J. Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry Truman. New York, 1977, pp. 160-161.

3. See: The Main Adversary: Documents of American Foreign Policy and Strategy 1945-1950. M., 2006, (hereinafter referred to as the Main Opponent ...), p. 108.

4. Ibid., p. 121-122.

5. Ibid., p. 269, 283.

6. Cline R. CIA from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York, 1988, p. 166.

7. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following definition in 1953: Psychological warfare is the planned use of propaganda and other informational measures designed to influence the opinions, feelings, behavior of the enemy or other groups of foreign citizens, which will ensure the implementation of the desired policy, the achievement of the planned purposes or the conduct of a military operation. // Linebarger P. Psychological warfare. Theory and practice of mass consciousness processing. M., 2013, p. 399.

8. See: Shironin V.S. restructuring agents. Declassified KGB dossier. M., 2016, p. 35. See also www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Liberty (Accessed 13 March 2016).

9. Lubyanka: Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB.1917-1991. Directory. The documents. M., 2003, p. 139-141.

10. Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich (1903-1994). In the bodies of military counterintelligence since 1928, in 1936-1941. - in various positions in the UNKVD - UNKGB in Moscow and the Moscow region. Since 1942 - Deputy, Head of the Department of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, in 1943-1946. - Head of the 1st Department of the Main Directorate of the NPO "Smersh". In 1946-1951. - Head of the UMGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region, in 1950-1951. - Member of the Collegium of the MGB. Dismissed from the security agencies in connection with the arrest of V.S. Abakumov. On November 23, 1954, he was deprived of the title "as having discredited himself during his work in the state security agencies and, therefore, unworthy of the high rank of general."

11. The "Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Peoples" (ANB) was formed on the initiative of the OUN at the First Conference of the Enslaved Peoples of Europe, held in November 1943. The main goal was proclaimed "the removal of the Communists from power and the division of the USSR into national states." At a conference in Munich on April 16, 1946, the Bulgarian National Front joined the NSA. The NSA was headed until his death in 1986 by Bandera's deputy for the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Ya.S. Stetsko. The NSA ceased its activities in 1996. The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KONR) was formed with the support of the German authorities in November 1944 by traitor A.A. Vlasov and formally united national organizations operating in the territories of the USSR occupied by the Wehrmacht. Many of its participants took refuge in the western occupation zones of Germany after the end of World War II.

12. The Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945. Volume 6. Secret War. Intelligence and counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War. M., 2013, p. 556.

13. Now Nikolskaya street in Moscow.

14. Alidin V.I. State security and time. M., 1997, p. 87. Alidin Viktor Ivanovich (1911-2002), colonel general. In 1930, on a Komsomol voucher, he was sent to work in the criminal investigation department. In 1933 he was drafted into the Red Army. After demobilization in February 1937 - at party work. In 1941 - one of the organizers of the people's militia, took part in the hostilities. Since 1945 - at party work in Ukraine. In August 1951, from the post of secretary of the Kherson Regional Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, he was sent to serve in the USSR Ministry of State Security. Head of department, head of the 7th department of the KGB of the USSR. Since September 30, 1967 - Member of the Collegium of the KGB of the USSR. From January 7, 1971 to January 6, 1986 - Head of the KGB Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region.

16. Blinov Afanasy Sergeevich (1904 - 1961). In the bodies of the OGPU since 1929. Since 1939. - Head of the UNKVD for the Ivanovo and Kuibyshev regions. Since 1942 - head of the 3rd (secret-political) department of the NKVD of the USSR. From May 7, 1943 to July 13, 1946 - Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR. Since 1945 - lieutenant general. In August 1951, he was dismissed from the state security agencies. By Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of November 23, 1954 No. 2349-1118ss "as having discredited himself during his work in the bodies ..." he was deprived of the rank of lieutenant general.

17. Mikhail Nifonovich Golovkov (1904-1985), colonel. In the state security agencies since 1926. For a long time he worked in the Kazakh SSR, having gone from an assistant to the detective to the deputy people's commissar of state security of Kazakhstan. Since September 1949 - Head of the 7th Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security. From August 29, 1951 to September 17, 1952 - Head of the UMGB for Moscow and the Moscow Region. In the future - in senior positions in the central apparatus of the MGB-MVD-KGB. From June 22, 1954 - Deputy Head of the Security Inspectorate under the Supreme Commissar of the USSR in Germany - Deputy Commissioner of the KGB for coordination and communication with the Ministry of State Security of the GDR. From July 20, 1959 - retired due to illness.

18. Ryasnoy Vasily Stepanovich (1904-1995), lieutenant general. In the bodies of the GUGB NKVD since 1937. Then - head of the UNKVD for the Gorky region (1941-1943), People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR (1943-1946), First Deputy People's Commissar - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1946-1952), Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR (1952-1953). From May 28, 1953 to March 30, 1956 - Head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Moscow and the Moscow Region. On July 5, 1956, he was dismissed from the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the facts of discrediting.

19. For more information about the American program for the use of balloons for reconnaissance and propaganda campaigns, including those involving NTS, see Druzhinin Yu.O., Emelin A.Yu., Pavlushenko M.I. Sophisticated look after the Soviets: The appearance of reconnaissance and propaganda foreign balloons over the territory of the USSR had a delicate calculation. // Independent military review. M., 2016, No. 48 (931).

20. In 1971, after the exposure of the US CIA funding of Radio Liberty, its funding came directly from the US Congress. The radio station had a budget of $38.5 million in 1973, $106 million in 2016, and a budget of $120 million for 2017. (From an interview former president RFE/RC Tom Dine in January 2016).

21. Central archive of the FSB of Russia. Foundation 8-os. Op.1. Quoted by: Mozokhin O.B. Statistical information about the activities of the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB (1918 - 1953). M., 2016, p. 430.

Story

For the first time, the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR was formed on February 3, 1941 by dividing the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD of the USSR) into 2 people's commissariats: the NKGB of the USSR, to which units directly involved in matters of state security (intelligence, counterintelligence, government security, etc.) . d.), and the NKVD of the USSR, which remained in charge of military and prison units, police, fire protection and a number of others. Almost a month after the start of the war - on July 20, 1941 - the NKGB and the NKVD were again merged into the NKVD of the USSR. The People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR in February - July 1941 was V. N. Merkulov.

The re-creation of the NKGB of the USSR took place on April 14, 1943 by separating the same units from the NKVD of the USSR as in February 1941. V. N. Merkulov again became the People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR.

In July 1945, the special ranks of the NKGB workers were replaced by military ranks. People's Commissar V. N. Merkulov, who had the rank of Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank, became an army general, his first deputy B. Z. Kobulov became a colonel general, and his deputy for personnel M. G. Svinelupov became a major general.

On March 15, 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed into ministries, respectively, the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR became the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, and by order No. 00107 of March 22, 1946, the territorial administrations were renamed accordingly (UNKGB became UMGB).

On May 4, 1946, V. S. Abakumov, head of the Smersh Main Directorate for the Security of Ukraine, became People's Commissar of State Security. With his arrival, the functions of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs began to flow into the jurisdiction of the MGB. In 1947-1952. internal troops, police, border troops and other units were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the MGB (the camp and construction departments, fire protection, escort troops, courier communications remained in the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

On the other hand, foreign intelligence was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the MGB. On May 30, 1947, a decision was made to create an Information Committee (CI) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, headed by V. M. Molotov, which united foreign political and military intelligence. In February 1949, the CI under the USSR Council of Ministers was reorganized into the CI under the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and external counterintelligence in Soviet foreign institutions was returned to the MGB. In November 1951, foreign intelligence was completely returned to the MGB.

On December 31, 1950, a collegium of 19 people was created at the MGB, consisting of the minister, his deputies and heads of the main departments.

On July 4, 1951, People's Commissar V.S. Abakumov was dismissed, and on July 11 he was dismissed from his post by the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (arrested on July 12). On August 9, S. D. Ignatiev was appointed People's Commissar. In the autumn of 1951, there were mass arrests of senior officials of the MGB (including Deputy Ministers Pitovranov, Selivanovskiy and Korolev).

Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 21, 1952 military ranks employees of the MGB were abolished, and special ranks of state security were introduced instead. However, the decree was not implemented, and employees of the MGB and its successors continued to wear military ranks.

On March 5, 1953, at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a decision was made to merge the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a single Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR under the leadership of L.P. Beria.

Leadership of the NKGB of the USSR in February - July 1941

Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (February 3 - July 20, 1941) - People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR
Serov, Ivan Alexandrovich - 1st Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR
Gribov, Mikhail Vasilievich - Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR for Personnel
Kobulov, Bogdan Zakharovich - Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR

The leadership of the NKGB of the USSR in 1943-1953.

Minister of State Security of the USSR (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar)

Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (April 14, 1943 - May 4, 1946)
Abakumov Viktor Semenovich (May 4, 1946 - July 4, 1951)
Ogoltsov Sergey Ivanovich (acting minister July 4 - August 9, 1951)
Ignatiev Semyon Denisovich (August 9, 1951 - March 5, 1953, representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the USSR Ministry of State Security from July 4 to August 9, 1951)

1st Deputy Minister (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar) of State Security of the USSR

Kobulov, Bogdan Zakharovich (April 14, 1943 - December 4, 1945)
Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (December 4, 1945 - May 7, 1946)
Goglidze, Sergey Arsentievich (August 26 - November 10, 1951)
Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (August 26, 1951 - February 13, 1952)
Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (November 20, 1952 - March 11, 1953) - "in intelligence affairs"
Goglidze, Sergei Arsentievich (November 20, 1952 - March 11, 1953) - "for other cases"

Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR for General Affairs

Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (May 7, 1946 - August 26, 1951)

Deputy Ministers (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar) of State Security of the USSR for Personnel

Svinelupov, Mikhail Georgievich (May 11, 1943 - December 31, 1950)
Makarov, Vasily Emelyanovich (December 31, 1950 - August 26, 1951)
Epishev, Alexey Alekseevich (August 26, 1951 - March 11, 1953)

Deputy Ministers (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar) of State Security of the USSR

Blinov, Afanasy Sergeevich (May 7, 1946 - August 26, 1951)
Kovalchuk, Nikolai Kuzmich (May 7, 1946 - August 24, 1949)
Selivanovsky, Nikolai Nikolaevich (May 7, 1946 - August 26, 1951)
Fedotov, Pyotr Vasilyevich (September 7, 1946 - June 26, 1947)
Apollonov, Arkady Nikolaevich (December 31, 1950 - August 26, 1951) - for the troops
Korolev, Nikolai Andrianovich (December 31, 1950 - August 26, 1951) - by police

Story

On December 31, 1950, a collegium of 19 people was created at the MGB, consisting of the minister, his deputies and heads of the main departments.

By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 21, 1952, the military ranks of the MGB officers were abolished, and special ranks of state security were introduced instead. However, the decree was not implemented, and employees of the MGB and its successors continued to wear military ranks.

Leadership of the NKGB of the USSR in February - July 1941

Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (February 3 - July 20, 1941) - People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR
Serov, Ivan Alexandrovich - 1st Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR
Gribov, Mikhail Vasilievich - Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR for Personnel
Kobulov, Bogdan Zakharovich - Deputy People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR

The leadership of the NKGB of the USSR in 1943-1953.

Minister of State Security of the USSR (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar)

Merkulov Vsevolod Nikolaevich (April 14, 1943 - May 4, 1946)
Abakumov Viktor Semenovich (May 4, 1946 - July 4, 1951)
Ogoltsov Sergey Ivanovich (acting minister July 4 - August 9, 1951)
Ignatiev Semyon Denisovich (August 9, 1951 - March 5, 1953, representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the USSR Ministry of State Security from July 4 to August 9, 1951)

1st Deputy Minister (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar) of State Security of the USSR

Kobulov, Bogdan Zakharovich (April 14, 1943 - December 4, 1945)
Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (December 4, 1945 - May 7, 1946)
Goglidze, Sergey Arsentievich (August 26 - November 10, 1951)
Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (August 26, 1951 - February 13, 1952)
Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (November 20, 1952 - March 11, 1953) - "in intelligence affairs"
Goglidze, Sergei Arsentievich (November 20, 1952 - March 11, 1953) - "for other cases"

Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR for General Affairs

Ogoltsov, Sergei Ivanovich (May 7, 1946 - August 26, 1951)

Deputy Ministers (until March 19, 1946 - People's Commissar) of State Security of the USSR for Personnel

Svinelupov, Mikhail Georgievich (May 11, 1943 - December 31, 1950)
Makarov, Vasily Emelyanovich (December 31, 1950 - August 26, 1951)
Epishev, Alexey Alekseevich (August 26, 1951 - March 11, 1953)

People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB), was created by a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Belarus dated February 3, 1941.

It is noteworthy that this decision was made not by a government body, but by the Central Committee of a political party, which formally had no rights to it: the “leading and guiding role” of the CPSU appeared in the Constitution of the USSR only in 1977. Therefore, this decision was formally illegal. It is also interesting that the later issued Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB was first approved by this decree. That is, contrary to the Constitution of the USSR, the political party approved the decisions of the highest legislative body of the country. Accordingly, the NKGB had to be guided not by the law and the Constitution, but by the decisions of the Central Committee of the party, which is outside the legal field and not bound by any legislative norms. This predetermined the anti-legal nature of the activities of the NKGB.

According to this resolution, the creation of the NKGB was explained by the need for "maximum improvement in the intelligence and operational work of state security agencies and the increased volume of work of the NKVD of the USSR and its diversity." The tasks assigned to the NKGB were:
– intelligence work abroad;
– combating subversive, espionage, terrorist activities foreign intelligence services within the USSR;
– operational development and elimination remnants of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various sections of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, and agriculture;
– protection of party and government leaders.

It is easy to see that only the first point, and, partially, the second, refers to the functions of ensuring state security. Partially, because anyone could be accused of belonging to foreign intelligence services, saboteurs and terrorists, and what kind of activity was considered “subversive”, the Central Committee’s resolution did not say. Anything could be declared "subversive activity".

Therefore, the main function of the NGKB was "the elimination of anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various segments of the population." What is considered a "counter-revolutionary formation"? We are not talking about partisan detachments (like, for example, Bandera), but about groups of citizens dissatisfied with the policies of the Communists, not organizationally connected, and having only a general social status. It is no coincidence that we are talking about “strata of the population”. This wording actually gives sanction to mass terror. He was appointed People's Commissar of the NKGB.

One of the reasons for the creation of the NKGB was the approach of war: the sovietization of new territories and the elimination of "anti-Soviet elements" there were supposed. In addition, reconnaissance against potential enemies of the USSR acquired special significance. But already in July 1941, the NKGB was again merged with the NKVD into a single people's commissariat: there were many two departments for waging war on their territory. The re-separation took place by the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of April 14, 1943. This Decree approved the following structure of the NKGB:
– secretariat(combined the functions of managing his own security);
– 1st directorate (intelligence);
– 2nd directorate (counterintelligence)(including intelligence and information work);
–3rd department (transport);
– 4th Directorate (sabotage). It existed long before the war, and many years after its end. It acted on the basis of the decisions of the Politburo and Stalin personally. The USSR has always denied its involvement in terrorism;
– 5th department (encryption-decryption);
– 6th department (security);
– office of the commandant of the Moscow Kremlin (Stalin's bodyguard);
– administrative-economic-financial department(The NKGB conducted extensive economic activities, he owned many enterprises, mines, he was in charge of many construction projects);
– investigation department for especially important cases(espionage, and, most importantly, anti-Soviet activities);
– department "A" (accounting and archival);
– department "B" (use of operational equipment)(listening, surveillance);
– department "B" (correspondence perusal)(this despite the fact that the secrecy of correspondence was guaranteed by law);
– Human Resources Department .

Created in November 1945 department "K" - counterintelligence support of nuclear industry facilities. In January 1946, he was transferred from the NKVD to the NKGB department "C": conducting intelligence on the atomic problem. Further reorganizations of the NKGB were already carried out within the framework of a new department - the Ministry of State Security, created on March 15, 1946.

B.Z. became the first deputy commissar of the NKGB (for general issues). Kobulov. Later - S.I. Ogoltsov. The main role in the work of the NKGB was played by the nominees L.P. Beria, which included both Merkulov and Kobulov. In particular, they were: S.A. Goglidze, V.G. Dekanozov, A.S. Blinov, E.P. Pitovranov, P.K. Sudoplatov, M.D. Ryumin, L.F. Tsanava, and some others.

The activities of the NKGB in February-July 1941 (the period, as we see, a short one), however, was "large-scale": including the "liquidation of anti-Soviet elements" in the Baltic republics, the deportation of the civilian population from the western regions of the USSR on the eve of the war on socio-political grounds (together with the NKVD and according to intelligence data from the NKGB), executions of political prisoners in the first weeks of the war in the evacuated regions of the country. The NKGB was supposed to give the country's leadership information about plans and intentions Nazi Germany, but, having at his disposal sufficiently voluminous information on this subject, the People's Commissar of the NKGB V.N. Merkulov reported to Stalin only what he wanted to hear. This was one of the reasons why the invasion of June 22, 1941 was a complete surprise for the government of the USSR.

In 1943-1945. reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the rear of the German troops are of particular importance in the work of the NKGB, and many employees of the NKGB honestly performed their military duty: they fought against the fascist invaders. But there was something else: provoking the Germans into repressions against the civilian population, arbitrary killings of persons suspected of collaborating with the invaders (often on false denunciations; besides, even chopping firewood in a soldier’s kitchen could be called “collaboration”), “policemen” (in people served the police for a variety of reasons - including under duress). Suspected in connection with the Gestapo were killed (very often - without any reason). The NKGB, with the help of its special detachments, fought against national formations: the Home Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Latvian and Estonian SS legionnaires, the Lithuanian "Forest Brothers". For these purposes, provocations were widely used, up to the creation of false rebel detachments, which, allegedly on behalf of the same "Bandera" attacked the population, robbed and killed. Criminal elements were also often involved in such detachments (criminals were promised an amnesty after the war).

As we moved west, the importance of "work" in the countries of Eastern Europe increased, where the NKGB was also engaged in the "liquidation of anti-Soviet elements." Under the newly formed state security bodies of the Eastern European communist regimes, groups of advisers to the NKGB were created, whose instructions, as a rule, were binding, and focused them on harsh repressions against all opposition forces, even potential ones. Employees of the NKGB in Poland, Hungary, Germany and other countries where she entered Soviet army, were engaged in arbitrary arrests and executions, citizens of foreign states were deported to Siberia without any legal grounds, often without trial and without explanation. The NKGB is also involved in the “confiscation” of huge valuables from private individuals in Germany and a number of other countries (under the guise of “reparations”, the Soviet administration often carried out a banal robbery; the NKGB officers also “did not forget themselves”).

In 1944-1946. military units of the NKGB conducted combat operations on the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia against local anti-communist formations. The regular army was involved in these operations, and it was in the NKGB that the tactics and strategy of this struggle, including mass deportations, were determined. Many of the NKGB's operations in these territories can be classified as war crimes. In particular, we are talking about provoking inter-ethnic clashes in the Kholm region between Poles and Ukrainians in 1944-1945, about reprisals against former soldiers and officers of the Vlasov army in 1945, about reprisals against the civilian population of East Prussia in 1945-1946. , and so on.

The number of organs of the NKGB in March 1946 was 137,672 people, including 22,000 people. "Unspoken composition" - employees who officially have a different place of work and keep in touch with agents. Thus, if we assume that each "unspoken collaborator" had "only" 10 informers "in touch", then even then we will get almost a quarter of a million "informers". Of course, there were many more.

Being focused on asserting the power of the communists in the "liberated" territories, on the use of illegal methods, the NKGB could not contribute in any significant way to the protection of the state interests of the USSR. The secret of the atomic bomb was obtained by another department - the NKVD, where, at the initiative of Beria, a special department was created to collect intelligence information on atomic and general scientific and technical topics. And the real German spies and saboteurs were revealed, as a rule, by the military counterintelligence SMERSH - a structure subordinated not to the NKGB, but to the army. The NKGB, from the very beginning, was only an instrument of political terror in the hands of the party.

Ivanov V.A. The mechanism of mass repressions in Soviet Russia in the late 20s-40s. M., 1998.

Khlobustov O. Birth of domestic counterintelligence. M., 2008.

Vinarov I. Soldiers of the Quiet Front. Sofia. 1987.

Agabekov G. Secret terror. M., 1996.

Tsarev O., Costello D. Fatal illusions. From the archives of the KGB. M., 1995.

Petrov I., Skorkin K. Who led the NKVD. 1934-1941. M., 1999.

Essays on the history of Russian foreign intelligence. At 6t. T.4. M., 1999.

Kokurin A.I., Petrov I.V. Lubyanka. Bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-KGB. 1917-1991. M., 2004.

Antonov V., Karpov V. Secret informants of the Kremlin. M., 2000.

Khlobustov O. State security under attack. From the notes of a professional. M., 2009.

Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov worked for a long time with Beria in Transcaucasia, where he was involved in mass repressions in Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the end of the 30s, he was the USSR ambassador to Germany, while he was under the operational control of the NKGB, and led the Soviet intelligence network in Germany. After the war - in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, then - again in the state security agencies. Shot on December 23, 1953, as "an accomplice of Beria." Currently, the Supreme Court of Russia has recognized Dekanozov's death sentence as inconsistent with the acts actually committed by him and replaced it with 20 years in prison.

Evgeny Pitovranov is one of the most prominent Soviet intelligence officers, the creator of a powerful intelligence network in the United States. Memoir author. Avoided reprisals.

Pavel Sudoplatov led the NKGB sabotage department for a long time. Participant of the civil war in Spain, where he also staged terrorist attacks, including those that led to the death of civilians. Previously involved in the murder of L.D. Trotsky. The organizer of the murder of S. Bandera and a number of other emigration figures in the post-war period. Prepared the assassination of the Yugoslav leader Josif Broz Tito. It is Sudoplatov who has the “leadership” in the use of explosives using striking elements (nails, bolts, glass), as well as in the invention of the “martyr's belt”. Memoir author.

Mikhail Dmitrievich Ryumin is the organizer of the "Doctors' Case", on which he conducted the investigation, and which he sought to inflate. He used torture and psychological pressure during interrogations. In 1953, after the death of Stalin, he was arrested, in 1954 he was convicted and shot. Not rehabilitated.

Lavrenty Tsanava in 1938-1952 headed the state security agencies in Belarus, is directly responsible for mass repressions in the BSSR. Shot. Not rehabilitated.

Paporov Yu. In the wake of the ghost of Trotsky. LG archive. 1994. Issue #7.

Kolpakidi A., Prokhorov D. Special operations of the Soviet intelligence. M., 2000.

Stetsovsky Yu. I. History of Soviet repressions. T.2. M., 1998.

Collection of legislative and normative acts on repressions and rehabilitation of victims of political repressions. M., 1993.

Degtyarev K. SMERSH. M., 2009.

The Black Book of Communism. Collection of documents. M., 2002.

Kolpakidi A., Sever A. KGB. M., 2010.

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Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR for General Affairs

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