The total air raids of the Second World War convincingly showed the uncompromising means of the participants in the conflict. Massive bombing attacks on cities destroyed communications and factories, led to the death of thousands of innocent people.

Stalingrad

The bombing of Stalingrad began on August 23, 1942. Up to a thousand Luftwaffe aircraft took part in it, which made from one and a half to two thousand sorties. By the time the air raids began, more than 100 thousand people had been evacuated from the city, but most of the residents could not be evacuated.

As a result of the bombing, according to the most rough estimates, more than 40 thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed. First, the bombing was carried out with high-explosive shells, then with incendiary bombs, which created the effect of a fiery tornado that destroyed all life. Despite significant destruction and a huge number of victims, many historians believe that the Germans did not achieve their original goals. Historian Aleksey Isaev commented on the Stalingrad bombing in the following way: “Everything did not go according to plan. Following the bombing, the planned development of events did not follow - the encirclement Soviet troops west of Stalingrad and occupation of the city. As a result, the bombing looked like such a terrorist act, although if everything had developed according to the written plan, it would have seemed logical.

It must be said that the "world community" responded to the bombing of Stalingrad. Residents of Coventry, destroyed by the Germans in the autumn of 1940, showed particular interest. The women of this city sent a message of support to the women of Stalingrad, in which they wrote: "From the city, torn to shreds by the main enemy of world civilization, our hearts are drawn to you, those who are dying and suffering much more than ours."

In England, a "Committee of Anglo-Soviet Unity" was created, which organized various events and collected money to be sent to the USSR. In 1944, Coventry and Stalingrad became sister cities.

Coventry

The bombing of the English city of Coventry is still one of the most discussed events of the Second World War. There is a point of view expressed, including by the British writer Robert Harris in the book "Enigma", that Churchill knew about the planned bombing of Coventry, but did not increase the air defense, because he was afraid that the Germans would realize that their ciphers were solved.

However, today we can already say that Churchill really knew about the planned operation, but did not know that the city of Coventry would become the target. The British government knew on November 11, 1940, that the Germans were planning a major operation called "Moonlight Sonata", and it would be undertaken on the next full moon, which fell on November 15th. The British did not know about the purpose of the Germans. Even if the targets were known, they would hardly be able to take proper action. In addition, the government relied on electronic countermeasures (Cold Water) for air defense, which, as you know, did not work.

The bombing of Coventry began on 14 November 1940. Up to 437 aircraft took part in the air raid, the bombardment lasted more than 11 hours, during which 56 tons of incendiary bombs, 394 tons of high-explosive bombs and 127 parachute mines were dropped on the city. More than 1,200 people died in Coventry in total. The water and gas supply was actually disabled in the city, the railway and 12 aircraft factories were destroyed, which affected the defense capability of Great Britain in the most negative way - the productivity of aircraft manufacturing decreased by 20%.

It was the bombing of Coventry that opened a new era of all-out air raids, which would later be called "carpet bombing", and also served as an excuse for the retaliatory bombing of German cities at the end of the war.

The Germans did not leave Coventry after the first raid. In the summer of 1941, they carried out new bombardments of the city. In total, the Germans bombed Coventry 41 times. The last bombing took place in August 1942.

Hamburg

For the troops of the anti-Hitler coalition, Hamburg was a strategic object, oil refineries, military industrial plants were located there, Hamburg was the largest port and transport hub. On 27 May 1943, RAF Commander Arthur Harris signed Bomber Command Order No. 173 on Operation Gomorrah. This name was not chosen by chance, it referred to the biblical text "And the Lord rained on Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord from heaven." During the bombing of Hamburg, British aircraft for the first time used a new means of jamming German radars, called Window: strips of aluminum foil were dropped from aircraft.

Thanks to Window, the Allied forces managed to minimize the number of losses, the British aircraft lost only 12 aircraft. Air raids on Hamburg continued from July 25 to August 3, 1943, about a million inhabitants were forced to leave the city. The number of victims according to various sources varies, but they amount to at least 45,000 inhabitants. The largest number of victims was on 29 July. Due to climatic conditions and massive bombardment, fiery tornadoes formed in the city, literally sucking people into the fire, asphalt burned, walls melted, houses burned like candles. For three more days after the end of the air raids, it was impossible to carry out rescue and restoration work. People waited for the wreckage, which had turned into coals, to cool down.

Dresden

The bombing of Dresden is one of the most controversial events of World War II to this day. The military necessity of Allied air raids has been disputed by historians. Information about the bombing of the marshalling yard in Dresden was transmitted by the head of the aviation department of the American military mission in Moscow, Major General Hill, only on February 12, 1945. The document did not say a word about the bombing of the city itself.

Dresden was not one of the strategic goals, besides, by February 45th, the Third Reich was living out its last days. Thus, the bombing of Dresden was more of a show of US and British air force. The officially declared target was German factories, but they were practically not affected by the bombing, 50% of residential buildings were destroyed, in general, 80% of city buildings were destroyed.

Dresden was called "Florence on the Elbe", it was a museum city. The destruction of the city caused irreparable damage to world culture. However, it must be said that most of the works of art from the Dresden gallery were taken to Moscow, thanks to which they survived. Later they were returned to Germany. The exact number of victims is still disputed. In 2006, historian Boris Sokolov noted that the death toll from the bombing of Dresden ranged from 25,000 to 250,000. In the same year, in the book of the Russian journalist Alyabyev, the sum of the dead was from 60 to 245 thousand people.

Lübeck

The bombing of Lübeck by the Royal Air Force of Britain on March 28-29, 1942 was an operation of retaliation by the British for air raids on London, Coventry and other British cities. On the night of March 28-29, on Palm Sunday, 234 British bombers dropped about 400 tons of bombs on Lübeck. The air raid took place according to the classical scheme: first, high-explosive bombs were dropped to destroy the roofs of houses, then incendiary ones. According to British estimates, almost 1,500 buildings were destroyed, more than 2,000 were seriously damaged, and more than 9,000 were slightly damaged. As a result of the raid, more than three hundred people died, 15,000 were left homeless. The irretrievable loss of the bombing of Lübeck was the loss of historical and artistic values.

Of all aspects of the use of air power, strategic bombing seems to have been the subject of the most heated debate. The beginning of these discussions dates back to 1920, when the Italian aviation specialist Douai suggested that victory in the war could only be won by long-range bombardment from the air; the ground forces and the navy are "only auxiliary means used for transport purposes and the occupation of territory." This view existed before, after the war, some senior American officers suggested that strategic atomic bombing, carried out on a large scale, could go a long way towards winning the war. The point of departure for this point of view was Clausewitz's position that war is a continuation of politics. This view suggests that the devastating bombing of Germany and Japan created fertile ground for the growth of communist sentiment in those countries and made them more hostile to the Anglo-Saxon democracies that destroyed their cities. Let's try to look into the future. Let us assume that the European continent or any part of Europe was captured by the Red Army. Will they ever be able to reunite politically with the West if their release is linked to the atomic bombing? There are many other contentious issues regarding strategic bombing. Should strategic bomber aviation be independent of the army and navy, and even of the rest of the air force? Should it report directly to the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or should it be an integral part of the air force, regardless of its form of organization? What is the best way to plan the sequence of bombardment of targets? When is it better to carry out daytime bombardment and when - at night? Etc.

Aviation strategists up until 1950 were widely divided on the significance of strategic bombing. The advent of the atomic and hydrogen bombs and modern strategic bombers with a range of up to 8,000 km, extended by air refueling, made the governments and commanders of every country clearly understand that strategic bombing could be the main means of achieving victory in a war or stabilizing an international politicians. At present, bombers from their bases can reach and attack targets anywhere in the world, delivering bombing strikes of unprecedented force.

The destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Tokyo and Berlin was horrendous, but it is nothing compared to what can be produced by concentrated repeated bombardments of ever-increasingly powerful atomic bombs.

In the period between the two world wars, the role of strategic bombing was repeatedly evaluated and re-evaluated in the aviation headquarters of various countries. Probably the most significant, fundamental change occurred in the Soviet air force in the thirties. Although the Russians initially viewed aviation as a means to serve the tactical requirements of the army and navy, the USSR was the first state in history to begin building a large air fleet of four-engine bombers. These were TB-3 bombers designed by Tupolev. By 1935, there were already several hundred of them in the Soviet air force. However, the need to build transport aircraft to transport airborne troops, the failures to prototype four-, six-, and eight-engine bomber-transport aircraft in the thirties, the need for a rapid expansion of fighter aircraft to counter the potential threat from Japan and Germany, all delayed construction of the Soviet strategic bomber aviation. The origins of the Russian heavy bomber date back to the period of the First World War, when Russia temporarily pioneered the use of a four-engine heavy bomber, which even then had almost the same wingspan as the Flying Fortress bomber of the Second World War.

In 1942 there was a new change in the Soviet air force. Stalin was concerned about the heavy losses of tactical aviation in the first months of the war with Germany. He wanted, like the British, to strike back directly at Germany at a time when the Red Army was retreating and did not set as its immediate task the return of the vast territories captured by the Germans in the Baltic republics, Eastern Poland, Belarus and Ukraine. That is why Stalin instructed General (later Marshal) Golovanov to reorganize heavy bomber aviation and unite it into an independent organizational unit subordinate to the State Defense Committee. This new organization, called ADD (long-range aviation), was militarily weak. Most of the aircraft were twin-engine American B-25 Mitchell aircraft supplied under Lend-Lease, and Soviet IL-4 aircraft. Later, several squadrons of Soviet-made four-engine PE-8 aircraft appeared. These aircraft, however, had insufficient range and carrying capacity, and lacked radar for navigation and blind bombing. The operations of these aircraft against the oil fields in Rumania, as well as the several raids they carried out on Berlin, Budapest and Warsaw, caused very little concern to the German air defense. Nevertheless, night fighter aviation was created in the German air force to fight Soviet bombers, but it never had of great importance.

However, since 1945, the Soviet air force has done everything possible to create a strong strategic bomber aviation. In the West, many were struck by the speed with which planes were built, which are an exact copy of the American B-29 Superfortres bombers that made an emergency landing on the territory of the USSR in the period 1946-1947. By 1950, the Soviet Air Force had several hundred Tupolev-designed four-engine bombers. Engine power, bomb load and range have been significantly increased. Ilyushin, the leading designer of tactical bombers, was switched to designing a heavy jet bomber. The Ilyushin-16 four-engine jet bomber was not accepted into service, but Ilyushin participated in the design of another heavy four-engine jet bomber. In 1949, the first atomic bomb was detonated in the USSR.

In a published report on air power in the Pacific, Major Alexander Seversky, one of the leading proponents of strategic bombing, stated that the United States, like Japan, had no intention of using air power at the start of the war except in the interest of providing close air support. This statement fully applies to the Japanese, who intended to subordinate their air force to the tactical requirements of the army and navy. The Americans were different. Mitchell was not the only person to point out the need for a heavy bomber force independent of the US military. He was simply the most popular of the "prophets". Generals Arnold and Spaats believed in the future of strategic bomber aircraft, but they were in the US Army Air Forces and were baffled by the ever-increasing demands and primacy of the ground forces. It is significant that the budget of the US Army in 1940 provided for appropriations insufficient even to create one squadron of Flying Fortress bombers. In Bomber Offensives, Lord Harris pointed out that the United States had taken over "the basic idea of ​​the strategic use of air power from the British Air Force." Many US Air Force officers, as well as British Air Force officers, will disagree with Seversky's assertion that the tactical use of air power was "the only goal that the military leaders of all belligerent states initially envisioned."

Sunken bomber. Photo: Matt Kieffer

Britain's priority in developing a general concept of strategic bombing is generally recognized. Before the end of the First World War, General Smuts presented a serious report to the military cabinet, in which he suggested that military aviation would soon be used for strategic purposes. The reason for this assumption was the daytime raids of German aircraft on London in June-July 1917. These raids caused great concern, since the air defense was unprepared to deal with them. In his report, Smuts made an unusual statement for that time, which has become common truth in our time. He wrote: “The day is not far off when actions from the air, entailing the devastation of enemy territory and the destruction of industrial and administrative centers on a large scale, can become the main ones, and the actions of the army and navy can become auxiliary and subordinate.” He also stated in his report that he "sees no limits for the independent use of military aviation."

Perhaps it is appropriate here to try to explain the concept of an independent air force. There are many cases of poor planning for long-range bombing missions due to the fact that the concept of independent bomber aircraft was the subject of disputes between the branches of the armed forces. The organization of the air force, which exists only on paper, is irrelevant to the effectiveness of air operations and is only a secondary factor. Göring's air force during the Second World War was independent only on paper, but in reality it was not used independently in the sense that General Smuts had in mind in 1917. This was mainly because the command of the German Air Force, in view of the existing economic policy in the pre-war period, did not develop its four-engine long-range bombers of the Junkers-90 and Focke-Wulf-200 types, but followed the trend towards the development of twin-engine Heinkel bombers, " Dornier and Junkers. When the German Air Force wanted to change this in 1942, the harsh combat environment, the rampage and ignorance of Commander-in-Chief Hitler, and the inability of industry to produce a sufficient number of heavy bombers all effectively prevented the creation of an effective strategic air force. At the same time, the example of the United States Army Air Force showed that the organization scheme is not a barrier to independent action. The American Flying Fortress and Superfortress bomber squadrons were theoretically an integral part of General Marshall's armed forces and, despite this, they operated almost as effectively as if they were an independent bomber command, like that of the British air force. The personal fighting qualities of US Air Force Generals Arnold, Spaatz, Kenya, Andersen, and Doolittle played a greater role than the Pentagon's decision.

When in 1942 heavy bomber aviation Soviet Union was singled out as an independent branch of the armed forces, it did not become more effective tool. Too much attention has been paid in the past organizational structure air force and too little of the necessary flexibility in their use. Talk about independent bomber aircraft is, in a sense, completely absurd and even dangerous. Even more dangerous is the tasking of bomber aviation with tasks that do not meet the requirements of the land army and navy. The purpose of long-range bombing is to help achieve victory in the war. The best way for an air force to win a war is to gain air superiority, then use heavy bomber aircraft to cripple enemy industrial capability, destroy lines of communication, undermine public morale, and help transport troops destined to occupy enemy territory. At the same time, it is assumed that the enemy air defense can be suppressed and deprived of the ability to resist for a long time.

However, most aviation experts believed that in the summer of 1943 the American program strategic bombing Nazi Germany was in jeopardy. This was because the U.S. Eighth Air Force did not have long-range escort fighters, and the German air force had reinforced day fighter aircraft to such an extent that they could inflict almost irreparable losses on the American bomber squadrons participating in the raids. At that time, Regensburg and Schweinfurt were too costly bombing targets for the Americans. The bombing of Japan and the subsequent bombing of Germany in 1944 and 1945 was a relatively easy task, since the enemy's air defenses were weakened. When B-29 bombers began bombing Japan in 1944, the latter had hundreds of heavily armed anti-aircraft fighters that were faster than American Super Fortresses. Due to the insufficient interaction between parts of the fighter aviation of the army and the navy, as well as the imperfection of the radar stations, the Japanese were not able to effectively use fighters with a speed of 640 km / h (such as the Frank). It is believed that if Japan had had a fighter force equal in strength to the RAF Fighter Command in 1940, it is not known whether American heavy bombers could have set a classic example of achieving victory through air power. Despite the presence of atomic bombs, in any war of the near future, effective means of defense will be found that can neutralize the effect of weapons of attack. Under the conditions of warfare by means of strategic aviation, the advantage can sometimes be on the side of the defenders, since they have an early detection system that provides data on the number of enemy aircraft participating in the raid, the height and direction of their flight; because supersonic fighters are faster than supersonic bombers and, finally, because radio-controlled rockets, launched from the ground or from the air, can be more effective at short range, that is, in strategic defense than in strategic offensive, as already called Lord Trenchard. In raids on the Soviet Union, American strategic bombers will not enjoy the same freedom of action that they enjoyed in the raids on Japan in 1945. Russia faces difficult defense problems. However, it remains doubtful: who (defense or attack forces) will win complete air superiority over the entire territory of the Soviet Union? American bombers can succeed under heavy fighter cover, against ports and secondary targets, but over inland heavily protected target areas such as Irkutsk and Moscow, they will encounter strong opposition both on their way to the target area and on the return route.

Bomber Lancaster. Photo: Konrad Summers

Seversky, for example, states that “the whole strategy of the Second World War was determined by the insufficient range of the air force. Aircraft possessed destructive power sufficient to upset the military production of the enemy country, but the range of the aircraft was insufficient for such strikes.

Bloody battles during the war were fought in the final analysis for the advancement of airfields of bomber aviation” (Seversky's italics). Of course, the main problem was the shortage of aircraft, not their range, as Air Chief Marshal Harris complains about in his book Bomber Offensives. He asked for 4,000 heavy bombers to carry out air raids on Europe and did not receive them. And it is not known what was the reason for the limited operations of the US 8th Air Force in Europe in 1942 and 1943: the insufficient range of the bombers, their insufficient number, or the strong air defense of the Germans? Moreover, the Red Army on the Eastern Front and the Americans in France and Germany in 1944-1945 fought bloody battles, the purpose of which was by no means to capture advanced airfields for bomber aircraft. The importance of strategic aviation will not be diminished if we say that strategic defense can nullify the full power of a strategic attack, especially when fighter units and anti-aircraft artillery units can be easily and quickly switched from performing tactical tasks to ensure offensive operations of ground forces to combat strategic bombers. The emergence of guided missiles, launched from the ground, from an aircraft or from other guided projectiles, once again underlines the high flexibility of air defense systems in this regard. In assessing the power of strategic bombing, one must constantly consider how many serviceable, manned and ready to fly bombers there are, how strong the enemy's air defenses are, and how accurate and effective bombing can be. In the heat of debate, these important points are often overlooked or ignored. The choice of targets for strategic bombing will always be influenced by such factors as the state of the enemy's air defenses, the importance of the objects of attack, and the amount of intelligence available about the enemy. Meteorological conditions are no longer as important a factor as they were, for example, during US Air Force operations against Germany in 1943 and 1944.

One of the most important lessons of strategic bombing, which has yet to be fully explored, is that the order in which objects are bombed according to their importance cannot play any role until the latest intelligence on the target is obtained. During the Second World War, most of the bomber force was wasted and many civilians were killed simply because the objects of attack were chosen incorrectly. One can recall, for example, how cities in neutral countries - Eire and Switzerland - were accidentally bombarded. This was not so much due to errors in aeronautical calculations, which also happened quite often, but due to ignorance of one's target of bombardment. If the Allied intelligence data on oil production in Germany, on the productivity of oil refineries, were accurate enough, then the Anglo-American strategic bombing of oil industry facilities would have begun much earlier than May 1944. If the Allies had been more aware of the enemy aircraft industry, there would have been no need for intensive bombardment of airframe factories, aircraft engine factories and aircraft assembly plants. There are many ways to kill a cat, but one way for one cat is enough. Intelligence and strategic bombing, like Darby and John, are inseparable from each other, but it is very difficult to achieve full recognition of this need both in peacetime and in wartime. Moreover, during the Second World War, Allied air reconnaissance was often unable to assist in assessing the results of the bombing of targets. If the commander of a strategic bomber does not know exactly to what extent his bombs destroyed the target, then how can he tell which targets he should attack next.

During the Second World War, bomber aircraft were often tasked with attacking targets for which there was virtually no fresh reliable information that could be relied upon. Why did we seek to destroy Monte Cassino by continuous bombing raids that had no military effect? Why, in June, July and August 1940, very small groups of British bombers were sent to bomb German aluminum plants, while Germany had just captured France with all its bauxite stocks and aluminum plants? Unfortunately, there are many such examples.

Apparently, when strategic bombing becomes the basis of strategy, the air command feels the need to carry out the bombing of a certain complex of objects, but often has little idea of ​​​​the purpose of such an event. Air Marshal Harris, in a sense, justifies such actions when he writes: “If the task was to check the strength of the enemy’s defenses, then it was necessary to immediately attack, albeit with small forces. The policy of keeping our fighting forces as long as they could be used on a large scale would mean that we would deprive ourselves of the opportunity to keep up with the enemy's countermeasures. This seems to be the main reason for the error. Scout Bombers can do a lot in terms of probing enemy air defenses, but they can also help make them more solid by giving the defender the opportunity to test their defenses in practice. Of course, strategic bomber aviation must be kept in reserve only until the military value of the facilities is known. What is the use of studying the problems of the bombing of Baku or Berlin and wasting money and effort in vain? At the same time that the bombers are trying to find the weak points of the air defense, the latter is studying ways to deal with the bombers. Getting a brief briefing before taking off on a mission is not the same as being well prepared to launch an attack with the appropriate forces. As Harris himself wrote, “The Dortmund-Ems Canal would never have been blocked for long if it had not been for accurate, often repeated attacks that did not allow the destruction to be restored.” The pilot of the British Air Force was awarded the Victoria Cross for hitting this target. Harris adds with regret: "A feat worthy of the Victoria Cross is of such a nature that it cannot be repeated often."

The question of selecting the forces appropriate to the assigned task, as well as providing intelligence data of an economic nature, cannot be fully resolved. In the future, it will play an even more important role than in the past. The use of the atomic bomb requires more careful reconnaissance of targets than before. This is due to two main reasons. First, the atomic bomb is terribly expensive: a large caliber bomb costs almost a million dollars. Secondly, it cannot be used with equal effect against any military target, and no one will risk throwing away such a huge amount of public money. If at one time crews and aircraft were the most expensive means of strategic aviation, now, in the atomic age, atomic bombs have become such means. The mainstream of the economics of using the air force has changed; atomic bombs are becoming more important than crews, which requires increased intelligence and better planning. The atomic bomb did not change the strategy of air power or the principles of strategic bombing. The atomic bomb did not increase the destructive power to those incredible proportions that were discussed in the first days after the events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Strategic Bombing Research Office has calculated that for such destruction as was done with the atomic bomb in Nagasaki, it would take 120 Superfortres bombers carrying 10 tons of conventional bombs each, and for such destruction as in Hiroshima, 210 bombers. Seversky points out: "It is true that Berlin, Dresden, Cologne, Hamburg, Bremen and many other large German cities received the same heavy destruction and on the same scale as Hiroshima and Nagasaki." It is also true that the suffering of the population, the loss of property and the destruction of industries as a result of firebombing was enormous in Tokyo and other cities in Japan. The use of the atomic bomb inevitably caused emotional experiences that do not contribute to a correct military analysis. The mikado's entourage deliberately exaggerated the destructive power of the atomic bomb in order to convince the Japanese people that it was a new supernatural weapon. This was done to preserve the prestige of the Mikado and to justify Japan's surrender to General MacArthur. In the name of humanity, not in the name of military strategy, John Hersey wrote his horrifying account of the devastation and tragedy in Hiroshima. American readers are more familiar with this document than they are with the more reliable data from the Atomic Energy Commission and reports from the Office of the Study of the Results of Strategic Bombing. It is not easy to overcome the influence of the flood of sensational reports about the atomic bombing that flooded the pages of the press for two or three years after the end of the Second World War. “The greatest tectonic force that has ever hit the earth ... a catastrophe, a world revolution, a flood, a rout and a disaster merged into one,” journalists wrote about this event. It was said that in Hiroshima, on the soil contaminated by the atomic bomb, it was possible to grow cucumbers the size of a skyscraper, as well as a large number of other vegetables of gigantic size, which overshadow all the achievements in the field of horticulture. In fact, it turned out that one Japanese farmer applied more fertilizer than his neighbor, and harvested more. It is now understood by most military commentators that the atomic bomb is not the universal air weapon that was previously believed. It may be appropriate to enumerate some of the limitations in the use of the atomic bomb, without diminishing, however, its power and significance as a deterrent.

It is unwise to use the atomic bomb against strong defensive fortifications. Dropping one large-caliber atomic bomb means risking too much at once. Small-caliber atomic bombs for fighter planes are available, but their cost is high. In a future war, jet fighters will have almost the same range and strike power as any heavy bomber of the Second World War. The creation of smaller atomic bombs and the increase in the rate of their production will reduce the cost of the bomb, but will not make it cheap. If we set ourselves the goal of using atomic bombs economically, then we must strive for the greatest possible number of aircraft carrying them to reach the goal. The high cost of atomic bombs does not allow making big miscalculations when using them. The successful conduct of an attack with the help of atomic bombs urgently requires special care in planning the operation and the best possible reconnaissance support. It is necessary to take special diversionary actions, create radio interference and organize fighter cover. If the atomic bombers are to penetrate inland beyond the range of the escort fighters, they must take advantage of the darkness of the night or poor weather conditions, which means that the accuracy of the bombing will be reduced. If the target cannot be detected visually, then it can be identified using bombsight radars; but at present, the defender has the ability to create radar and electromagnetic interference that can distort the image of the target on the radar screen or mislead the commander. There are many different objects against which the effect of an atomic explosion will be much less effective than against the light wooden dwellings of the Japanese. An analysis of the destruction caused by the use of the atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, as well as during the post-war tests at Bikini and in New Mexico, showed that against some concrete and steel structures, the atomic bomb may be less effective than a series of rocket projectiles or armor-piercing bombs. The use of atomic bombs against reinforced concrete submarine bases, as well as against underground aviation or other factories, is wasteful. Modern cities with their steel and reinforced concrete structures will not suffer to the same extent as Hiroshima and Nagasaki, especially if there is a well-organized anti-nuclear defense, ready to eliminate the consequences of an attack. The use of an atomic bomb against airfields is tantamount to firing a cannon at sparrows. For the same reasons, it is unprofitable to use the atomic bomb against many railway objects, for example against small stations and road junctions. The cost of atomic bombing such targets would be unacceptably high. The consequences of an atomic raid will be effective for about a day. The experience of using the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other data lead to the conclusion that the main restoration work can be carried out in most cases only after a few days. It may take one or two days to eliminate the consequences of an atomic bombing. The zone of continuous destruction now, for World War II bombs, was about one square mile, and not a quarter of a square mile, as was the case in Hiroshima. Finally, most of the shock wave strength and thermal effect is lost because the atomic bomb is detonated at high altitude or because the bulk of the atomic bomb's energy is expended over a limited area.

There is no doubt that strategic bombing should be carried out both day and night. The round-the-clock operations of the Anglo-American aviation against Germany proved the expediency of combining daytime raids with night ones. Such actions forced the Germans to split their fighter aircraft into two parts and divert a large number of squadrons of single-engine and twin-engine fighters from carrying out tasks in support of the German army. There was a need to have two types of fighters: single-engine - with a short range of the "Messerschmit" and "Focke-Wulf", for operations during the day and in good meteorological conditions, and twin-engine - such as "Junkers" and "Messerschmit" - for operations at night and in bad meteorological conditions. Of course, sometimes both performed the same tasks. Most of the American bomber raids on Japan were carried out in daytime, so the defense of Japan was carried out by single-engine day fighters. It would be very instructive to see what would happen to the air defense of Japan if the daytime operations of the American air force were supplemented by the night raids of the British Air Force. If Japan had not capitulated, then the Lancaster bomber squadrons would have begun to conduct combat raids from about. Okinawa. Then the population of the cities of Japan would be forced to suffer from round-the-clock devastating bombardments, as was the case in Hamburg, Leipzig and other German cities. The Japanese fighters would have to work with great tension, and, most importantly, this would affect the composition of the kamikaze air units. It would have been much better in 1944 and 1945 to destroy Japanese fighters during dangerous night battles than to allow them to be used in large numbers against American and British naval vessels. In July 1944, seventeen squadrons were armed with "Zero" (Zeke-52) fighters equipped for use by suicide pilots. Fourteen of these squadrons operated against the American fleet in the fall of that year during the fighting off the Philippines. In addition to transports and cruisers, three American aircraft carriers were damaged: Hornet, Franklin and Hancock. When Japan surrendered in August 1945, it had 5,000 suicide bomber planes ready, mostly fighters. One of the most effective countermeasures against the suicide pilots who threatened the US Navy in the last year of the Pacific War would have been intensive round-the-clock strategic air operations against Japan.



Strategic bombing during World War II took on a larger scale than ever before. Strategic bombing by Nazi Germany, Britain, the US, and Japan used conventional weapons, firebombs, and nuclear weapons.

"Carpet bombing" is an expression denoting non-aimed bombing of areas. In this case, a large number of bombs are used (often in combination with incendiary bombs) to completely destroy the selected area, or to destroy the enemy personnel and materiel, or to demoralize him. During civil war in Spain in 1937, the city of Guernica was bombed when at least 100 civilians were killed during the raids of the Condor Legion. Nazi Germany resorted to bombing civilian targets from the early days of World War II. The British government ordered its RAF to strictly adhere to the Amsterdam Draft International Rules, which forbade attacks on civilian infrastructure outside the war zone, but abandoned it on May 15, 1940, the day after the bombing of Rotterdam. On August 24, 1940, German aircraft launched the first bombing of London. A period of mutual bombing of cities followed, the main target of which was the industrial urban zones. In February 1942, the RAF ceased its attempts at precision strategic bombing, and switched to the practice of carpet bombing, the main purpose of which was "the morale of the enemy's civilian population." It was clarified that "the target of the bombing should be residential areas, and not, for example, docks or aircraft factories."

The United States entered the war with the intention of using high-precision strategic bombing, which was used with varying degrees of success in Europe. However, in the case of Japan, due to the presence of high-altitude jet streams, high-precision strategic bombing proved ineffective and was abandoned in favor of carpet bombing. The British were deeply impressed by the German strategic bombing of the First World War. For the first time in hundreds of years, London was successfully attacked by the enemy. When the war began in 1939, the RAF had only 488 bombers of all types, mostly obsolete, of which only about 60 were new Vickers. Most of the rest did not have sufficient range to strike even on the Ruhr (not to mention Berlin), had insignificant weapons, and could not carry a significant bomb load. There were no effective sights for bombing, very few bombs that could cause significant damage to the enemy, and even such obvious things as maps of Europe to determine the course to the target and back were in great short supply. Moreover, the difficulty of targeting bombers, at night, at long ranges to accurately attack small targets, was greatly underestimated.

Germany by that time had abandoned plans for the production of strategic bombers. In view of the fact that German technical resources were already largely used to meet other needs. The doctrine of the Luftwaffe assumed the active support of the army, and taking into account the practical experience of Spain, German command concentrated on the use of tactical bombers as aerial artillery in support of army operations, and fighters as a means of protecting bombers from enemy fighters. With the outbreak of hostilities in Western Europe, all three main participants (UK, Germany and France) concentrated on daytime tactical bombing. The RAF found that bravery in combat could not make up for the lack of necessary aircrew training and aircraft armament; the losses of the British bombers during the defense of France were catastrophic, and the results of their action were minimal. As a result, following the results of the first year of the war, few people remembered the strategic bombing.

Due to mounting losses during the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe began resorting to night bombing tactics. During the week beginning 12 August, less than a quarter of the Luftwaffe's flights were made at night, while in last week August - already more than half. On 19 August Goering ordered a major night attack on Liverpool, and gave his subordinates the freedom to choose targets for the bombing. London was bombed on 15, 18/19, 22/23, 24/25, 25/26 and 28/29 August. In general, during the bombing of British cities in August 1940, more than 1,000 people died.

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In response, the RAF made its first raid on Berlin on 25/26 August. This was politically embarrassing for Göring, who argued that the Luftwaffe could protect major German cities from air raids. Under pressure from his superiors, Kesselring in particular, and believing that the RAF was much weaker than it actually was, Goering ordered the bombing of London to be concentrated in the hope that the "last remaining" RAF fighters would be drawn into dogfights, in which the Luftwaffe will be able to win due to numerical superiority. The massive bombing of London began on 7 September, with over 300 bombers attacking in the evening and another 250 at night. By the morning of September 8, 430 Londoners had been killed, and the Luftwaffe issued a press release stating that over one thousand tons of bombs had been dropped on London within 24 hours. Over the next 9 months, many English cities were bombed, including Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Belfast, Cardiff and Coventry. The stated goal of the bombings was strategic - the destruction of port and industrial infrastructure; but it is also beyond doubt that breaking the will of the ordinary English to resist was an important, if not the main, aim of this campaign.

Civilian casualties were significant. The expected decline in the will to resist, however, did not occur; moreover, according to popular belief, the bombings had the opposite effect. During 1941, the air forces of the parties were drawn into the radio navigation war. German scientists developed a range of radio navigation devices designed to help Luftwaffe pilots target at night over British territory, while the British worked on countermeasures (of which it is worth mentioning the development of airborne radar, decoy beacons and radio jammers). Despite the significant damage inflicted by the German bombing and significant loss of life among the civilian population, Britain's air defense gradually improved, and the need to transfer all possible parts of the Luftwaffe to the Eastern Front led to the gradual transformation of the bombing from massive to rare harassing raids.

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Britain launched its own strategic night bombing campaign in 1940 and built it up to impressive proportions by the end of the war. The impact of strategic bombing on the enemy was poorly understood at the time and greatly exaggerated. Especially in the first two years of the campaign, very few people realized how little the damage was and how quickly the Germans made up for lost production, despite the obvious lessons that Britain could learn from its own experience of surviving German air attacks earlier.

Arthur Harris, head of the Royal Air Force Bomber Command, said that "for lack of a rapier, they had to resort to a club." In his perception, although pinpoint strikes against specific targets would be much more preferable, it was not physically possible to do this, and since war is war, it is necessary to attack with what is at hand. He supported the idea of ​​bombing cities. Knowing that it would result in civilian casualties, because it was a choice between bombing cities and no bombing at all. And also, because the bombing of cities meant the dropping of large numbers of bombs on areas full of economic activity, in which industrial plants were located, making a significant contribution to German military production.

A very significant part of British industry was occupied with the task of creating a huge fleet of heavy bombers. Up until 1944, the effect on German war production remained extremely small and raised doubts as to whether the result was worth the effort. The usual counter-argument to this was that, in any event, this was the only direction in which British war production could be directed. The impact of strategic bombing on German resource allocation, however, became significant over time, as Germany eventually had to devote up to a quarter of its military production to air defense and bombing relief. The damage done to the German transport system was also very significant. In addition, the Luftwaffe was weakened and by the middle of 1944 the Allies had gained air supremacy over Germany during the daytime, which was absolutely necessary for successful preparation to the Allied landings in Normandy.

In August 1942, the first crews of the US 8th Air Force began to arrive in England, armed with Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress strategic bombers. The first test raid was made on August 17, 1942 on a railway junction in Rouen Sotteville in northwestern France. In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, it was decided to begin strategic bombing of Germany by joint Anglo-American forces. The targets of the bombing were to be both objects of the military industry and the cities of Germany. The operation was codenamed Point Blank. Large-scale round-the-clock bombing - by the US Air Force during the day, by the British - at night - many industrial areas of Germany, mainly the Ruhr, were subjected to. This was followed by attacks directly on cities such as Hamburg, Kassel, Pforzheim, Mainz and the often criticized raid on Dresden. The tonnage dropped by the US Air Force in Europe was much less than the RAF, as the latter had larger bombers and bombed over a longer period. Despite their popularity among the military and politicians, strategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds, since it did not always give a reliable result, and on moral grounds, due to significant civilian casualties.

In Germany, the will to resist was not broken by strategic bombing, which was carried out on a larger scale than the German bombing of Great Britain. In Germany, as well as in Japan, there were no surrender riots and the German workers, with sullen stoicism, supported war production to the maximum. high level; the morale of German civilians also, although affected by the bombing, survived until the end of the war. Most of the German civilians, mostly women and children, were evacuated from the cities in the later stages of the war. Workers in some, but not all, factories were replaced by German concentration camp prisoners with low labor motivation who were severely repressed by their SS guards if their productivity declined; most of the surviving German workers, however, continued to work and remained in their posts.

to be continued…

Hamburg, Lübeck, Dresden and many other settlements that fell into the firestorm zone survived the terrible bombardment. Vast areas of Germany were devastated. Over 600,000 civilians were killed, twice as many were injured or maimed, and 13 million were left homeless. Priceless works of art, ancient monuments, libraries and scientific centers were destroyed. The question, what are the goals and true results of the bombing war of 1941-1945, is being investigated by Inspector General of the German Fire Service Hans Rumpf. The author analyzes the results of strategic bombing of German territory and evaluates their effectiveness from a military point of view.

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The following excerpt from the book Fire storm. Strategic bombing of Germany. 1941-1945 (Hans Rumpf) provided by our book partner - the company LitRes.

STRATEGY OF AIR WAR

It is now considered an indisputable fact that the German concept of air warfare was wrong, even fatal for the country, while the British doctrine proved its correctness and effectiveness. In Germany, this opinion is fueled by a general disappointment in the results of the aviation opposition of the parties. This disappointment was experienced by both the military and the civilian population. This was greatly facilitated by the publication of the pessimistic works of wartime pilots X. Rickhoff (Trumpf oder Bluff (“Trump or Bluff”?) and W. Baumbach (Zu Spat (“Latecomers!”), Written in 1945 and 1949, respectively. Similar thoughts repeatedly but one who has studied the more thoughtful publications of recent years, which dealt with the problem of the combat use of aviation, must ask himself whether it is possible to speak so categorically and unambiguously about a subject that requires careful comprehensive study.

The main theme of the attacks of the disappointed Germans is that the leaders of the country were too carried away by tactical aviation and the issues of its interaction with army units on the battlefield, which could not but negatively affect the plans for the deployment of a strategic aviation war and did not allow working out an appropriate strategy for air counteraction to the enemy. In 1935, the first Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe made a recommendation for the development of a four-engine long-range bomber as part of the general German rearmament plan. This, of course, would open up the prospects for the creation of strategic aviation to the Germans. Then they might have been able to catch up with the British in this matter. But it is believed that his narrow-minded followers failed to understand or simply ignored the very essence of the strategy of modern air warfare: achieving air superiority in order to organize a decisive strategic air offensive behind enemy lines. Thus, as the official story goes, Germany was left without a fleet of heavy bombers, and as a result (although this is not usually stated directly) she lost the war in the sky and, as a result, the war itself.

Against such a simplified concept, it can be objected that from the very beginning and as further development events, the strategy for the use of military aviation was determined geographic location two main opponents of the country.

From this point of view, it is important to understand whether the enemy is on the same continent or is separated from the country by an ocean, whether the enemy is mainly a land or sea power. Island states depend on maritime forces; continental countries need to provide defense strong army. Aviation, which has become a new type of armed forces, is most closely associated with the navy, and war in the sky is somewhat like war at sea.

British developments

As for the UK, air operations were closely linked to operations at sea, and the Air Force interacted with the Navy in matters of ensuring the security of sea lanes. Therefore, the crews of British aircraft resembled sailors in character, and in the reports on the progress of the operation, the expression "captains and crews" was typical. One can just as easily compare air marshals with admirals. At the same time, representatives of the senior command staff of the Luftwaffe had the rank of field marshal. Many of them did have the rank of field marshal before being transferred to the Air Force.

According to British tradition, strategic aviation is a separate branch of the armed forces. It is relatively small, but has a highly developed technical support structure. It was believed that such an organization reduces the number of losses and contributes to a more successful implementation of the combat mission. An old English song sings of the great heroes of the nation who died in the Battle of Trafalgar. The same is true of folk tales. The 185 men who laid down their lives in that decisive battle at sea did more for their country than the 800,000 British soldiers who died in battles of attrition on the fields of France and Flanders during the First World War. The typical British view of warfare is that it should be won with as little loss and liability as possible.

But in those days when the war was just beginning, no one could have imagined that the losses of the Royal Air Force in World War II would amount to 79,281 people killed. At the same time, only the command of the bomber aviation lost 44 thousand killed, 22 thousand wounded and 11 thousand missing. In other words, the losses of the Air Force exceeded the losses of the army in the operations of invasion and liberation of Europe. The horrendous loss figures gave rise to a lot of reproaches against the command that the bomb war was “the most illiterate, cruel and most bloody of all forms of warfare” (Captain Cyril Falls), “the world has not known such uncivilized methods of warfare since the time of the Mongol devastation "(B.G. Liddell Hart).

Despite the fact that England was clearly inclined towards the option of waging a strategic bombing war, they never forgot about air defense issues either. At the initial stage of the war, air defense forces were actually given priority. At that time, fighter aviation was given such importance in ensuring the defense of the islands that it was not inferior to the forces of the Luftwaffe Fighter Command, and, according to the latest data, even surpassed them. In any case, fighter aircraft were carefully prepared to repel an enemy attack, if any. At the same time, the bomber command then complained that it "had no meat to cover its bones."

Beginning in 1935, the program for the four-engined bomber, an aircraft that was supposed to stop the heart of German industry, enjoyed full support. Seven years passed before the British authorities were pleased to state that they had got what they were striving for: in 1942, the first Halifax and Lancaster bombers entered service. Despite its relatively small size, the Lancaster could carry 9 tons of bomb load without compromising its flight performance. In this "no other bomber could compare with it." Until then, Britain had not had a bomber at its disposal that could cause serious damage to Germany.

The head of the British Air Force Bomber Command requested 4,000 heavy bombers of this type for the needs of bomber aviation, as well as a thousand Mosquito light high-speed bombers in order to be able to operate over German territory around the clock. Later, when during the war came critical moment, he asked for even more: "30 thousand bombers - and tomorrow the war will be over."

But even a more modest request could only be met at the expense of other branches of the armed forces. In fact, the first air attack on the cities of Germany began in the spring of 1942, when only 69 heavy bombers were under the command of the bomber command.

At the peak of the massive air attack on Germany in the autumn of 1943, the British had 1,120 heavy and 100 fast light bombers to do so. But by that time, the Royal Air Force was supported by about a thousand more Flying Fortresses from the US Air Force.

Air power of Germany as a land power

So, as can be seen from the above, Great Britain was constantly working towards the development of its Air Force, which became an independent branch of the armed forces from 1918, trying to make aviation an "air force" in the full sense of the word. At the same time, the prevailing trend in Germany was to create "ground aviation", designed to work closely with ground forces on the battlefield. The views of the Russians and the French on the development of aviation were closer to the German concept. Everything indicates that Hitler and his generals thought primarily in terms of land warfare. In peacetime, the Air Force was called upon to serve as an instrument of foreign policy pressure. During the war, their main task was to provide direct support for the conduct of a "blitzkrieg" war on the ground.

This was the basic idea for which the Luftwaffe command is now usually accused of adopting the "wrong" concept of warfare in the air. Allegedly, this concept forced to pay undeservedly increased attention to the creation of a dive bomber (Ju-87). In addition, there were twin-engine medium-range bombers capable of diving. At the same time, the role of the long-range heavy bomber was seriously underestimated.

But German military doctrine was not based on defense. And Hitler held completely opposite views. Thus, from the very beginning, offensive tasks were set before the Luftwaffe. The bomber was considered "an aircraft for conquering the battlefield", although not a single air offensive of an operational scale was ever carried out. It will forever remain a mystery. Hitler and Goering were not interested in fighters, they needed bombers. And yet they never set themselves the task of creating an effective long-range bomber. They had to choose among the following options:

a) heavy, armored, low-speed four-engine bomber with a crew of 7 to 10 people, having high flow fuel;

b) a faster twin-engine medium lightly armored bomber with a crew of 3 to 5 people and a bomb load of 500 to a thousand kilograms (Junkers-88 took on board up to 3 thousand kg of bombs, Heinkel-111 up to 2 thousand kg, "Dornier-17" up to a thousand kg. - Ed.);

c) a one- or two-seat high-speed bomber, the speed of which, if possible, should have exceeded the speed of a fighter.

There were different opinions as to whether a dive bomber or a bomber that bombs from level flight will have better flight characteristics and therefore higher efficiency in air warfare. There were also discussions about range, speed, ceiling, takeoff and landing speeds. Even now it is not known exactly why the long-range bomber was never built in the end. The reasons for this are still a topic of heated debate.

The conditions in which England and Germany found themselves before the start of the feverish arms race were not the same. As for Germany, one should not forget about the monstrous race that the country had to undertake after 15 years, when its armed forces were practically disarmed. In addition, the re-equipment of the Air Force had to be carried out in an even greater hurry compared to the army and navy. In addition, it was at that time that the period came when technology around the world developed by leaps and bounds. When a combat aircraft prototype, after several years of work on it, was finally ready for production, it often became obsolete. In an environment of rapid technological leap, the recommendations of even the most perceptive and experienced experts could easily be wrong.

Those problems which in Germany still had to be carefully and attentively examined, had long since been solved in England. Prototypes of strategic bombers were already undergoing flight tests and were to go into production in the very near future. The situation in the USA was just as favorable. Both countries, in the strictest secrecy, successfully developed long-range strategic bombers.

In Germany, a long, unfavorable period of disarmament imposed on her, during which she was generally forbidden to build military aircraft, canceled out the obvious benefits of starting everything from clean slate. Perhaps the situation would have been different if the Luftwaffe had been built up gradually, without constant pressure. But Goering and his staff were too impatient to wait for competent answers to fundamental technical questions. This impatience, as well as the nervousness and unease caused by the uncertain situation, reflected a state of internal uncertainty, the fear that too much time had been lost and that England might now take them by surprise.

Hitler was an amateur in matters of aviation and was constantly dependent on the opinion of his experts, such as Göring, Udet, Eschonnek, who, at a young age during the First World War, proved to be outstanding fighter pilots. But, becoming politicians and statesmen, they had neither the time nor the opportunity to acquire fundamental knowledge in the field of aviation strategy. In the Ministry of the Air Force, which was headed by Goering, there were seven heads of departments, four of whom were from the army and had no experience in aviation at all. Therefore, it is obvious that such people were simply not able to compete with the more experienced specialists of the British Air Ministry in determining the strategy for the construction and use of the Air Force.

It seems likely that Hitler was actually afraid of the prospect of being drawn into an all-out air war, having some idea of ​​how such a confrontation might end. This explains the readiness with which he seized on the new idea of ​​establishing protected areas put forward in 1936, as well as his many attempts to put an end to massive bombing. Such steps were, of course, carefully considered and never entirely sincere. Hitler's last active attempts to stop air terror were made in 1940, when his army occupied advantageous positions, occupying ports along the English Channel. He tried to find his own method of warfare, which could be countered by the strategic air offensive of the British. When he did not succeed, the policy of the two countries in the construction and use of military aviation began to differ so much that finally a situation developed when Germany did not have strategic aviation, and England practically had no tactical aviation. And during the war, both sides, due to technical difficulties, simply could not restore the situation. For Germany, this was mainly due to two reasons: firstly, the disastrous campaign in Russia greedily absorbed everything created by the military industry. And secondly, what happened later, the needs of the defense of their own territory made the production of fighters more and more vital. There are critics who are inclined to regard the underestimation of the need for a tactical air force in England as a profound mistake as the failure of Germany to build its own strategic bomber force capable of attacking industrial facilities and undermining enemy morale in a war to destroy the economy and production. In addition, these aircraft, if necessary, could inflict retaliatory air strikes on the enemy.

From the very beginning, Hitler viewed the Luftwaffe as a weapon of foreign policy pressure and even blackmail. An example is Prague, where this worked effectively for the first time. On the other hand, the propaganda had so inflated the alleged power of the Luftwaffe that the actual use of the Air Force was inevitably associated with a feeling of great disappointment. This is what happened with Goering's famous promise to create such a barrier to enemy aircraft in the West that not a single Allied aircraft could overcome it. Both at home and abroad, German propaganda tirelessly repeated that the Luftwaffe was so much stronger than the aviation of any other country that they were simply invincible. And, as is often the case with propaganda, she allowed herself to play a great game with numbers. This was also a factor that acted against the creation of strategic aviation, since all efforts were aimed at hitting opponents with unprecedented figures regarding the volume of aircraft production in the country.

At that time, Udet had the greatest influence on the technical policy of Germany in the field of aviation. His views were very categorical: "We do not need expensive heavy bombers, since their creation requires too much raw material, compared with the production of a twin-engine dive bomber."

Perhaps here lies the key to the failures of the Luftwaffe? Maybe Germany could not afford to maintain powerful strategic bomber aircraft due to the lack of raw materials, production capacity and sufficient fuel reserves? The country had to save. Of course, not in money - huge sums of money were spent on the creation and development of the Luftwaffe. We had to conserve raw materials, such as aluminum, as well as high-octane gasoline. Here neither Germany nor England possessed unlimited resources.

Finally, the lightly armored Ju-88 ("Junkers-88") was created in Germany. For its time, it was a high-speed car (480 km / h), but nevertheless it could not compete in speed with the Royal Air Force fighters (520 km / h Hurricane, 600 km / h Spitfire). But this program had advantages in terms of a purely quantitative indicator: instead of one long-range bomber, three short-range bombers could be built.

For the entire duration of the war, approximately 100 thousand aircraft were produced in Germany against 400 aircraft produced in England. However, one should not forget that Germany produced 41,700 tanks, while England produced 26,000. Hitler and Goering pretended to be ignorant of the vast manufacturing power of the United States, as if they did not consider them an important factor in the outbreak of conflict. But it is unlikely that they themselves seriously believed in this, since both remembered the times of the First World War, when everyone had the opportunity to see what role the US economy had on the course and results of the war. During World War II, Detroit alone produced 27,000 heavy bombers and 5 million high-explosive aircraft bombs.

Lessons from the Battle of England

As is now known, the leaders of Germany, responsible for the country's policy in the field of building the Air Force, did not abandon the creation of heavy long-range bombers capable of carrying a large bomb load. It's just that this task has been postponed to the future. As a consequence of this decision, all efforts were focused on the release of dive bombers, as well as medium-range bombers, intended for close support of ground forces. As a result, Germany hoped to create the most powerful tactical aircraft in the world for its time. The Germans hoped to partially compensate for their lack of strategic bomber aviation by the fact that, having occupied vast areas on enemy territory, they would deprive him of the opportunity to wage a serious air war against the Reich. In accordance with this basic postulate, the Luftwaffe was created solely as a means of supporting army units and formations on the battlefield. The German Air Force was consolidated into so-called air fleets, each of which had squadrons of medium bombers designed to solve limited operational tasks. But they did not have the ability to bomb long distances and over large areas over an extended period. As the data of the strategic analysis of the results of the bombing war in Europe conducted by the Americans showed, at the first stage of the war this form of air countermeasures was absolutely successful for the Germans. The first time the Luftwaffe was defeated was during the Air Battle of England. But even then it did not hurt the German leadership too much. Everyone was sure that after Russia was defeated, Germany would have plenty of time to deal with England once and for all.

In an address to the Imperial Defense Committee on November 8, 1943, Goering, as if defending himself, pathetically exclaimed: “At the beginning of the war, Germany was the only country that had an effective air force at its disposal, which is independent view armed forces and armed with first-class aircraft. You can already comment on this statement, but what the Reichsmarschall said next clearly demonstrates the confusion that reigned in his brains regarding the strategy of air war: “At that time, all other states crushed the power of their aviation, distributing it between the ground forces and the fleet. Aircraft were considered as auxiliary weapons. Therefore, they did not have a means of delivering massive strikes. But in Germany we had it from the very beginning. The bulk of our Air Force had a structure that made it possible to strike in the depths of enemy territory and achieve strategic results. Although, of course, a small number of our dive bombers and, of course, our fighters also operated over the battlefield.

With certain limitations, these words can be considered more or less true in order to characterize the first months of the war, when the few and obsolete aircraft of Poland, as well as the French air force, were taken by surprise and were mostly destroyed on their own airfields. But Goering ignores the exact opposite fact that took place during the Battle of England. They were not inferior to the Luftwaffe (the British fighter aircraft, of course, were inferior to the German ones both in quantity and quality, especially in the initial period of the Battle of England. But there were many factors on the side of the British. Here are the short duration of the action of German fighters, and anti-aircraft artillery, and radars ( i.e. early detection), and wrong tactics. Ed.) The Royal Air Force dispelled this myth. Then it became very quickly clear that neither as a branch of the armed forces, nor as a conceptual means of the Luftwaffe were not suitable for waging the unfolding strategic aviation war. The war in the air, which the leaders of Germany expected to fight in the autumn of 1940, had nothing to do with real events. Everything went completely wrong. There was no clear vision of the situation. absent practical experience waging such a war; technical issues were especially poorly worked out. The "effective air force" that Goering spoke of acted in an obviously disorderly and even confused manner in the rapidly changing situation at different phases of the air war. Sometimes they were used hesitantly and at random, even when conducting operations of a not very large scale. And sometimes, on the contrary, German pilots recklessly rushed into battle during large-scale operations in a rapidly changing environment. This did not take into account, for example, the fact that actions against certain targets require a different approach in the daytime and at night. After five months of fierce fighting, in which the Luftwaffe suffered heavy losses, the political leadership of the country decided to attack Russia. During the preparations for a new war, the German Air Force was forced to first weaken the onslaught on England, and then completely curtail the air offensive.

For a while, public opinion in Germany managed to be misled. People didn't know the truth about what was going on. The populace had no idea of ​​the extreme strain that all crews and ground services had to endure from the start of the Battle of England. Reality showed that the tasks set during the strikes on British territory, namely the conquest of air supremacy and the achievement of decisive strategic results after bombing industrial and administrative centers, turned out to be impossible. For this, the country simply did not have the necessary technical means. Not only for this reason, but the Luftwaffe never again had the opportunity to benefit from the experience, which had to be so heavily paid for, since they were no longer able to conduct large-scale operations. Unlike the Germans, the British Royal Air Force later used this experience to the fullest.

The truth is that even if all the leaders of the Luftwaffe were geniuses in their field, the equipment that was then in service with the German Air Force could not achieve decisive goals and seriously affect the course of the war. Today it is known that even 20-30 times more significant aviation forces, that is, those that the Allies concentrated to carry out bombing attacks on German territory, were insufficient to seriously affect the work of the country's military industry enterprises. Some tangible results were achieved only towards the end of the war, when the Allied aviation had absolute air superiority and was able to unhinderedly deliver accurate bombing strikes on selected objects of key industries: ball bearing factories, aircraft factories, factories for the production of synthetic fuel. In parallel, highways and railways were bombed. Therefore, it is not surprising that even the most desperate efforts of the Luftwaffe at the beginning of World War II were not enough, and the results achieved were very different from what was envisaged by ambitious plans. The fact remains that, given a really difficult task, the Luftwaffe, who at that time was less than five years old, did not have enough experience and did not even know how to competently start solving it.

German public opinion is still inclined to see the country's lack of strategic aviation as the cause of the catastrophic situation that had developed in the country by the end of the war. But, as the data of the US Air Force Strategic Command Research Group show, despite the fact that Hitler, of course, planned to create a highly effective air force in the country, he did not attach much importance to the problem of destroying the enemy’s military economy by bombing. The reason for this lies in the fact that Germany planned to conquer enemy territories so quickly that there was no need to separately plan the destruction of enemy military enterprises.

Air Marshal Harris writes in his book "Bomber Offencive" (Bomber Offencive. P. 86): "They [the Germans] actually had no strategic bombers at all, since all their bomber aircraft, which included more than a thousand machines, had to provide problem solving by the army. It was used for bombing cities only when it was not required to provide support to the German army units. Even in the daytime, it was suitable for solving only tactical, but not strategic tasks.

Physicist, Laureate Nobel Prize Professor Blackett in his book The Military and Political Consequences of the Development of Atomic Energy writes: “It is obvious that the German Air Force was built in such a way that it was intended to perform primarily tactical tasks, mainly to interact with parts of the ground forces. .. They acted in this way, and, with the exception of the destruction of parts of Warsaw, Rotterdam and Belgrade as a result of air raids in front of the advanced units of their troops, the German offensive in Europe was carried out without massive attacks on enemy cities.

Speight attributes this tactic to a lack of understanding. Indeed, he is inclined to believe that the Germans lack intelligence. “The Germans never understood anything about the sky,” he claims smugly. In this, Lord Tedder agrees with him: “They [the Germans] could not understand what air power means, even more than they understood nothing about what sea power means” (Air power in war. P. 45) . Most, but, as we shall see later, not all representatives of the victorious countries share these views. And even in Germany itself, there are now those who retroactively reproach the Luftwaffe command, since allegedly "none of them possessed a strategic talent on the scale of Moltke." This refers to the great German "railroad strategist", a man for whom "technological progress was only a favorable means to wage swift victorious wars." (Meaning Moltke Sr. (1800 - 1891). - Ed.)

It is easy to understand that this comparison has a very dubious value. By the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, the railway network in both countries was already quite highly developed. Therefore, one can easily call that conflict "the world's first war on railway". But the bombing of the enemy for the first time began to be used only in the Second World War. And even in World War II, there was only one operational line of strategic communications and supply by air (from West Africa to Egypt).

Such reckless criticism once again demonstrates how much easier it is sometimes to create a preconceived opinion than to determine the real state of the problem. When they begin to investigate the issue for real, they come to much more objective conclusions. Thus, for example, Professor Blackett, analyzing what might have happened if Germany had abandoned most of its military industry to the construction of strategic bomber aircraft, writes: “It is clear that by the time of the surrender of France, such a turn in German policy would have been detrimental to her major military forces. campaigns. On the one hand, such a turn would have to be carried out through perfectly organized interaction between the ground forces and aviation. On the other hand, this did not promise any obvious benefits in the near future, since the campaigns in Poland, France and the Netherlands were won too quickly for the Germans to have time to feel the need to have their own strategic aviation ... If at that time Hitler had more long-range bombers and fewer fighters, then in 1940 he would have been even less prepared for the capture of England” (pp. 27-28).

Of course, given the terrible destruction in the heart of Europe, many Germans regret that Germany did not have an effective retaliatory force at its disposal, which, perhaps, would make the "bombers" consider whether to continue air raids. But, one way or another, in Germany many times they began to work on the creation of a modern heavy bomber, but, for one reason or another, these attempts constantly ended in failure. Several German-produced four-engine aircraft were quickly lost in the epic, grueling battles in the East, or shot down on long-range reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic. The light bomber "Lightning", which for many years was Hitler's cherished dream, was created too late for it to be used in large numbers. And one of the main reasons for this lies in the fact that previous failures made Hitler suspicious and incredulous. They forced him to try himself as a designer. The He-177 heavy bomber was developed between 1942 and 1944. This aircraft had an unusual design, it was equipped with four twin engines. However, its creators never managed to overcome the so-called "growth problems", and in the end the project was abandoned. If you believe that before the project was finally buried, 1146 aircraft were produced, then this was another disaster for the country, which few people know about.

But much more important than the lack of effective strategic bomber aviation in Germany was the lack of training there for a competent organization of strategic air defense, although in this case the lack of raw materials cannot figure as an intelligible reason for this. When a significant number of fighter planes were produced in Germany by the summer of 1944, they found themselves chained to the ground, as they were practically left without trained flight personnel.

At the same time, the leaders of the Luftwaffe really rarely had a clear idea of ​​the tasks before them. Organization, equipment and operational planning were often carried out without in the best way. Until, finally, one day everything collapsed at once. The German military industry has never been powerful enough to fully satisfy all the needs of the Luftwaffe, so the conclusions set out in the books of X. Rickhoff and W. Baumbach "Trump or Bluff?" and "Latecomers!" only give a distorted picture of reality. Perhaps the most accurate situation could be described in the book "Too weak!". And the people who unleashed the war in 1939 are guilty of all this.

The myth of the strategic bombing of Germany by Anglo-American aircraft

The main myths of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of Germany in 1943-1945 are that they played a decisive role in the collapse of German resistance in World War II. This thesis was actively disseminated during the war years by American and British propaganda, and in post-war years gained popularity in Anglo-American historiography. An opposite and equally mythological thesis was reinforced in Soviet historiography, which asserted that the Anglo-American bombing of Germany only slightly reduced its military and economic potential.

In January 1943, at the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt and Churchill decided to begin strategic bombing of Germany with a joint Anglo-American force. The targets of the bombing were to be both objects of the military industry and the cities of Germany. The operation was codenamed Point Blank. Prior to this, British air raids on German cities were of more moral than strategic importance. Now the main hopes were placed on the American B-17 Flying Fortress four-engine strategic bombers. Initially, German aircraft factories, as well as factories for the production of engines and ball bearings, were identified as priority targets. However, on April 17, 1943, an attempt to attack the Focke-Wulf plant near Bremen with 115 bombers ended in failure. 16 aircraft were shot down and 48 damaged. Since the main aircraft factories were located in the south of Germany, bombers were forced to fly there without fighter escort. This made daytime raids too risky due to insufficient fighter cover, and targeted bombing was ruled out during night raids. A raid on Schweinfurt, where there was a plant that produced almost 100% of German ball bearings, and on the center of the aircraft industry Regensburg in Bavaria on August 17, 1943, led to the loss of 60 B-17s out of 377 and 5 Spitfire fighters and P-47 Thunderbolts. The Luftwaffe lost 27 Me-109, Me-110 and FV-190 fighters. About 200 civilians were killed.

The second attack on Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, led to even more deplorable results. Of the 291 B-17s, 77 were lost. Another 122 vehicles were damaged. Of the 2,900 crew members, 594 were missing, 5 were killed and 43 were wounded. After that, the bombing of targets deep in Germany was postponed until the availability of escort fighters, which could accompany the bombers all the way from the airfield to the target and back.

On January 11, 1944, during the attack of Oschersleben, Halberstadt and Braunschweig, 60 Flying Fortresses were irretrievably lost.

The third raid on Schweinfurt on 24 February 1944 was successful. Thanks to the escort of the P-51 Mustang and P-47 Thunderbolt fighters with external tanks, only 11 of the 231 B-17s participating in the raid were lost. "Mustangs" were able to fly to Berlin and back. The raid on Schweinfurt was part of the air battle over Germany, which later became known as "Big Week" and lasted from 20 to 25 February. During it, the Anglo-American Air Force, which attacked aircraft industry facilities, lost 378 bombers and 28 fighters, while the Luftwaffe lost 355 fighters and about a hundred pilots. This damage forced the Germans to sharply increase the production of fighters. From now on, they could not even dominate the skies over Germany. This guaranteed the success of the allied invasion of France. From the end of April 1944, the theater of operations was moved to France and the bombing was aimed at disabling the transport infrastructure in order to make it difficult to transfer German reinforcements. As a result of the raids, the total productivity of synthetic fuel plants from April to July decreased from 180,000 tons to 9,000 tons per month. Despite the fact that 200 thousand workers were specially allocated for the restoration of these enterprises, productivity in August was only 40 thousand tons per month, and this level was not raised until the end of the war. Also, as a result of raids, the production of synthetic rubber decreased by 6 times.

Strategic bombing resumed in full in September 1944 and was now focused on synthetic fuel plants and transport infrastructure. As a result, fuel production dropped sharply, and since September 1944 the German army and the Luftwaffe were on starvation rations. Now the German air defense had little to oppose to the Anglo-American bombing. From the end of 1944, due to the depletion of synthetic fuel, German aircraft very rarely took to the air. Arms production in Germany grew until September 1944, and then began to decline due to the impact of strategic bombing. And in 1944, the Luftwaffe consumed 92% of synthetic gasoline and only 8% of conventional, and in the land army, the share of synthetic fuel was 57%. By the time the Anglo-American troops surrounded and occupied the Ruhr in March 1944, its industry was practically paralyzed due to the destruction of the transport infrastructure.

When it turned out that it was not possible to permanently disable aircraft factories and other key industrial facilities in Germany with the help of aerial bombardments, the Anglo-American command decided to switch to area bombing (the so-called "carpet bombing") of large cities in order to undermine the morale of the German population and army. A series of such bombardments hit Hamburg between 25 July and 3 August 1943. More than 50 thousand people died, about 200 thousand were injured. Such a large number of victims was due to the fact that a fiery tornado arose in the city. Berlin, Cologne, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Nuremberg and other cities were also subjected to carpet bombing.

"Carpet bombing" also continued until almost the end of the war. The largest was the bombing of Dresden on February 23–25, 1945. At least 25 thousand people died then. There are also higher estimates - up to 135 thousand dead. Many of the approximately 200,000 refugees could have perished in the city, although there was no exact count.

The last raid of the Flying Fortresses was made on April 25, 1945. In the future, due to the lack of targets in connection with the occupation of all major German cities by the Allied troops, strategic bombing was stopped.

In total, 593 thousand people became victims of the bombing of Germany within the borders of 1937, including about 32 thousand prisoners of war. About 42 thousand people died in Austria and the Sudetenland. About half a million people were injured. In France, the victims of the Anglo-American bombing were 59 thousand killed and wounded. In England - 60.5 thousand people died as a result of German bombing and shelling with V-1 and V-2 rockets.

In general, the strategic bombing of German cities did not play a decisive role in the outcome of the war, but it must be admitted that their role was significant. They significantly slowed down the growth of the German military industry, forced the Germans to spend significant resources on the restoration of destroyed factories and cities. In the last six months of the war, thanks to the constant destruction of the main factories for the production of synthetic fuel, the Luftwaffe was practically chained to the ground, which, perhaps, brought victory over Germany closer by several months.

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