“I will die on the deck of the Nagato, and by that time Tokyo will have been bombed 3 times.”
- Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

The defeat of Japan in World War II seems so natural that there cannot be any options or discrepancies. The total superiority of the United States in natural, human and industrial resources, multiplied by a powerful economy and a high level of scientific development - in such conditions, America's victory in the war was only a matter of time.

If everything is extremely obvious about the general reasons for the defeat of the Japanese Empire, then the purely technical side of naval battles in the Pacific is of genuine interest: the Imperial Japanese Navy, once one of the most powerful fleets in the world, perished under the blows of numerically superior enemy forces. He died in terrible agony, suffering and agony. The armor warped, rivets flew out, the plating burst, and streams of gushing water collided in a roaring whirlpool on the decks of the doomed ship. The Japanese fleet was going into immortality.

However, before their tragic death, the Japanese sailors scored a number of striking victories. The “Second Pearl Harbor” off Savo Island, the pogrom in the Java Sea, the daring raid of aircraft carriers into the Indian Ocean...

As for the famous attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base, the role of this operation is largely exaggerated by American propaganda: the US leadership needed to unite the nation in the face of the enemy. Unlike the Soviet Union, where every child understood that a terrible war was taking place on the territory of his own country, the United States had to fight a naval war on foreign shores. This is where the tale of the “terrible attack” on an American military base comes in handy.

Memorial on the hull of the lost Arizona (the battleship was launched in 1915)

In reality, Pearl Harbor was a complete failure of Japanese carrier-based aviation - the entire "success" was the sinking of four decrepit World War I battleships (two of which were raised and restored by 1944). The fifth damaged battleship, Nevada, was refloated and returned to service by the summer of 1942. In total, as a result of the Japanese raid, 18 US Navy ships were sunk or damaged, while a significant part of the “victims” escaped with only cosmetic defects.

At the same time, not a single bomb fell on:

Power plant, ship repair facilities, port cranes and mechanical workshops. This allowed the Yankees to begin restoration work within an hour after the end of the raid.

Giant dry dock 10/10 for repairing battleships and aircraft carriers. The unforgivable mistake of Japanese carrier-based aircraft would become fatal in all subsequent battles in the Pacific: with the help of their superdock, the Americans would restore damaged ships in a matter of days.

4,500,000 barrels of oil! The tank capacity of the US Navy refueling station at Pearl Harbor at that time exceeded the entire fuel reserves of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

Fuel, hospitals, berths, ammunition storage facilities - Japanese pilots “donated” the entire infrastructure of the base to the US Navy!

There is a legend about the absence of two US Navy aircraft carriers from Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack: they say, if the Japanese had sunk the Lexington and the Enterprise, the outcome of the war could have been different. This is an absolute misconception: during the war years, the US industry delivered 31 aircraft carriers to the fleet (many of which did not even have to participate in battles). Had the Japanese destroyed all aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers in Pearl Harbor, along with Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands, the outcome of the war would have been the same.

We should dwell separately on the figure of the “architect of Pearl Harbor” - Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. There is no doubt that he was an honest military man and a competent strategist, who more than once warned the Japanese leadership about the futility and disastrous consequences of the coming war with the United States. The admiral argued that even with the most favorable development of events, the Imperial Japanese Navy would last no more than a year - then the inevitable defeat and death of the Japanese Empire would follow. Admiral Yamamoto remained true to his duty - if Japan is destined to die in an unequal battle, he will do everything so that the memory of this war and the exploits of Japanese sailors will forever be remembered.

Japanese aircraft carriers on their way to Hawaii. In the foreground is "Zikaku". Ahead - "Kaga"

Some sources call Yamamoto one of the most outstanding naval commanders - around the figure of the admiral, the image of an “eastern sage” was formed, whose decisions and actions are filled with genius and “incomprehensible eternal truth.” Alas, real events showed the opposite - Admiral Yamamoto turned out to be completely mediocre in tactical issues of fleet management.

The only successful operation planned by the admiral - the attack on Pearl Harbor - demonstrated a complete lack of logic in choosing targets and disgusting coordination of the actions of Japanese aviation. Yamamoto planned a "stunning blow". But why were the fuel storage facility and infrastructure of the base untouched? - the most important objects, the destruction of which could really hamper the actions of the US Navy.

"They can't take a hit"

As Admiral Yamamoto predicted, the Japanese war machine moved forward uncontrollably for six months, bright flashes of victory one after another illuminated the Pacific theater of war. Problems began later - the continuous strengthening of the US Navy slowed down the pace of the Japanese advance. In the summer of 1942, the situation almost got out of control - Admiral Yamamoto’s tactics of fragmenting forces and separating “strike” and “anti-ship” groups of carrier-based aircraft led to the disaster at Midway.

But the real nightmare began in 1943 - the Japanese fleet suffered defeats one after another, and the shortage of ships, aircraft and fuel became more and more acute. The scientific and technological backwardness of Japan made itself felt - when trying to break through to the US Navy squadrons, Japanese planes fell from the sky like cherry petals. At the same time, the Americans confidently flew over the very masts of Japanese ships. There were not enough radars and hydroacoustic stations - more and more often Japanese ships became victims of American submarines.

The Japanese defensive perimeter was bursting at the seams - colossal reserves allowed the Americans to land troops simultaneously in different regions of the Pacific Ocean. Meanwhile... more and more new ships appeared in the vastness of the Pacific theater of operations - the US industry daily delivered a couple of new combat units (destroyers, cruisers, submarines or aircraft carriers) to the fleet.

The ugly truth about the Imperial Japanese Navy has been revealed: Admiral Yamamoto's bid for an aircraft carrier fleet has failed! In conditions of total enemy superiority, Japanese aircraft carriers perished as soon as they reached the combat zone.

Japanese carrier-based aircraft achieved notable successes in raiding operations - the raid on Ceylon or Pearl Harbor (if you do not take into account missed opportunities). The surprise factor and large combat radius of aviation made it possible to avoid return fire and return to base after successfully completing the mission.

The Japanese had an equal chance of winning squadron battles with the US Navy (Battle of the Coral Sea, Midway, Santa Cruz). Here everything was decided by the quality of training of pilots, ship crews and, most importantly, His Majesty Chance.

But in conditions of numerical superiority of the enemy (i.e., when the probability of getting under return fire was 100%), the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet did not even have a ghostly hope for any favorable outcome of the situation. The principle of “winning not by numbers, but by skill” turned out to be useless - any fire contact ended in the quick and inevitable death of the aircraft carrier.

It turned out that the once formidable aircraft carriers did not hold up at all and sank like puppies, even with little exposure to enemy fire. Sometimes, a few hits from conventional bombs were enough to sink an aircraft carrier. This was a death sentence for the Imperial Navy - aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft turned out to be extremely ineffective in a defensive war.

The disgusting survivability of aircraft carriers was best demonstrated by the Battle of Midway Atoll: a group of 30 Dontless dive bombers, under the command of Captain McCluskey, who broke through, burned two Japanese attack aircraft carriers, Akagi and Kaga, in literally a minute (their hulls, burnt out, sank in the evening ). A similar fate befell the aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu on the same day.

American attack aircraft carrier USS Bellow Wood after a kamikaze attack

Everything can be learned by comparison: in October 1944, a Japanese squadron of 12 battleships and cruisers sailed for several hours under continuous attacks from more than 500 American carrier-based aircraft. Without any air cover and with primitive air defense systems. The result was only the death of the cruiser Suzuya and heavy damage to a couple of other ships. The rest of Admiral Takeo Kurita's squadron safely left the area of ​​American aircraft and returned to Japan.

It’s even scary to imagine what would have happened if large aircraft carriers had been in place of the battleships Yamato and Nagato - a hail of small-caliber bombs would have caused uncontrollable fires on the flight and hangar decks, and then the rapid death of the ships from internal explosions.

The reason for the poor condition of the Nagato superstructure is a nuclear explosion with a power of 23 kt.
The old Japanese battleship turned out to be stronger than nuclear fire!

Admiral Kurita's squadron happily escaped destruction. And at this time, a real massacre was taking place in the vastness of the Pacific Ocean:

On June 19, 1944, the heavy aircraft carrier Taiho was sunk. The only torpedo hit from the Albacore submarine did not cause significant damage, but caused depressurization of the fuel line. A small unnoticed problem turned into a disaster - 6.5 hours after the torpedo attack, the Taiho was torn to shreds by an explosion of gasoline vapors (1,650 sailors died).
The trick was that the brand new aircraft carrier Taiho was destroyed on her first combat campaign, just three months after launching.

A day later, on June 20, 1944, the attack aircraft carrier Hiyo was lost under similar circumstances. The only difference is that the fatal torpedo was dropped by a carrier-based aircraft.

The fantastic sinking of the super-aircraft carrier Shinano 17 hours after its first departure to sea is just a common curiosity in the history of naval battles. The ship was unfinished, the bulkheads were not sealed, and the crew was not trained. However, there is a grain of humor in every joke - eyewitnesses reported that one of the torpedo hits was directly in the area of ​​jet fuel tanks. Perhaps the crew of the aircraft carrier was very lucky - at the time of sinking, the Shinano was empty.

The USS Shokaku appears to be having problems with its flight deck.

However, aircraft carriers also failed for less significant reasons. During the battle in the Coral Sea, three air bombs took the heavy aircraft carrier Shokaku out of play for a long time.

A song about the rapid destruction of Japanese aircraft carriers would not be complete without mentioning their opponents. The Americans faced the same problem - the slightest exposure to enemy fire caused terrible fires on board aircraft carriers.

In October 1944, the light aircraft carrier Princeton was completely burned out by just two 250-kg aerial bombs.

In March 1945, the aircraft carrier Franklin was seriously damaged - only two 250-kg aerial bombs hit the ship, which caused one of the largest tragedies of the US Navy in terms of the number of casualties. The bombs fell in the center of the flight deck - a fire instantly engulfed 50 aircraft, fully fueled and ready to take off. Result: 807 dead, a completely destroyed air wing, uncontrolled fires on all decks of the ship, loss of speed, a 13-degree list to the port side and the aircraft carrier was ready to sink.
The Franklin was saved only due to the absence of the main enemy forces nearby - in a real battle the ship would certainly have been sunk.

The aircraft carrier Franklin has not yet decided whether to stay afloat or sink
Survivors pack their bags and prepare for evacuation

Kamikazes hit the aircraft carrier Interpid

Fire on the aircraft carrier "Saint Lo" as a result of a kamikaze attack (the ship will die)

But the real madness began with the advent of Japanese kamikazes. “Living bombs” falling from the sky could not damage the underwater part of the hull, but the consequences of their falling onto the flight deck lined with aircraft were simply terrible.

The incident on the attack aircraft carrier Bunker Hill became a textbook case: on May 11, 1945, the ship was attacked by two kamikazes off the coast of Okinawa. In a terrible fire, Bunker Hill lost its entire air wing and more than 400 crew members.

From all these stories there is a very obvious conclusion:

The Imperial Japanese Navy was doomed - building a heavy cruiser or battleship instead of the Taiho aircraft carrier would have made no difference. The enemy had a 10-fold numerical superiority, coupled with overwhelming technical superiority. The war was already lost the moment Japanese planes struck Pearl Harbor.

However, it can be assumed that by having highly protected gunships instead of aircraft carriers, the Imperial Navy, in the situation in which it found itself at the end of the war, could prolong its agony and cause additional damage to the enemy. The American fleet easily crushed Japanese aircraft carrier groups, but every time it encountered a heavy Japanese cruiser or battleship, the US Navy had to tinker a lot.

Admiral Yamamoto's bet on aircraft carriers turned out to be disastrous. But why did the Japanese continue to build aircraft carriers until the very end of the war (even rebuilding the last Yamato-class battleship into the Shinano aircraft carrier)? The answer is simple: Japan's dying industry could not build anything more complex than an aircraft carrier. It may sound incredible, but 70 years ago an aircraft carrier was structurally quite simple and cheap, much simpler than a cruiser or battleship. No electromagnetic supercatapults or nuclear reactors. The simplest steel box for servicing the same small and simple aircraft.

True, the aircraft carrier trough will sink even from small-caliber bombs, but the crew of the aircraft carrier hopes that they will only have to fight against an obviously weak and unprepared enemy. Otherwise – the “overkill” manner.

Epilogue

Low survivability is inherent in the very idea of ​​an aircraft carrier. Aviation needs SPACE - instead, it is driven onto the cramped decks of a rocking ship and forced to carry out takeoff and landing operations with a runway length three times shorter than required. The dense layout and crowding of aircraft inevitably serves as a source of increased accident rate for an aircraft carrier, and the general lack of security and constant work with flammable substances lead to a natural result - a serious naval battle is contraindicated for an aircraft carrier.

8-hour fire aboard the USS Oriskany (1966). The explosion of a magnesium flare (!) led to a massive fire in the hangar, with the death of all the aircraft in it and 44 sailors from the ship’s crew.

The terrible fire on the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (1967), which became the largest tragedy in terms of the number of casualties in the post-war history of the US Navy (134 dead sailors).

A repetition of similar events on board the aircraft carrier Enterprise (1969).

Urgent measures were taken to increase the survivability of aircraft carrier ships, automatic deck irrigation systems and other special equipment appeared. It would seem that all the troubles are behind us.

But... 1981, unsuccessful landing of the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft. Explosions roar on the flight deck of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Nimitz, and flames rise above the ship's superstructure. 14 casualties, 48 ​​wounded. In addition to the Prowler itself and its crew, three F-14 Tomcat interceptors burned in the fire. Ten Corsair II and Intruder attack aircraft, two F-14s, three Viking anti-submarine aircraft and a Sea King helicopter were seriously damaged. Nimitz at one point lost a third of its air wing.

A similar incident on the USS Midway

An ineradicable problem with safety and survivability will haunt aircraft carriers as long as the circus called “carrier-based aviation” exists.

Japan has always attracted close attention for its uniqueness. Given its geographical location, this island country attaches great importance to the development of the navy.

Total information

In total, a little more than 45.5 thousand military personnel and 3.7 thousand civilians serve in the Japanese fleet. Of these, 8,000 are part of naval aviation. 1,100 volunteers who left military service at the end of their contracts or length of service are assigned as a permanent reserve. About 12 thousand people work in the Maritime Safety Authority (MSD).

As a small island state, Japan has a fairly powerful fleet. The Navy, photos of individual units of which can be seen in the article, is armed with an impressive number of ships and submarines. The warships of the main class are made up of squadrons based mainly on the main Yokosuka.

• The squadron with escort ships includes four flotillas where destroyers are assigned.
• The submarine division includes 2 groups of submarines.
• In addition to the Yokosuka base, the two flotillas are based at the Kure naval base.
• Flotillas engaged in the protection of coastal waters are stationed at military bases: Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and Ominato. There are only five such units. This includes obsolete destroyers and frigates, landing ships, combat boats, and auxiliary vessels.

Recruit training is carried out on training ships.

The Japanese Navy today includes a total of 447 units of various types of ships and submarines. These are combat and patrol ships, boats and support vessels, located, as already noted, at the main naval bases - Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kyure, and auxiliary ones - Maizuru, Ominato and Hanshin.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force also maintains aviation. These are airplanes - 190 units, and helicopters - 140 units. Of these, 86 are P-3C Orion patrol and anti-submarine aircraft, as well as 79 SH-60J Seahawk helicopters.

Historical reference

Until 1945, there was an Imperial Japanese Navy. It was disbanded when World War II ended and the Japanese islands came under occupation by the combined Allied forces. Japan, whose Navy was re-established only in 1952, had the right to maintain it only as a self-defense force.

The Imperial Japanese Navy, which existed since 1869, actively showed itself in the Japanese-Chinese (1894-1895), Russian-Japanese (1904-1905), the First and Second World Wars.

Before World War II, Japan had the most powerful aircraft carrier fleet on the planet, consisting of 9 aircraft carriers, then there were only seven in the North American fleet, of which four were stationed in the Atlantic Ocean. The displacement of the Japanese battleships of the Yamato class was the largest in the world. At the same time, Japan, whose Navy possessed the most modern Zero fighter for carrier-based aircraft at that time, was still significantly behind the United States in the number of battleships and other types of ships in the fleet, except for aircraft carriers. Japan's industrial capabilities were also significantly lower than those of America. In total, in 1941, Japan had in service 10 battleships, 9 aircraft carriers, 35 cruisers, 103 destroyers and 74 submarines. Accordingly, the American and British Air Force and Navy were able to demonstrate significantly more powerful forces against Japan in World War II.

The process of eliminating the Japanese Imperial Navy after defeat in the war was completely completed by 1947.

Tasks of the newly created fleet

Created as part of the Self-Defense Forces, the Japanese Navy was intended to:

• conduct combat operations with enemy naval and air groups to gain dominant influence in the sea and ocean waters off the coast of Japan;
• block strait zones in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, East China and Japan;
• conduct amphibious landing operations and provide support to ground units in the coastal area;
• protect sea communications, defend naval bases, bases, ports and coasts.

In times of peace, Japanese Navy ships guard national territorial waters, maintain a favorable operational regime in a thousand-mile ocean zone, and perform patrol duty, together with the Maritime Security Administration.

Features of the Japanese Navy

The Japanese Constitution currently prohibits self-defense forces from possessing offensive weapons (aircraft carriers, cruise missiles, etc.). At the same time, for the country's military-political elite, the framework established by the results of the war is becoming cramped.

The presence of territorial disputes with neighboring states such as Russia and China provokes the Japanese to create a full-fledged one that would be equipped with all modern weapons. Of course, this fact is given maximum disguise by the Japanese leadership.

Today, the Japanese Navy's ship composition and weapons are clearly being intensively expanded and updated. Modern weapons systems, manufactured in North America or standardized with those in service with the American naval forces, are being introduced.

Japan: Navy (structural structure)

The head of the Japanese naval forces is the commander, who is also the chief of staff, holding the rank of admiral.

Structurally, the Japanese Navy consists of headquarters, fleet, five regions, air training command, as well as formations, units and institutions under central command. The headquarters is located in an administrative complex in the capital of the state, where control centers for other branches of the military and the Ministry of Defense are also located.

In total, the headquarters staff includes 700 employees, of which about six hundred are officers and admirals.

The fleet consists of:

• headquarters located at Yokosuka Naval Base;
• three commands - escort, submarine and aviation;
• minesweeper flotillas;
• reconnaissance groups;
• experience groups;
• oceanography divisions;
• special forces patrol squad.

The fleet has a little more than a hundred warships. Here is a list of some items:

• diesel submarines - 16 pieces;
• destroyers - 44 pieces;
• frigates - 8 pcs.;
• landing ships - 7 pcs.;
• minesweepers - about 39 pcs.

The fleet is under the command of a vice admiral.

Escort force structure

The escort force, under the command of a vice admiral, is led by headquarters located at the Yokosuka naval base.

Subordinate to him are:

• flagship;
• four flotillas based at Yokosuke, Sasebo, Kure and Maizuru;
• six separate divisions of destroyers or frigates;
• units with landing ships;
• supply transports;
• ships providing combat training;
• study group.

The flotillas are headed by rear admirals, who are subordinate to the corresponding headquarters and 4 destroyers, united in divisions, divided into two types.

The first type division consists of:

• destroyer with guided weapons;
• two conventional destroyers.

The second type includes three ordinary destroyers and one with a guided missile charge.

Individual divisions have from two to five vessels. The location of the ships belonging to the frigate (destroyer) unit is one of the naval bases.

Vessels included in the supply transport division are allowed to be stationed at various bases.

Separate groups of landing ships are equipped with Osumi helicopter docks, which are located at the Kure base. In addition, each division includes six air-cushioned boats designed for landing.

The training group includes a headquarters located in Yokosuka and five training detachments distributed at various bases.

Submarine force composition

The commander of the submarine force has the rank of vice admiral and commands the following military units:

• headquarters at Yokosuke base;
• two flotillas with submarines located there and at the Kure base;
• submariner training center and training division.

Each flotilla is under the command of a rear admiral, to whom all military personnel at headquarters, on the flagship submarine mother ship, and in two or three submarine divisions (each includes 3-4 submarines) are also subordinate.

Air force structure

The location of the air command is Atsugi Air Base.

Structurally, it consists of the following divisions:

• headquarters;
• seven air wings;
• three separate squadrons;
• three detachments: two aircraft repair detachments and an air traffic control detachment;
• one mobile engineering company located at Hachinohe Air Base.

The commander of the aviation forces bears the rank of vice admiral. The chief of staff and wing commanders are rear admirals.

Aircraft wings consist of:

• headquarters;
• four squadrons: patrol, search and rescue, anti-submarine helicopter units and;
• engineering and aviation support and supply groups;
• airfield technical support units.

The 31st Air Wing is subordinate to a special detachment containing. The aviation squadron has from one to three aviation and technical detachments. The air patrol squadrons located in each air wing are armed with P-3C Orion base aircraft. SH-60 models are deployed in squadrons with anti-submarine helicopters. Search and rescue squadrons have up to three squadrons with UH-60J helicopters.

Structure of the minesweeper flotilla

The flotilla of minesweepers is subordinate to the commander - the rear admiral. It consists of a headquarters, four divisions (three - base and one - sea minesweepers), two floating bases for mine-sweeping ships and a detachment for supporting mine-sweeping operations. Each division includes from two to three ships.

Structure of other groups

The experience group is commanded by a rear admiral.

The composition of the unit is as follows:

• headquarters in Yokosuka;
• vessel division;
• three centers: the first - for the development and design of ships, the second - for control and communication systems, the third - a testing laboratory for ship weapons with a testing ground in Kagoshima.

The ocean group, in addition to the headquarters, anti-submarine defense center, meteorological support group and two coastal sonar stations, also includes ships for hydrographic research, hydroacoustic observations and cable-laying ships.

The intelligence group includes a headquarters and three departments (for collecting operational information, conducting information and analytical activities, and reconnaissance by radio-electronic means).

The special purpose patrol squad has the following tasks:

• detain and inspect ships violating territorial coastal boundaries;
• fight terrorist and sabotage groups;
• carrying out reconnaissance activities and sabotage.

Japanese Navy vs Russian Navy

Many experts are trying to make a comparative analysis of the Japanese and Russian fleets. It is taken into account that Japan has about a hundred ships and is in second place in the number of destroyers. In particular, there are two missile destroyers (10 thousand tons of displacement) and a helicopter carrier Izuto (27 thousand tons). Japan, whose Navy is peacekeeping-oriented, has a specialization in anti-submarine and air defense. The total displacement of the Japanese fleet is 405.8 thousand tons.

The Russian fleet, with a displacement of 927,120 tons, is armed with ships left over from the days of the Soviet Union. The newest destroyer is twenty years old, the oldest is fifty years old, but all submarines have been modernized and equipped with modern military equipment. Unfortunately, more than half of the ship's personnel are subject to modernization and replacement.

Japan is a key player in the Pacific theater

Japanese Navy flag

On the Sunday before last, the Japanese Navy discovered two Chinese warships heading to the Pacific Ocean off the island of Okinawa. The ships were in international waters, but their proximity to Okinawa, where American and Japanese troops are stationed, worried Tokyo. Traditionally, state navies inform neighboring states in advance about the courses of their ships, especially if the ships must pass in close proximity to the borders of these states.

This is not the first time the Chinese Navy has broken tradition. Three months earlier, two Japanese warships, while patrolling off Okinawa, discovered a flotilla of Chinese ships, including two submarines. Then a Chinese helicopter flew over the Japanese ship, which forced Tokyo to issue an official protest.

Because of these and other incidents, China enjoys a reputation as a maritime aggressor in the region, where no neighbor dares to contradict it. No one, except, perhaps, Japan, which is gradually increasing its naval power. Despite the rapid development of the Chinese fleet, the US and Japanese navies still dominate in the Pacific region. According to the policy of the ruling Democratic Party of Japan, this advantage should be maintained.

Japanese Navy

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has about 100 warships of the main classes, including 2 helicopter carriers, 18 submarines, 47 destroyers and frigates, 29 mine sweepers, 9 patrol ships and 9 landing ships with a total displacement of 432,000 tons; about 180 aircraft and 140 helicopters. The fleet personnel is 46,000 people.
In recent decades, China has focused on building large-displacement warships to replace hundreds of coastal patrol vessels. These destroyers, frigates and landing ships can operate far offshore. In addition, China is working on the former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, developing the DF-21 ballistic anti-ship missile and developing a satellite system.

Undoubtedly, China wants to be able to display its flag anywhere in the world. Another goal of the PRC is a show of force in border waters. But Beijing is not alone in pursuing a defensive strategy. Today's Japan is testing supersonic anti-ship missiles, the targets of which could well be Chinese ships. The island state has at its disposal the most modern non-nuclear submarines, which pose a danger to Chinese surface ships and submarines. In addition, Japan says it will expand its intelligence capabilities.

“China is developing means of preventing the United States from entering the region, but Japan is also doing the same in relation to China,” says Eric Wertheim, an independent military analyst and author of the popular book “The Battle Fleets of the World.”

Generally speaking, instability in the Pacific region poses a threat not only to the navies of the United States and China, but also to the navies of all states in general. According to Jim Thomas, an analyst at the Washington-based Center for a New American Security, the world is entering "an era that follows the era of military power projection." The naval strategies of states are becoming defensive in nature. And, despite the terrifying military potential of the PRC, in this light Japan looks more profitable. According to Wertheim, “the strategy of exclusion is more typical for Japan, the Japanese Navy is a more flexible and mobile force.”

This is evidenced by the fact that the Japanese Navy managed to detect Chinese ships last Sunday and in April. Japan's submarines, aircraft, satellites and surface ships are ready to track the movements of the Chinese Navy in order to transmit guidance data to Japanese or American units.

But Japan is ready not only to defend itself. The country has the potential to penetrate Chinese defenses, including intercepting DF-21 missiles. Japan's newest Kongo-class destroyers, some of the most powerful and modern ships in Asia, are equipped with radar and interceptor missiles capable of eliminating the threat of a ballistic missile attack. Kongo provides missile defense to the Japanese islands, but "these missile defense capabilities could also be used to protect American aircraft carriers in the event of hostilities," Wertheim said.

But does Japan intend to strengthen military cooperation with the United States? Last month, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama announced his resignation after failing to fulfill a campaign promise to move the Futenma US military base outside Okinawa Prefecture. Hatoyama's successor in the post, Naoto Kan, avoids touching on this issue. In the event of a crisis that could flare up due to another incident at sea, such ambiguity in relations between Japan and the United States could have a bad impact on the interaction of the armed forces of the states.

However, according to Nicholas Zhechenyi, an analyst at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Kahn government is moving in the right direction. “We are seeing an emphasis on the critical importance of the US-Japan alliance in light of the Chinese threat. Any development will be carried out in a bilateral context, perhaps through strategic dialogue between Japan and the US in the coming months,” the expert said.

On October 23–26, 1944, the Japanese fleet suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of American squadrons in Leyte Gulf, and the countdown to the final defeat of the empire began. In the photo - the battleship Yamato under a bomb attack by US aircraft, October 24, 1944

After the battle in Leyte Gulf, the Japanese fleet conducted only tactical operations. During one of them, the battleship Yamato came under attack from 227 US fleet aircraft, received 3 air bombs and up to 20 torpedo hits and exploded. The column of fire shot up 2 kilometers upward, and the smoky mushroom, 6 kilometers high, was slightly inferior to the atomic one. In the photo - the explosion of the battleship Yamato, April 7, 1945

Yamato's last voyage also marked the end of Japan's organized operations at sea. After that, the Japanese ships were finished off where they fell into the sights. Pictured is the battlecruiser Haruna, which sank in Kure Harbor, October 1945

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

The light cruiser Oedo lying on its side in the waters of the naval base in Kura. The photo was taken from an aircraft of the American aircraft carrier USS Wasp. Oedo sank on July 28, 1945 after being hit eight times by bombs.

And yet the war, which no longer had strategic meaning, continued. Western historians are baffled by the desperate determination of the Japanese to fight to the last man, to the last plane and ship. In the photo - the battle cruiser "Haruna" on a combat cruise

Until the emperor canceled the order to fight, Japan fought. When he ordered the military to lay down their arms, the nation obeyed, despite a record number of military suicides. In the photo - the battleship "Ise" on a combat cruise

Source: Kure Maritime Museum

The heavy cruiser Tone sank near Hiroshima on July 23, 1945.

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

The destroyer Akisimo, lost in Manila harbor under US air strikes on November 13, 1944

Escort aircraft carrier "Kayo" in Beppu Bay. Destroyed by B-25 Mitchell bombers from the aircraft carrier Ticanderoga on July 24, 1945

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

Aircraft carrier "Amagi". Attacked during a raid on Kure on July 28, 1945, sank on July 29

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

The aircraft carrier "Amagi" in the forests before being dismantled for metal. June 1, 1946

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

Battleship Nagato in the Yokosuka roadstead. He was captured by the Americans as a trophy and sent to Bikini Atoll to participate in nuclear weapons testing - an underwater explosion as part of Operation Crossroad. Photo from 1946

Source: U.S. Naval Historical Center

The explosion of a 40-kiloton atomic bomb at a depth of 27 meters near Bikini Atoll. At the foot of the water “mushroom” you can see the silhouettes of ships. Even the Yamato never died so spectacularly

The date of birth of the Imperial Japanese Navy is considered to be June 1869, when, after the end of the civil war, all the ships captured from the shogunists and received by the emperor from clans loyal to him were brought under a single command. The fleet consisted of the French-built armored ram Kotetsu (later Azuma), purchased in the USA in 1867, the gunboat Chiodogata, the corvette Yoshun, four wheeled and four sailing ships. A year later, they were joined by the armored corvette Ryuzo, built in Scotland for the fleet of the American southern states and purchased by the Japanese Prince Hizen. But it was not until 1875, when, under the influence of difficult relations with Korea, it was decided to build a modern naval force, Japan adopted its first shipbuilding program. Due to the weakness of their industry, orders for the construction of large ships (casemate battleship Fuso, armored corvettes Kongo and Hiei) and 4 destroyers (in 1879) were given to English firms. Small ships with wooden hulls began to be built by a military shipyard in Yokosuka, which was led by French specialists.

In 1882, Japan was able to adopt a more extensive 8-year program that included the construction of 46 warships, the construction of shipyards and factories, and the training of officers, sailors and naval technical personnel. Since the French “Young School”, which denied the importance of battleships in naval warfare, was then popular in the management of the fleet, only cruisers, gunboats and destroyers were built under this program: 14 ships, including two cruisers, in Japan, the rest in England and France. However, the deterioration of Japanese-Chinese relations in the early 1890s forced Japan to order two powerful battleships from England to counter those existing in China.

When the Sino-Japanese War began in 1894, not all new ships had time to enter service. Nevertheless, the Japanese fleet, which was based on high-speed cruisers with rapid-fire artillery, managed to defeat the strongest, but poorly prepared enemy. Combat experience allowed the Japanese to draw two very important conclusions: the need for good armoring of ships intended for squadron combat; and about the usefulness in such a battle of a high-speed detachment with sufficiently powerful weapons and protection. Based on these conclusions, Japan began to build up its naval forces when a new, more dangerous rival appeared on the horizon - Russia.

Although Japan won the war with China, under pressure from Russia, which was supported by Germany and France, it was forced to take a modest position in the peace negotiations, losing most of its claims. But, having received indemnity and Anglo-American loans, the Japanese immediately began to prepare for a new war, this time with the “Great Northern Neighbor”.

Despite the absence of combat losses, the receipt of several Chinese ships and the completion of all those ordered before the war, the fleet of the Land of the Rising Sun in 1895 was inferior to the Russian one, which also had large reserves in the Baltic and Black Sea. Therefore, the shipbuilding program of 1896, designed for 10 years, included 4 even more powerful battleships, 6 turret armored and 6 armored cruisers, 23 fighters and 63 destroyers. All large ships (except for 3 armored cruisers), 16 fighters and most of the destroyers were built abroad, taking into account the latest achievements of naval technology and, basically, the program was completed ahead of schedule. Russia's retaliatory steps forced Japan in 1903 to order an additional 3 battleships and armored cruisers, as well as 2 armored cruisers. But at the beginning of 1904, given that the Russian program of 1898 was still far from being completed, the Japanese decided to start a war without waiting for these last ships to be ready. As an emergency measure, however, they managed to buy two armored cruisers built for Argentina in Italy, further increasing their advantage over the Russian Pacific squadron based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

Note: the text of the section is published based on the book: S. Suliga Ships of the Russian - Japanese War of 1904-1905. Part 2. Japanese fleet

Photo archives